Thus, it was necessary for both the trial judge and the jury to hear the psychiatrist's testimony to enable the judge to pass upon the question of competency, and, in view of the finding of competency, for the jury to pass upon the issue of credibility. See State v. Jensen, 5 Wn. App. 636, 489 P.2d 1136 (1971); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the facts of this case.

This court has said that "unsound mind," as used here, means total lack of comprehension or the inability to distinguish between right and wrong. Accord State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (equating "unsound mind" with "insanity"). If the definition of "unsound mind" in CR 60(b)(2) was to have a different meaning than in CrR 6.12(c), we believe the drafters would have included a definition.

This court has said that "unsound mind", as used here, means total lack of comprehension or the inability to distinguish between right and wrong. State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967); State v. Hardung, 161 Wn. 379, 297 P. 167 (1931). We said in State v. Moorison, 43 Wn.2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953) that where a person has been adjudicated insane, a presumption of incompetency arises, rebuttable by the person offering the witness.

Even if Knoud's alleged incapacity at the time of the 2002 sales agreement is relevant to the propriety of the quiet title judgment Knoud sought to vacate, it does not appear that Knoud presented substantial evidence of the 2002 incapacity. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (persons of unsound mind include only those who are commonly called insane and those without comprehension at all, not those whose comprehension is merely limited). Everyone is presumed sane, and this presumption is overcome only by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

In determining the competency of a mentally disabled 14-year-old, the test set forth in Allen applies. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (applying Allen test to a 14-year-old mentally disabled female, alleged by the defendant to have a mental age less than 10 years old).Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

See also, e.g., In re Dependency of AEP, 135 Wn.2d 208, 223, 956 P.2d 297 (1998); Jenkins v. Snohomish County PUD, 105 Wn.2d 99, 101, 713 P.2d 79 (1986); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967); State v. Hunsaker, 39 Wn. App. 489, 491, 693 P.2d 724 (1984); State v. Smith, 30 Wn. App. 251, 253, 633 P.2d 137 (1981). Under any of these formulations, the competency of a witness turns on three basic preliminary questions of fact.

The determination of whether a child witness is competent is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803, 650 P.2d 201 (1982); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). [2] The test for competency of a young child as a witness consists of the following:

As noted previously, the term "unsound mind", refers only to those with no comprehension at all, not to those with merely limited comprehension or a history of mental disorders. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (fact that witness attended school for the mentally retarded and was of limited mental capacity held not to constitute evidence of "unsound mind" within the meaning of the statute). Evidence of the special living arrangements of Thompson and Osborne, without more, simply does not permit the inference that they have "no comprehension at all."

(Italics omitted.) State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967), quoting State v. Hardung, 161 Wn. 379, 381, 297 P. 167 (1931). Thus, although of "unsound mind," a witness may possess sufficient comprehension regarding certain matters so as to be competent to testify as to them.

In other words, the statutory term refers to those who are without comprehension at all, not to those whose comprehension is merely limited. State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). Williams contends that he should have been permitted full cross-examination and the use of the witness' testimony at the second trial to impeach her testimony at the first trial.