Opinion
No. COA11–1292.
2012-05-15
STATE of North Carolina v. Anthony WRIGHT.
Attorney General Roy Cooper by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State. Anne Bleyman, attorney for defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered upon jury convictions by Judge John E. Nobles in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 April 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State. Anne Bleyman, attorney for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Anthony Wright (defendant) appeals from judgments entered upon jury convictions of 1) first-degree murder, 2) first-degree kidnapping, 3) second-degree kidnapping, and 4) attempted first-degree murder. After careful consideration, we find no error.
Mary Bennett lived just outside of New Bern with her 17–year–old great niece, Shakeia Downing. Mary's grandson, Daniel Winston, also lived with them for some time, but he later moved to a house nearby. Shakeia's mother, Michelle, lived next door to Mary.
Sometime in 2009, defendant was hired to perform repair work to Michelle's home. Defendant was allowed to stay in the house while completing the repair work. After the repairs were completed, defendant continued to reside in the house to assist Michelle. Michelle suffered from many health problems, and she died that same year. Defendant continued to live at the house after her death. He often visited Mary's house, and defendant and Shakeia began a relationship.
On the evening of 19 August 2009, Mary's grandson, Daniel, took a cab to Mary's house for the night. Defendant and Daniel then got into an altercation. Mary heard a gunshot and saw blood coming out of Daniel's mouth. She turned to defendant, and he said “I didn't mean to shoot that boy.” Defendant then prohibited Shakeia from calling an ambulance, and he also prohibited Mary from leaving the house. He told Mary the he would shoot her if she left. Defendant kept Mary and Shakeia in the house for several hours. He then told Shakeia to pack a bag and to leave. As she left the house, she heard a gunshot. She then looked inside and saw her grandmother on the floor, bleeding from her head.
Defendant forced Shakeia to stay at Michelle's house with him for the remainder of the night. The next day, defendant told Shakeia to go to school and to “act normal.” He also instructed her to say that “the cab driver did all the shooting.” Defendant then returned to Mary's house, where he ran into her neighbor who was passing by. Defendant told the neighbor that he saw blood inside the house and he asked her if she had seen Mary. The neighbor quickly called the police. She and defendant then approached the front door to Mary's house. Around this time, Mary, who had not died from her injuries, began talking. When she saw defendant, she pointed at him and said “[h]e killed my grandson. He killed my grandson. He killed Tony. He killed—I mean, killed Junior.” Defendant denied this statement, but Mary continued to say “[y]ou shot Junior. You shot Junior. Get off my property. Get off my property. You shot him. Sandra, get him off my property. He shot Junior.”
Defendant was arrested on 20 October 2009. On 22 March 2010, he was charged, by a “short-form” indictment, with 1) murder, 2) attempted murder, 3) first-degree kidnapping, and 4) second-degree kidnapping. On 7 March 2011, defendant's case came on for trial by jury. During the trial, defendant took the stand to testify on his own behalf. On the stand, defendant denied shooting Mary and Daniel. Defendant also chose to affirm that he was telling the truth, rather than to swear on the Bible. During the State's closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced defendant's decision to not swear on the Bible. Defendant objected to this statement, but the trial court overruled that objection.
On 7 March 2011, defendant was convicted of all charges and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree murder. His remaining convictions were consolidated, and he was sentenced to a minimum term of 251 to 311 months' imprisonment to run consecutively with the life term. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in overruling his objection to the State's closing arguments. Specifically, defendant argues that during the State's closing arguments, the prosecutor asserted that defendant lied when he testified and that this remark violated defendant's rights. We disagree.
The standard of review for improper closing arguments that provoke timely objection from opposing counsel is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sustain the objection. In order to assess whether a trial court has abused its discretion when deciding a particular matter, this Court must determine if the ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that “wide latitude must be given to counsel in their [closing] arguments[.]” State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 657, 157 S.E.2d 335, 344 (1967). But, “[i]t is improper for a lawyer in his argument to assert his opinion that a witness is lying. He can argue to the jury that they should not believe a witness, but he should not call him a liar.” Miller, 271 N.C. at 659, 157 S.E.2d at 345.
In State v. Tyler, our Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statements, that the defendant put his “hand on the Bible and told about 35,000 whoppers [,]” was “no more than an argument that the jury should reject the defendant's testimony because his version of the events [was] unbelievable.” State v. Tyler, 346 N.C. 187, 207, 208, 485 S.E.2d 599, 610 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted).
Here, the prosecutor argued that “it's fortunate that [ ] he chose to be affirmed when he took the witness stand, for if he had put his hand on the Holy Bible and swore to tell the truth, it probably would have burst into flames.” We find this comment to be similar to the comments made by the prosecutor in Tyler. Both statements provided similar inferences, and in each case the State did not specifically call defendant a liar. Instead, the State simply implied to the jury that it should not believe defendant's version of the events.
While we strongly advise against such comments, we are unable to agree that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sustain the objection here. And we conclude that the trial court did not err with regards to this issue.
Defendant next argues that his conviction for first-degree murder must be vacated because the “short-form” indictment did not allege the elements of first-degree murder. As such, defendant argues that the “short-form” indictment violated his rights to due process, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter judgment on the first-degree murder charge. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this argument. “[I]ndictments for murder based on the short-form indictment statute are in compliance with both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions .... the short-form indictment is sufficient to charge first-degree murder on the basis of any of the theories[.]” State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174–75, 531 S.E.2d 428, 437 (2000) (citations omitted).
Here, the indictment complied with the requirements of our General Statutes. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15–144 (2011). Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument.
No error. Judges GEER and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).