Appellant's statement is true to this extent, that, in so far as we have been able to find, the Brodie case has never been cited or referred to in any subsequent case, other than the Lewis case. However, we are unable to agree with counsel for appellant, that the rule laid down in the Brodie case has not at least been modified by State v. Vukich, 158 Wn. 362, 290 P. 992, and State v. Winchell, 14 Wn.2d 420, 128 P.2d 643, if his contention is that the Brodie case established the rule in this state that, where it appears that no jury is on duty in connection with the court before which a prosecution is pending during the sixty-day period following the filing of an information, and the trial court concludes that good cause for the delay has been shown, such showing is not good cause for the failure to bring the defendant to trial within sixty days, under Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2312. The Brodie case presented a rather unusual set of facts.

In the absence of a showing that the defense of the case will be damaged or prejudiced by holding trial after the 60-day period, the setting of the case for trial before the next jury term would be good cause, unless the next jury term is so far away as to be oppressive and vexatious. State v. Jenkins, 19 Wn.2d 181, 142 P.2d 263 (1943); State v. Winchell, 14 Wn.2d 420, 128 P.2d 643 (1942). Defendants assign error to the admission of their written confessions, but the record shows this assignment to be without merit.

A partial list of the decisions is as follows: State v. Brodie, 7 Wn. 442, 35 P. 137; State v. Lewis, 35 Wn. 261, 77 P. 198; State v. Seright, 48 Wn. 307, 93 P. 521; State v. Parmeter, 49 Wn. 435, 95 P. 1012; State v. Alexander, 65 Wn. 488, 118 P. 645; State v. Miller, 72 Wn. 154, 129 P. 1100; State v. Jones, 80 Wn. 335, 141 P. 700; State v. Nilnch, 131 Wn. 344, 230 P. 129; State v. Estes, 151 Wn. 51, 274 P. 1053; State v. Vukich, 158 Wn. 362, 290 P. 992; State v. Wingard, 160 Wn. 132, 295 P. 116; State v. Lester, 161 Wn. 227, 296 P. 549; State v. Thomas, 1 Wn.2d 298, 95 P.2d 1036; State v. Domanski, 5 Wn.2d 686, 106 P.2d 591; State v. Winchell, 14 Wn.2d 420, 128 P.2d 643; State v. Jenkins, 19 Wn.2d 181, 142 P.2d 263; State ex rel. James v. Superior Court, 32 Wn.2d 451, 202 P.2d 250. In the ably researched and well written opinion by Ellis, J., in State v. Miller, 72 Wn. 154, 129 P. 1100, a distinction is made betwixt a criminal defendant's interests based upon amendment 10 of the state constitution and those based upon Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2312.

[1] It appears that appellant had been admitted to bail, and, no jury having been called prior to the time he was tried, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit. State v. Vukich, 158 Wn. 362, 290 P. 992; State v. Winchell, 14 Wn.2d 420, 128 P.2d 643; State v. Jenkins, 19 Wn.2d 181, 142 P.2d 263. Appellant argues that, because he had been brought before a justice of the peace upon a charge identical with that stated in count I of the information, and because that case was still pending, the superior court had no jurisdiction either of count I of the information or of the other counts therein stated.

) The reasons given by the learned trial judge for continuing the cause are, however, not so lacking in the elements of "good" cause under the statute, though of doubtful justification ( State v. Arkle, 76 Mont. 81, 245 P. 526; State v. Chadwick, supra.), as to demand the petitioner's discharge, especially since his incarceration is only nominal. ( State v. Winchell, (Wash.) 128 P.2d 643.) He is, however, entitled to be tried. Everyone knows that the longer the trial of a case is delayed, the more difficult it is to obtain the presence of witnesses — death, distant departure, and fading memory intervening many times to defeat justice.