Opinion
23578
March 6, 2003.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (CR. NO. TR60-63:6/28/00)
On the briefs:
Steven Booth Songstad, for defendant-appellant.
Lyle E. Winters Arleen Y. Watanabe, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff-appellee State of Hawai`i.
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, and NAKAYAMA, JJ., CIRCUIT JUDGE PERKINS, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY, and ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Defendant-appellant Lyle E. Winters (Winters) appeals from the judgment and sentence of the district court of the second circuit, the Honorable Douglas H. Ige presiding. Specifically, Winters appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Winters argues that the district court erred when it determined that: (1) the defendant's statement that he "had a few drinks" did not require a Miranda warning; and (2) the defendant was properly informed of sanctions before submitting to a blood test.
Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we affirm the district court's judgment. With respect to Winters's first point of error, a Miranda warning was not required because the totality of circumstances do not indicate that Officer Dalere's questions constituted custodial interrogation. SeeState v. Ketchum, 97 Haw. 107, 118, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001); State v. Ah Loo, 94 Haw. 207, 210-212, 10 P.3d 728, 731-33 (2000); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 300, 687 P.2d 544, 550 (1984). With respect to Winters's second point of error, inasmuch as Winters failed to identify an omitted sanction that prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent decision, Winters was sufficiently informed of the sanctions for submitting to or refusing to submit to a breath or blood test pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-151 (Supp. 1999). Moreover, Castro v. Administrative Director of Courts, 97 Haw. 463, 464, 40 P.3d 865, 866 (2002), is not controlling in the instant case because there were no prior alcohol enforcement contacts so there was no confusion as to which sanction applied, and thus the absence of a definition for "prior alcoholic enforcement contact" did not prevent Winters from making a knowing and intelligent decision. SeeState v. Rodgers, 99 Haw. 70, 75, 53 P.3d 209, 214 (2002).
Accordingly, because Winters's statement did not require a Miranda warning and Winters was sufficiently informed of sanctions pursuant to HRS § 286-151, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the district court's judgment from which the appeal is taken is affirmed.
I concur in the result because it has been long established by prior cases, i.e. precedent, that police questioning necessary to obtain information on a traffic stop does not amount to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-39 (1984) (a traffic stop is "presumptively" temporary and brief and the circumstances of a traffic stop are not as "police dominated" as the interrogations found objectionable in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), unless further circumstances rendered the suspect "in custody"); State v. Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 188, 706 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1985) (questioning which resulted in the defendant's admission that he had consumed four beers and smoked marijuana did not rise to custodial interrogation because the officer engaged in "legitimate, straight forward, and noncoercive questioning necessary to obtain information to issue a traffic citation"); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 300, 687 P.2d 544, 550 (1984) ( Miranda warnings not mandated prior to questioning the defendant or administering a field sobriety test for driving under the influence). Indeed, this case is like Wyatt.