State v. Wyse

15 Citing cases

  1. State v. Froehlich

    96 Wn. 2d 301 (Wash. 1981)   Cited 37 times
    Holding expert testimony explaining mental condition permissible to impeach witness whose "mental disability ... is clearly apparent and [their] competency is a central issue in the case"

    Thus, it was necessary for both the trial judge and the jury to hear the psychiatrist's testimony to enable the judge to pass upon the question of competency, and, in view of the finding of competency, for the jury to pass upon the issue of credibility. See State v. Jensen, 5 Wn. App. 636, 489 P.2d 1136 (1971); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the facts of this case.

  2. In re Kranches v. Kranches

    163 Wn. App. 1006 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)

    This court has said that "unsound mind," as used here, means total lack of comprehension or the inability to distinguish between right and wrong. Accord State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (equating "unsound mind" with "insanity"). If the definition of "unsound mind" in CR 60(b)(2) was to have a different meaning than in CrR 6.12(c), we believe the drafters would have included a definition.

  3. State v. Smith

    97 Wn. 2d 801 (Wash. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    In Smith, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court held that the record contained a "solid foundation" for the trial court's determination of competency where, although retarded, the witness was "able to understand the obligation to tell the truth on the witness stand, and... was able to relate the basic facts of the incident."

    This court has said that "unsound mind", as used here, means total lack of comprehension or the inability to distinguish between right and wrong. State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967); State v. Hardung, 161 Wn. 379, 297 P. 167 (1931). We said in State v. Moorison, 43 Wn.2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953) that where a person has been adjudicated insane, a presumption of incompetency arises, rebuttable by the person offering the witness.

  4. Johnson v. Knoud

    150 Wn. App. 1030 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)

    Even if Knoud's alleged incapacity at the time of the 2002 sales agreement is relevant to the propriety of the quiet title judgment Knoud sought to vacate, it does not appear that Knoud presented substantial evidence of the 2002 incapacity. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (persons of unsound mind include only those who are commonly called insane and those without comprehension at all, not those whose comprehension is merely limited). Everyone is presumed sane, and this presumption is overcome only by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

  5. State v. S.J.W

    149 Wn. App. 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 10 times

    In determining the competency of a mentally disabled 14-year-old, the test set forth in Allen applies. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (applying Allen test to a 14-year-old mentally disabled female, alleged by the defendant to have a mental age less than 10 years old).Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

  6. State v. Karpenski

    94 Wn. App. 80 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 46 times
    In State v. Karpenski, 94 Wn.App. 80, 122, 971 P.2d 553 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 63 P.3d 765 (2003), the trial court found the child's hearsay statements to be unreliable where each statement of abuse "came after numerous equivocal responses" and were "accompanied by highly inconsistent responses demonstrating an extremely confused state of mind."

    See also, e.g., In re Dependency of AEP, 135 Wn.2d 208, 223, 956 P.2d 297 (1998); Jenkins v. Snohomish County PUD, 105 Wn.2d 99, 101, 713 P.2d 79 (1986); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967); State v. Hunsaker, 39 Wn. App. 489, 491, 693 P.2d 724 (1984); State v. Smith, 30 Wn. App. 251, 253, 633 P.2d 137 (1981). Under any of these formulations, the competency of a witness turns on three basic preliminary questions of fact.

  7. State v. Pham

    75 Wn. App. 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that a defendant does not have "a constitutional right to a certified interpreter"

    The determination of whether a child witness is competent is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803, 650 P.2d 201 (1982); State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 437, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). [2] The test for competency of a young child as a witness consists of the following:

  8. State v. Watkins

    71 Wn. App. 164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    In Watkins, the court held that where the record showed that the witnesses were capable of recalling and recounting the events in question, no sua sponte duty existed to inquire into whether the witnesses were of unsound mind.

    As noted previously, the term "unsound mind", refers only to those with no comprehension at all, not to those with merely limited comprehension or a history of mental disorders. See State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 429 P.2d 121 (1967) (fact that witness attended school for the mentally retarded and was of limited mental capacity held not to constitute evidence of "unsound mind" within the meaning of the statute). Evidence of the special living arrangements of Thompson and Osborne, without more, simply does not permit the inference that they have "no comprehension at all."

  9. State v. Smith

    30 Wn. App. 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    (Italics omitted.) State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967), quoting State v. Hardung, 161 Wn. 379, 381, 297 P. 167 (1931). Thus, although of "unsound mind," a witness may possess sufficient comprehension regarding certain matters so as to be competent to testify as to them.

  10. State v. Williams

    9 Wn. App. 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 8 times

    In other words, the statutory term refers to those who are without comprehension at all, not to those whose comprehension is merely limited. State v. Wyse, 71 Wn.2d 434, 436, 429 P.2d 121 (1967). Williams contends that he should have been permitted full cross-examination and the use of the witness' testimony at the second trial to impeach her testimony at the first trial.