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State v. Wright

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three
Mar 31, 2005
126 Wn. App. 1045 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)

Opinion

No. 22756-1-III

Filed: March 31, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No: 03-1-02905-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/14/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Tari S. Eitzen.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Mark Charles Prothero, Attorney at Law, 421 W Riverside Ave Ste 868, Spokane, WA 99201-0402.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Kevin Michael Korsmo, Attorney at Law, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-2043.

Andrew J. III Metts, Spokane County Pros Office, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-0270.


Sean Michael Wright appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

On January 25, 2003, while on routine patrol, Spokane police officers Aaron Ames and Tyler Cordis saw two cars parked in a dark area, near the intersection of North Foothills Drive. One of the cars belonged to Mr. Wright. The officers checked the registration on Mr. Wright's car and found it was clear. The two cars then drove away. Mr. Wright drove east on North Foothills in the right lane, while the officers were in the left lane. Mr. Wright then made a right turn without signaling. The officers stopped him for failing to signal properly.

When the officers approached the car, they saw a bottle of alcohol inside. They also noticed Mr. Wright had an open bottle of cologne in his lap. Both officers detected the odor of burning marijuana in the car. Mr. Wright was arrested for minor in possession of alcohol. In a search incident to the arrest, the officers discovered an unlocked backpack on the passenger floorboard. Inside the backpack, the officers found several bags of marijuana.

Mr. Wright was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Claiming the stop was pretextual and the officers engaged in a warrantless search, he moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied his motion. Mr. Wright was convicted after a bench trial on stipulated facts. This appeal follows.

Mr. Wright claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. On appeal of a superior court's suppression order, this court reviews only those factual findings to which the appellant has assigned error. State v. O'Day, 91 Wn. App. 244, 247, 955 P.2d 860 (1998). Because Mr. Wright has not assigned error to the superior court's findings, we accept as verities the court's determination as to the `factual events and happenings,' but independently examine the legal issues raised by those findings. Id. We also give great significance to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Ozuna, 80 Wn. App. 684, 691, 911 P.2d 395, review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1030 (1996).

Mr. Wright contends the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because the initial stop of his car was pretextual. RCW 46.61.021(2) authorizes officers to detain persons for traffic infractions `for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction.' A traffic detention is a seizure and must have been justified in its inception to be lawful. State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 628-29, 811 P.2d 241 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 739, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1007 (1991).

The detention must be based on `a well founded suspicion based on objective facts' that the person is violating the law. State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980). An officer's suspicions will justify a search only if he can `point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.' Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. An officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle if he has probable cause to believe the driver has committed a traffic violation. State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 259, 970 P.2d 376 (1999), review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1009 (1999).

RCW 46.61.305 provides in pertinent part:

(1) No person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.

(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

RCW 46.61.305(1), (2). This statute and RCW 46.61.021 authorize an officer to stop the driver of a vehicle who fails to signal his intent to turn for at least 100 feet before making the turn. As reflected in the unchallenged findings of fact, Mr. Wright failed to signal for at least 100 feet before making a right turn. The officers' conduct was objectively reasonable. Mr. Wright has presented no evidence the officers had a subjective reason to initiate the stop. In these circumstances, the stop was not pretexual. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358-59, 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

Mr. Wright next contends the officers engaged in a warrantless search of the backpack located in his car. `As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.' Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 736 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)). One exception to the general rule is a search incident to a lawful arrest. `During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence.' State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). The Fourth Amendment permits a search of all containers found in the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981). Under Washington Constitution article I, section 7, officers may search the passenger compartment, but may not search any locked containers found inside the compartment. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 457, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). A lawful custodial arrest, however, must precede any such incidental search. State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 587, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). Here, Mr. Wright does not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest for being a minor in possession of alcohol. Thus, the warrantless search of the unlocked backpack in the car was permitted as a search incident to Mr. Wright's arrest.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

SCHULTHEIS, J. and KURTZ, J., Concur.


Summaries of

State v. Wright

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three
Mar 31, 2005
126 Wn. App. 1045 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
Case details for

State v. Wright

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SEAN M. WRIGHT, Appellant

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three

Date published: Mar 31, 2005

Citations

126 Wn. App. 1045 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
126 Wash. App. 1045