Opinion
A-14395 7128
09-11-2024
STATE OF ALASKA, Petitioner, v. CHRISTOPHER ISAIAH WOODCOX, Respondent.
Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Petitioner. Jason Weiner, Jason Weiner & Associates, PC, Fairbanks, for the Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Petition for Review from the District Court, No. 4FA-23-01775 CR Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Maria P. Bahr, Judge.
Appearances:
Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Petitioner.
Jason Weiner, Jason Weiner & Associates, PC, Fairbanks, for the Respondent.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HARBISON, Judge .
Christopher Isaiah Woodcox is charged with one count of misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). Under AS 28.35.030(b)(1), a defendant who has been convicted of misdemeanor DUI is subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence if the person has been "previously convicted" of DUI or refusal to submit to a chemical test.
AS 28.35.030(a).
AS 28.35.030(b)(1), (w)(4).
After Woodcox was charged with misdemeanor DUI, he filed a motion contending that a previous conviction he received for drunken driving, entered in 2022 by a military court, should not subject him to sentencing as a second DUI offender in Alaska. The district court agreed, ruling, inter alia, that Woodcox's military conviction did not qualify as a previous conviction because the State had not established that the conviction was for a crime that has "elements similar" to DUI under Alaska law. The court also suggested that Woodcox's conviction may have been entered in violation of Woodcox's fundamental rights.
The State petitioned this Court for review of the district court's ruling. For the reasons we explain in this opinion, we grant the State's petition and reverse the district court's order ruling that Woodcox has not been "previously convicted" for purposes of establishing his mandatory minimum sentence under AS 28.35.030(b)(1).
Background facts and proceedings
A defendant convicted of misdemeanor DUI is subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence if they have been "previously convicted." Under AS 28.35.030(w)(4)(A), a defendant is "previously convicted" if, in relevant part, they were convicted within the preceding fifteen years of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a law or ordinance with "similar elements" to AS 28.35.030(a).
AS 28.35.030(b)(1).
Woodcox was charged in this case with misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, he filed a motion requesting a court finding that his prior conviction, which was entered in military court under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), would not enhance the mandatory minimum penalty for his pending DUI if he were convicted. As support for his request, Woodcox attached several documents from his military case which he said were provided by the State. These documents included "Charge Sheet[s]," a "Request for Trial Before Military Judge Alone," and an "Entry of Judgment" against him that was signed by a military judge. In his motion, Woodcox did not challenge the authenticity of these documents; rather, he argued that the documents did not establish that he had been "previously convicted" for sentencing purposes.
Woodcox acknowledged that the Entry of Judgment showed that he had entered pleas to "all but a few of the charges" listed, that the other charges were "withdrawn and dismissed," and that he pleaded to "being 'drunk' and driving a truck." However, relying on this Court's opinion in Lee v. State, Woodcox asserted that the judgment did not establish that his prior offense had "the same elements or constitutional safeguards as a driving under the influence charge in Alaska."
Lee v. State, 507 P.3d 483 (Alaska App. 2022).
The State opposed Woodcox's motion, pointing out that in Lee, this Court determined that a prior military conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea could be used to enhance a minimum sentence in Alaska if the defendant was afforded the right to an attorney. In his reply, Woodcox confusingly responded that (1) the judgment did not indicate that he had entered a guilty plea to the charge of drunken driving; (2) the judgment did not specify whether he was convicted of drunken driving (or instead, of reckless driving); (3) the elements of drunken driving under 10 U.S.C. § 913 are different from the elements of Alaska's DUI law, and (4) the judgment did not indicate that he was afforded the right to counsel. (10 U.S.C. § 913 is commonly referred to as Article 113 of the UCMJ. The parties and trial court judge appeared to use both terms interchangeably. We refer to the statute as 10 U.S.C. § 913 throughout this opinion for clarity.)
In Lee, we left unanswered the question of whether a military conviction could be used to enhance the applicable sentencing range if the defendant had been convicted by a jury under Article 25 of the UCMJ. Id. at 497.
The district court initially denied Woodcox's motion. But Woodcox filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the court had ruled prior to receiving his reply (which had been filed three days late).
After reviewing Woodcox's motion for reconsideration and the State's response, the district court reversed its prior ruling, finding that Woodcox was not "previously convicted" of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a law or ordinance with "similar elements" to AS 28.35.030(a). The court found that the State had not shown the following: that Woodcox had been convicted based on a guilty plea rather than a trial; that Woodcox had been convicted of drunken driving rather than reckless driving; and that Woodcox had been represented by counsel. The court also ruled that, because it could not determine which offense Woodcox was convicted of, it was unable to determine whether the elements of the previous offense were similar to those set out in Alaska's DUI statute. The court thus determined that, if Woodcox was convicted of the pending DUI, the court would sentence Woodcox as a first DUI offender.
After this ruling, the State filed a petition for review in this Court, arguing that the district court erred when it determined that Woodcox's military conviction could not be considered a "previous conviction."
Although interlocutory review is not a matter of right, we conclude that our discretionary review is appropriate in this case. We accordingly grant the State's petition for review and, for the reasons explained in this opinion, we reverse the district court's determination that Woodcox has not been "previously convicted" for purposes of establishing the applicable mandatory minimum sentence under AS 28.35.030(b)(1).
Woodcox was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
According to the State, Woodcox pleaded guilty to drunken driving in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 913. This statute provides:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who -
(1) operates or physically controls any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in a reckless or wanton manner or while impaired by a substance . . ., or
(2) operates or is in actual physical control of any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath is equal to or exceeds the applicable limit under subsection (b),
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 913(a) (emphasis added).
To support its claim that Woodcox pleaded guilty to drunken driving, the State primarily relies on two documents that were filed as exhibits during the trial court proceedings: a "Statement of Trial Results" (dated February 28, 2022) and an "Entry of Judgment" (dated May 2, 2022). We accordingly describe these documents in some detail.
Both of these documents were signed by a military judge, and they both indicate that the "Sentence/Acquittal Date" was February 24, 2022. Both documents state, on the first page, that they were entered after a "Special Court-Martial" and that the sentencing forum was a military judge.
The Statement of Trial Results includes a chart that specifically describes several pieces of information about the charges, including the "pleas." The chart is prefaced with an explanation stating that it includes a "[s]ummary of charge(s), specification(s), pleas, and findings" and contains columns labeled "Charge(s)," "Arraigned Offense(s)," "P," and "F."
The Entry of Judgment likewise includes a description of the "Findings and Sentence" in a nearly identical chart, which also contains columns labeled "Charge(s)," "Arraigned Offense(s)," "P," and "F." Both charts also contain columns listing the length of confinement and the fine that were ordered by the court.
The district court found that these documents were unclear and confusing. But we do not share the court's confusion. The Statement of Trial Results specifically includes the defendant's "pleas," and has a column labeled "P." This column has cells containing either "G" or "NG," clearly corresponding to a plea of "guilty" or "not guilty." Each time the plea column lists Woodcox's plea as "NG" (not guilty), the "F" (findings) column indicates that the charge was "[w]ithdrawn and dismissed (with prejudice)" and the "Confinement" column states "N/A." By contrast, each time the plea column lists Woodcox's plea as "G" (guilty), the "F" column also indicates "G" (guilty) and the "Confinement" column sets out a term ranging from 6 months to 9 months. The Entry of Judgment follows a similar pattern.
See Walter B. Huffman & Richard D. Rosen, Military Law: Criminal Justice & Administrative Process § 11:2 (2022) (recognizing that the "Statement of Trial Results" in military proceedings includes the accused's pleas).
The chart contains a column, titled "Fine," that states "N/A" for all of the listed charges.
Relevant to this case is the entry for what was originally numbered as Charge VI. For this charge, both documents contain the same description of the "arraigned offense," stating that Woodcox "[d]id . . . physically control a vehicle, to wit: a passenger truck, while drunk." Furthermore, on both documents, this entry cites to "Art:113" - referring to Article 113 of the UCMJ (which, as noted earlier, is another way to reference 10 U.S.C. § 913). After this description of the offense, the documents indicate in the plea column that Woodcox pleaded "G" to this charge, and they indicate in the findings column that the court found him "G" of committing this offense. The documents then indicate in the "Confinement" column that Woodcox was sentenced to 6 months for this offense, concurrent with the sentences on Charges II, IV, VII, and VIII (i.e., the other charges to which he pleaded guilty and was found guilty).
The district court also found that the documents did not clearly state which subsection of 10 U.S.C. § 913 Woodcox was convicted of violating. The court noted that 10 U.S.C. § 913 contains two separate offenses: subsection (a)(1) sets out the offense of reckless driving (i.e., "operat[ing] or physically control[ing] any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in a reckless or wanton manner"), while subsection (a)(2) sets out the offense of drunken driving (i.e., being in "actual physical control of any vehicle . . . while drunk"). The district court also noted that, in the column listing the charge against Woodcox, the military documents do not list which of these subsections Woodcox was convicted of violating, and it thus determined that the documents did not establish whether Woodcox was convicted of reckless driving under subsection (a)(1) or drunken driving under subsection (a)(2).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(1), (2).
But we have previously explained that "if the statute of conviction is divisible into alternative sets of elements, a court may consider certain court records for the limited purpose of determining the statutory subsection under which the defendant was previously convicted." In this case, the description of the charge on both the Entry of Judgment and the Statement of Trial Results indicates that Woodcox did "physically control a vehicle . . . while drunk"; it does not state that he had operated the vehicle in a "reckless or wanton manner" (or use similar language). This description tracks the statutory language of subsection (a)(2) rather than (a)(1), and the judgment shows that he pleaded guilty to the described charge. We accordingly reject Woodcox's claim that the judgment was ambiguous as to which of these offenses he was convicted of violating.
Morgan v. State, 523 P.3d 1254, 1259 (Alaska App. 2023).
As we have explained, during the trial court proceedings, Woodcox made many technical claims about what the military documents do and do not show, claiming that they were confusing and internally inconsistent. But he never challenged the authenticity of the documents, and he never claimed that he did not actually plead guilty to drunken driving.
When the State produces an authenticated copy of a judgment, the judgment is prima facie evidence of the prior conviction. Here, the State submitted the Entry of Judgment and the Statement of Trial Results to the district court - and each of these documents indicated that Woodcox was convicted based on his guilty plea. Thus, absent a substantive challenge, the State was under no duty to offer more conclusive proof of Woodcox's guilty plea.
AS 12.55.145(e); see also Stewart v. State, 763 P.2d 515, 517-18 (Alaska App. 1988) (holding that the requirements of AS 12.55.145(b) apply to convictions entered under AS 28.35.030).
Brodigan v. State, 95 P.3d 940, 944 (Alaska App. 2004) (explaining that a presumption of regularity attaches to a final judgment); see also Gant v. State, 712 P.2d 906, 908 (Alaska App. 1986) (holding that when a defendant does not deny the authenticity or nature of a prior conviction but objects on technical grounds alone, an authenticated docket abstract is sufficient prima facie evidence of the prior conviction); cf. AS 12.55.145(d) ("If the defendant introduces substantial evidence that the defendant is not the person named in a prior judgment of conviction, that the judgment is not authentic, that the conviction did not occur within" the relevant lookback period, or that the elements of their prior offense are not similar to the relevant Alaska crime, "then the burden is on the [S]tate to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.").
We accordingly conclude that the State met its burden of establishing that Woodcox entered a guilty plea to the charge of drunken driving in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2).
The elements of the military statute under which Woodcox was previously convicted are similar to the elements of driving under the influence
As we have explained, under AS 28.35.030(w)(4)(A), a defendant is "previously convicted" if they were convicted, within the preceding fifteen years, of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a law or ordinance with "similar elements" to AS 28.35.030(a). In its petition, the State asserts that the federal statute Woodcox was convicted of violating - 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2) - has "similar elements" to Alaska's DUI statute, AS 28.35.030(a).
Whether a conviction entered by another jurisdiction has "similar elements" to an Alaska crime is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.Although the elements must be "similar" to the Alaska statute, they need not be identical; there may be "some acts covered by one statute that will not be covered by the other." We have previously explained that the legislature intended the similarity requirement of AS 28.35.030(w)(4) to be construed broadly. Thus, DUI convictions from other jurisdictions may qualify as prior convictions under Alaska law even if there are some differences in how the other jurisdiction defines the crime. In determining whether elements are "similar," we apply a categorical approach, comparing the elements of the two relevant statutes, without consideration of the underlying facts of the prior offense.
Lee v. State, 507 P.3d 483, 496 (Alaska App. 2022) (citing Borja v. State, 886 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Alaska App. 1994)).
Borja, 886 P.2d at 1314.
Phillips v. State, 330 P.3d 941, 943 (Alaska App. 2014).
Id.
Morgan v. State, 523 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Alaska App. 2023).
Thus, in order to determine whether Woodcox was "previously convicted" for purposes of enhancing his sentence, we must compare the elements of DUI (in violation of AS 28.35.030(a)) with the elements of Woodcox's previous offense - drunken driving, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2).
To convict a defendant of DUI under AS 28.35.030(a), the government must prove that the defendant (1) drove or operated a motor vehicle, and (2) did so "while under the influence" of alcohol or a controlled substance. To convict a defendant of violating 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2), the government must prove that the defendant (1) operated or was in actual physical control of any vehicle, and (2) did so while "drunk."
AS 28.35.030(a)(1).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2).
During the trial court proceedings, Woodcox claimed that because the military statute prohibits operating a vehicle while "drunk" rather than "while under the influence" of alcohol, the two crimes do not have "similar elements." On appeal, Woodcox points out that the term "drunk" was not defined in any of the documents provided by the State.
When it is necessary for Alaska courts to interpret the elements of offenses from other jurisdictions, we look to that jurisdiction's statutes and case law. We have therefore reviewed cases in which military courts have described the elements of drunken driving under 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2). In these cases, courts have consistently held that, for purposes of 10 U.S.C. § 913(a)(2), a person is "drunk" if they are experiencing intoxication by alcohol "sufficient to impair the rational and full exercise of the mental or physical faculties."
See Cunningham v. State, 536 P.3d 739, 743-44 (Alaska App. 2023) (looking to other Oregon statutes and case law when interpreting whether an Oregon statute had similar elements to an Alaska statute).
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 51.c(6) (2024); see United States v. Alton, 2023 WL 3144078, at *12 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) (unpublished) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the appellant was drunk for purposes of a charge of drunken operation of a vehicle under the MCM definition); see also United States v. Chambers, 54 M.J. 834, 835 n.4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (relying on the definitions found in the MCM to describe the elements of an offense); United States v. Gonzalez, 60 M.J. 572, 579 n.18 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004) (approving of the trial judge's use of the MCM to define the term "drunk"). But see United States v. Davis , 47 M.J. 484, 486 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (noting that military appellate courts are not "bound" by explanations of the elements of an offense contained in the MCM: "The President establishes the Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive Order. The Manual includes sections on the elements of proof necessary to make out offenses in the UCMJ. . . . We note that we are not bound by the President's interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses.").
Under our own caselaw, a defendant is "under the influence" of alcohol for purposes of Alaska's DUI statute if they are impaired by alcohol such that they cannot operate a motor vehicle "with the caution characteristic of a person of ordinary prudence who is not under the influence." This is a similar standard to that set out under military law. To the extent the standard is slightly different, any difference would implicate only a narrow spectrum of unusual cases.
Molina v. State, 186 P.3d 28, 29 (Alaska App. 2008) (quoting Gundersen v. Anchorage, 762 P.2d 104, 114-15 n.7 (Alaska App. 1988)).
We accordingly conclude that the military law prohibiting drunken driving under which Woodcox was convicted is sufficiently similar to its Alaska counterpart to qualify as a previous conviction under AS 28.35.030(w)(4)(A).
Woodcox failed to show that his guilty plea in military court was obtained in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution
The State lastly argues that the district court erred in determining that Woodcox's fundamental rights may have been violated and that Woodcox's prior conviction accordingly was flawed.
See, e.g., Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska App. 1985) (holding that the defendant's prior Wisconsin DUI conviction could not be used to enhance his mandatory minimum sentence in Alaska because Wisconsin law did not provide the right to court-appointed counsel for his first DUI charge, violating the due process principle of fundamental fairness); State v. Peel, 843 P.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Alaska App. 1992) (holding that the defendant's prior Louisiana DUI conviction could not be used to enhance his mandatory minimum sentence in Alaska because Louisiana law did not provide the right to a jury trial for a DUI charge); see also Chilcote v. State, 471 P.3d 599, 603-04 (Alaska App. 2020) (holding that the defendant failed to establish that plain error occurred in sentencing when the trial court relied on her prior DUI conviction from Virginia to enhance the sentence on her Alaska conviction even though she had not been advised of her right to a jury trial, as a failure to provide such an advisement is not a violation of a "fundamental right" under the Alaska Constitution).
In Lee v. State, we addressed a defendant's claim that his military adjudication should not have qualified as a prior conviction for purposes of establishing the applicable presumptive range because defendants in military tribunals are not entitled to a unanimous verdict by a jury of their peers. We noted that, when a military member is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, their case does not actually proceed to a court-martial adjudication, and we concluded that, as a result, their conviction is neither tainted by the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict nor affected by the likelihood that the jury would primarily be comprised of officers. We recognized, however, that if a defendant was not afforded the right to counsel before entering a plea, the absence of counsel could render the plea involuntary, making the resulting conviction invalid for purposes of enhancing the defendant's sentence.
Lee v. State, 507 P.3d 483, 497 (Alaska App. 2022).
Id.
Id.
Relying on Lee, Woodcox first notes that the UCMJ does not provide the same right to a jury trial as that afforded by civilian courts because it provides for a jury that consists of superior officers rather than the military member's "peers." But, like the defendant in Lee, Woodcox was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, and he did not actually proceed to a court-martial adjudication. Thus, Woodcox's prior conviction is not tainted by the possibility that the jury would be comprised primarily of officers.
See id. at 497 n.58; Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 825(a)-(c).
Woodcox next claims that the military documents provided by the State do not indicate that he was afforded the right to counsel. But when a defendant collaterally attacks a prior conviction on the ground that they were denied their fundamental rights, the defendant has the burden of offering evidence that the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm.
See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (acknowledging the "presumption of regularity" that attaches to final judgments, even when the question is waiver of constitutional rights); Chilcote, 471 P.3d at 603 & n.17 (acknowledging that the defendant had presented sufficient testimony to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to an out-of-state conviction); United States v. Stewart, 977 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the burden was on the defendant to demonstrate that his earlier state conviction was not constitutionally valid, thus placing "the burden on the party seeking to impugn the validity of the record - a variation on the presumption of regularity attributable to official records"); United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the burden was properly placed on the defendant raising the challenge to show the constitutional invalidity of the prior conviction being used for sentence enhancement); United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that once the government has shown that a defendant has a prior conviction, "the burden rests with the defendant to show that the conviction was unconstitutional" (quoting United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1990))).
Here, Woodcox has not offered any particularized evidence to suggest that he was not afforded the right to an attorney during the military proceedings. In fact, under the UCMJ, defense counsel must be afforded to defendants, like Woodcox, who are charged in a special court-martial proceeding. The State thus was entitled to rely on the presumption of regularity, under which "every act [of the court] is presumed to have been rightly done until the contrary appears," to defeat Woodcox's claim.
See United States v. Cruz, 20 M.J. 873, 884-85 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (holding that a court-martial properly called into existence is entitled to the presumption of regularity), rev'd on other grounds, 25 M.J. 326 (C.M.A. 1987).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 827, § 838; see Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31 & n.8 (1976).
Smith v. State, 484 P.3d 610, 617 (Alaska App. 2021) (quoting Jerrel v. State, 851 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Alaska App. 1993)).
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred when it determined that Woodcox's military conviction could not be considered a "previous conviction" because it may have been constitutionally infirm.
Conclusion
We GRANT the State's petition for review and REVERSE the district court's order that Woodcox was not "previously convicted" for purposes of establishing the applicable mandatory minimum sentence under AS 28.35.030(b)(1).