State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 215, 689 P.2d 153, 158 (1984) ("Tactical decisions require the skill, training, and experience of the advocate. A criminal defendant, generally inexperienced in the workings of the adversarial process, may be unaware of the redeeming or devastating effect a proffered witness can have on his or her case."); see also State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 503, 600 P.2d 1133, 1135 (App. 1979) (stating an attorney's decision whether or not to call a witness was a tactical decision the court was reluctant to second-guess); see, e.g., State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶¶ 28-29, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005) (stating that an indigent defendant "is not entitled to counsel of choice or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney," and disagreements in trial strategy do not constitute an irreconcilable conflict). In the criminal context, personal rights that may not be waived by counsel include: "whether to plead guilty, whether to waive a jury trial and whether to testify.

State v. Flores, 140 Ariz. 469, 475, 682 P.2d 1136, 1142 (App. 1984). See also State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596, 599, 592 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1979) (no prejudice resulted to defendant from his counsel's failure to interview victim prior to trial); State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 504, 600 P.2d 1133, 1136 (App. 1979) (counsel's failure to interview victims did not render his assistance ineffective because counsel "was prepared to cross-examine the victims and . . . the cross-examination was effective"). Defense counsel often may obtain information concerning a victim's expected testimony from sources other than the victim, such as police reports, interviews with other witnesses, preliminary hearings, and grand jury transcripts.

There are a number of reasons why an attorney may choose not to call a witness, including a concern that the witness may perjure himself "or that his participation in the defense may harm the defendant more than his testimony, * * *, will aid him." State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 503, 600 P.2d 1133, 1135 (App. 1979). Unless the defendant is able to show that counsel's decision was not a tactical one but, rather, revealed ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation, ABA commentary to Rule 4-5.

It is important to note that this is not a case in which we are asked to determine if counsel was ineffective because he made a tactical decision not to call a proffered witness. See Vess v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953, 86 S.Ct. 1215, 16 L.Ed.2d 214 (1966); State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 600 P.2d 1133 (App. 1979). Disagreements in trial tactics will not support a claim of ineffectiveness provided the conduct has some reasoned basis.

Thus counsel explored the insanity defense and made a strategic decision not to pursue it. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may not be predicated upon disagreements as to trial strategy. State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28, 612 P.2d 484 (1980); State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 600 P.2d 1133 (App. 1979); State v. Cufio, 12 Ariz. App. 461, 471 P.2d 763 (1970); see also Saunders v. Eyman, 600 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1977). As for the defense of intoxication, counsel raised that question in cross-examining the state's witnesses, and the jury was properly instructed as to the effect of intoxication on a person's mental state.

But such inferences must be based on the record in the case and our case law generally. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 (1985) (under first prong of Strickland, courts may "consult various sources" in determining reasonableness); State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 502-03 (App. 1979) (considering whether appellant's attorney made tactical decision not to use witness testimony based on "the facts in the record"). Otherwise, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary.

And courts are particularly "reluctant to second-guess the attorney" "when the question is whether or not to call a particular witness." State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 503, 600 P.2d 1133, 1135 (App. 1979).

He concludes the remaining witnesses were "suppressed and held favorable evidence to [his] defense." He does not cite to the record in support of his contention, and our review of the record reveals no support for it. Cf. State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 503, 600 P.2d 1133, 1135 (App. 1979) (the decision whether to call a witness is a strategic one). ¶16 Fields also takes issue with certain items of evidence and asserts error because the State "relied solely on circumstantial evidence and inference." However, a criminal conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence.

" (internal citations omitted)); State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28, 33, 612 P.2d 484, 489 (1980) ("[T]he power to control trial strategy belongs to counsel."(citations omitted)); State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 502-03, 600 P.2d 1133, 1134-35 (1979) (finding an attorney's decision whether to call a witness a tactical decision the court was reluctant to second-guess); Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that a waiver of the right to cross examination and confrontation "may be accomplished by the accused's counsel as a matter of trial tactics or strategy." (citations omitted)).

Additionally, trial counsel's decision not to call some of the witnesses purportedly requested by appellant to testify presents, at most, a disagreement between defense counsel and his client as to trial tactics and does not provide grounds for finding that counsel's representation was inadequate. See State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 600 P.2d 1133 (1979); State v. Pietsch, 109 Ariz. 261, 508 P.2d 337 (1973). Viewing trial counsel's representation in its entirety we are of the opinion that appellant was accorded effective assistance of counsel.