Opinion
ID No. 0103012308.
Submitted: April 7, 2005.
Decided: June 6, 2005.
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Donald Roberts, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware.
Stephen R. Winn, pro se Defendant, Delaware Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, Delaware.
ORDER
On this 6th day of June, 2005, upon consideration of Stephen R. Winn's ("Defendant") pro se motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant filed his original motion for postconviction relief, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"), on September 15, 2003 and amended it on June 28, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
2. On February 25, 2002, a jury trial was held in New Castle County, Delaware, and Defendant was found guilty of Rape in the First Degree, Kidnaping in the First Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, Terroristic Threatening and Criminal Contempt of a Domestic Violence Protective Order. On May 31, 2002, this Court sentenced Defendant to 47 years in prison.
The jury found Defendant not guilty of Assault Second Degree and instead found him guilty of the lesser included offense of Assault Third Degree.
Subsequently, Defendant filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware challenging his conviction. Defendant's only contention was that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the victim's prior consistent statement into evidence, which Defendant argued was cumulative and unduly prejudicial. After considering Defendant's argument, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded on March 19, 2003 that the Superior Court acted well within its discretion in admitting the victim's statement as affirmative evidence and affirmed its judgment. On July 22, 2003, the Court denied Defendant's motion for modification of sentence.
Winn v. State, 829 A.2d 142 (Del. 2003).
Id.
Id.
On September 15, 2003, Defendant filed his original pro se motion for postconviction relief, in which he claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and raised six grounds for relief. After receiving Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, this Court ordered John S. Edinger ("Counsel") to submit an affidavit responding to Defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. On February 18, 2004, Counsel filed the affidavit in the form of a letter, refuting those allegations. Later, Defendant moved to amend his Rule 61 motion and the Court granted Defendant's motion on July 20, 2004. On Dec. 27, 2004, the Court issued an opinion addressing Defendant's initial six grounds for relief, however the Court inadvertently failed to consider the issues set forth in the amended petition. This order addresses the remaining claims.
3. As best as can be discerned, Defendant raises the following seven grounds for relief in his subsequent amended motion for postconviction relief, filed on June 28, 2004:
(i) Defendant was denied his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process of law, when the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on all the elements needed to be proven for the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree, and when the trial court failed to give a lesser included offense instruction;
(ii) Defendant was denied his 5th and 14th Amendment rights of due process of law and 6th Amendment right to legal and fair proceedings, when the State failed to prove every element of the unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree;
(iii) Defendant was denied his 5th and 14th Amendment rights of due process of law, and his 6th Amendment right to legal and fair proceedings, when the State failed to prove every element of the kidnaping offense beyond a reasonable doubt;
(iv) Defendant was denied his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination, his 4th and 14th Amendment rights to due process of law, and his 6th Amendment right to fair and legal proceedings when prosecution offered tape recorded communications between the victim and Defendant into evidence that were illegal and inadmissible evidence;
(v) Defendant was denied his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process of law and his 6th Amendment right to confrontation, when the prosecution offered into evidence medical reports of the alleged victim as business records pursuant to D.R.E. 803(6) without first complying with D.R.E. 902(11)(C);
(vi) Trial Court committed plain error by permitting the alleged victim to testify to Defendant's prior bad acts, without applying any of the requirements mandated by Getz, which denied Defendant of his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process of law and his 6th Amendment right to legal and fair proceedings;
(vii) Defendant was denied his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process of law and his 6th Amendment right to legal and fair proceedings, when the prosecution made improper comments to the jury, which implied Defendant's guilt.
Rule 61(i)(3) bars claims not previously asserted. It is unclear from Defendant's motion whether this claim relates to the same statement which was raised on appeal. However, even if it was previously asserted, his claim is barred under Rule 61(i)(4), because it was formerly adjudicated in Winn v. State, 829 A.2d 142 (Del. 2003).
4. Before addressing the merits of any claims raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must apply the procedural bars of Rule 61(i). Generally, "any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction . . . is thereafter barred." However, that bar is inapplicable when Defendant can establish a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." These exceptions are narrowly tailored and applicable only in limited circumstances.
See Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
See Younger, 580 A.2d at 555.
5. Having examined the substance of Defendant's claims, the Court concludes that Defendant has not carried his burden in establishing that he has been deprived of a substantial constitutional right that undermined the "fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings." All of the grounds raised in Defendant's amended motion are procedurally barred because he had the opportunity to raise them in his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court and failed to do so. In addition, the exceptions found in Rule 61(i)(4) and (5) are inapplicable since Defendant has failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice."
Id.; See State v. Scott, 2002 WL 485790, at *3 (Del.Super.).
See Winn v. State, 829 A.2d 142 (Del. 2003).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
This was a horrible case in which an innocent woman was brutally beaten with a baseball bat and sexually molested by the Defendant. The evidence as to Defendant's guilt was overwhelming and the sentence he received was appropriate. The evidence clearly supported the offenses which the jury found the Defendant guilty and there were no improper legal rulings that were inconsistent with the discretion given to this Court regarding evidentiary matters. The Defendant's conviction has not lead to a miscarriage of justice and as a result his claims are procedurally barred.
According to Younger, 580 A.2d at 554, the Court should not consider the merits of a Defendant's claims where procedural bars exist.
6. For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant has not established grounds for relief and the motion is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.