Opinion
No. COA12–1474.
2013-07-2
STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher Wayne WOMACK.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gayl M. Manthei, for the State. James N. Freeman, Jr., for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 6 January 2012 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr., in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 June 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gayl M. Manthei, for the State. James N. Freeman, Jr., for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant Christopher Wayne Womack appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and one count each of injury to real property and communicating threats. Because the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him and his request for a jury instruction on compulsion or duress, we find no error.
At trial, evidence was presented tending to show that, on 19 March 2011, Defendant met Sharon Parker at Big Daddy's Bar in Graham, North Carolina. Defendant and Parker had recently ended their romantic relationship, during which Parker had told Defendant she was pregnant with his child. At the bar, Defendant learned Parker had lied about being pregnant with his child. Defendant expressed his feelings of affection toward Parker, but when she did not reciprocate, Defendant threatened to kill her. The bar's owner and some patrons escorted Defendant outside, and the owner retrieved Parker's purse from Defendant's truck. The owner and patrons returned inside. Shortly thereafter, Defendant attempted to re-enter the bar, but was blocked from doing so by two bar patrons, Bryan Lloyd and Michael Nobles. A fight ensued during which Defendant stabbed Lloyd in the face with a knife. Nobles and two other men were able to pin Defendant down and take the knife away. The men then released Defendant, who got in his truck and drove backwards toward Nobles. Nobles dove out of the way, injuring his leg when he landed on the concrete, and Defendant struck the bar with his truck. Defendant drove away, but was later apprehended by a sheriff's deputy.
On appeal, Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to Brian Lloyd. Defendant contends the State's evidence that Lloyd suffered a serious injury was insufficient to send the charge to the jury. We disagree.
“Upon [a] defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for the [appellate] Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied,515 U.S. 1135, 132 L.Ed.2d 818 (1995). “This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
The essential elements of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury are: “(1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) inflicting serious injury, (4) not resulting in death.” State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–32(b) (2011). “Whether a serious injury has been inflicted is a factual determination within the province of the jury .” State v. Walker, 204 N.C.App. 431, 446, 694 S.E.2d 484, 495 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 189, 446 S.E.2d 83, 87 (1994) (holding that, “as long as the State presents evidence that the victim sustained a physical injury as a result of an assault by the defendant, it is for the jury to determine the question of whether the injury was serious”).
Here, the State presented evidence that Defendant stabbed Lloyd in the face with a pocket knife. Lloyd testified that he heard a “loud popping noise” as the knife hit his cheek bone, the knife stuck into his cheek bone, he pulled the knife out himself, and there was a lot of blood. At trial, Lloyd still had a mark on his face from the stabbing. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Lloyd sustained a physical injury from Defendant's assault, and it was thus for the jury to determine whether the injury was serious enough to support a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Id. Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to Lloyd.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on the defense of compulsion or duress. Defendant contends he was compelled to assault Lloyd and Nobles, each of whom: weighed more than Defendant, prevented Defendant from re-entering the bar to retrieve his cigarettes, and temporarily pinned him to the ground during the ensuing fight. We conclude that Defendant's argument is misplaced.
A trial court must only “give a requested instruction if it is a correct statement of the law and is supported by the evidence.” State v. Haywood, 144 N.C.App. 223, 234, 550 S.E.2d 38, 45 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 72, 553 S.E.2d 206 (2001). “In order to successfully invoke the duress defense, a defendant would have to show that his actions were caused by a reasonable fear that he would suffer immediate death or serious bodily injury if he did not so act.” State v. Smarr, 146 N.C.App. 44, 54, 551 S.E.2d 881, 888 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 291, 561 S.E.2d 500 (2002). Further, a defense of duress “cannot be invoked as an excuse by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm.” State v. Kearns, 27 N.C.App. 354, 357, 219 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1975), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 300, 222 S.E.2d 700 (1976).
Here, the evidence showed that Defendant was escorted out of the bar by the bar's owner and some patrons and told to leave the premises. After the owner and patrons returned inside, Defendant then produced a knife and walked back to the bar's entrance, attempting to re-enter. The fight ensued after Defendant was ejected from the bar. Absolutely no evidence suggests that anyone compelled Defendant to return to the bar, and Defendant could have avoided the altercation entirely by leaving after he was escorted out to the parking lot. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on the defense of compulsion or duress.
NO ERROR. Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).