The provision of R.C. 4731.41 that "[n]o person shall practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches without a certificate from the State Medical Board" applies to one who has a certificate for the practice of a limited branch of medicine or surgery and who practices medicine or surgery beyond the scope permitted by such limited certificate. (Paragraph one of the syllabus in State v. Winterich, 157 Ohio St. 414, followed.) 3.
Id. at p. 65. (3) In State v. Winterich, 105 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio St. 1952), the Ohio Supreme Court held that substances, although classifiable as foods, become "drugs" within legal contemplation if prescribed by chiropractors for patients and if such substances are "intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease . . ." 105 N.E.2d at p. 861
State v. Urbaytis (1951), 156 Ohio St. 271, 277. And, see State v. Winterich (1952), 157 Ohio St. 414; State v. Petro (1947), 148 Ohio St. 473; Atkins v. State (1927), 115 Ohio St. 542, certiorari denied, 274 U.S. 720; Cole v. McClure (1913), 88 Ohio St. 1; Ford v. Osborne (1887), 45 Ohio St. 1. In the framework of the two cases herein, the only pertinent and substantive speed law is that part of R.C. 4511.21 providing that "no person shall operate a motor vehicle * * * in and upon the streets and highways at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the street or highway and any other conditions."
In this case, the very essence of the offense entailed a combination of both weight and axle separation, and a failure to establish either was fatal to the presentment of a prima facie case. See State v. Nutter (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 116, 258 N.E.2d 440; State v. Miclau (1957), 167 Ohio St. 38, 146 N.E.2d 293; State v. Winterich (1952), 157 Ohio St. 414, 105 N.E.2d 857. We note also that the record is silent upon the question of the type of tires on appellee's vehicle.
"In sustaining the burden, probative evidence must be offered of every material element which is necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Winterich, 157 Ohio St. 414, 105 N.E.2d 857."
In sustaining the burden, probative evidence must be offered of every material element which is necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Winterich, 157 Ohio St. 414, 105 N.E.2d 857. Direct and circumstantial evidence in the record in this case constitutes probative evidence that defendant was alone and in possession of the car involved in this accident at the time, as indicated by various witnesses, that it occurred, to wit, 10:30 p.m.
The state must prove every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Winterich (1952), 157 Ohio St. 414. "In addition to the elements of the crime, the state is required to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Heigley, 11th Dist. No. 2007-L-122, 2008-Ohio-1688, ¶26, citing State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516.
State v. Kulig, * * * [(1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 157, 160]. Mere suspicion is not sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. State v. Winterich, * * * [(1952), 157 Ohio St. 414, 423]." (Emphasis added.)
"* * * `a statute defining a crime or offense cannot be extended by construction, to persons or things not within its descriptive terms, though they appear to be within the reason and spirit of the statute.'" State v. Winterich (1952), 157 Ohio St. 414, at 419 [47 O.O. 316]. Furthermore, in view of the language of Ordinance No. 553.01, and the citation issued to the appellant, it is clear that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the appellant.
It has been suggested by the prosecution that judicial notice be taken of the contents of the official United States Pharmacopoeia or the official National Formulary to provide the meaning for the term Seconal. This same point was raised in the case of State v. Winterich, 157 Ohio St. 414, 421, 423. The court said (Stewart, J.):