[3] Since we hold that the initial stop was improper, all evidence seized as a result of that stop must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); State v. Woods, 3 Wn. App. 420, 475 P.2d 573 (1970). The Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Thus, a search of an illegally parked automobile by police, to inspect its certificate of registration conducted in the absence of its driver, which revealed evidence of a burglary upon which a warrant was obtained for the search of a house was held good in a case pointing out the differences under the constitution between one's house and his automobile. See State v. Woods, 3 Wn. App. 420, 475 P.2d 573 (1970). And other valid regulatory measures are in effect pertaining to vehicular registration, capacity, equipment and safety devices.
We accept the trial court's determination, but do not independently decide, that the snapshot was unlawfully seized. See, however: State v. Gibson, 76 Wn.2d 814, 459 P.2d 22 (1969); State v. Woods, 3 Wn. App. 420, 475 P.2d 573 (1970).[1] Prior to evaluating the totality of circumstances in the case at bench, we should note that this is not a so-called "pure" identification case.
[1] The sole issue on appeal is: Was the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, consisting of the suits, tools, and furs, proper? It has long been settled that objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. State v. Woods, 3 Wn. App. 420, 475 P.2d 573 (1970); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 88 S.Ct. 992 (1968). Officer Kelleher stated that no one was under arrest until the furs were discovered, and that at no time was he afraid either occupant possessed weapons or that defendant would be able to drive away.
after receiving Miranda warnings in the presence of his attorney, stated that he had bought the guns found in the car for $125. The defendant moved below that the evidence objected to be suppressed because he asserts that, under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969), in effect at the date of arrest ( Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 91 S.Ct. 1148 (1971)), once the arrestees were placed in the officers' car, the right to search incident to the arrest terminated since the arrestees could not then obtain any weapon from nor destroy any evidence from within the Cadillac car. He contends that under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the later search of the car and the seizure therefrom of the articles introduced in evidence, albeit pursuant to a search warrant, were illegal. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048, 83 S.Ct. 1899 (1963); State v. Woods, 3 Wn. App. 420, 475 P.2d 573 (1970). See also, State v. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 470 P.2d 552 (1970).