Opinion
No. 111263.
01-16-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert Alan WILSON, Appellant.
William F. Dunn, of Kansas City, for appellant. Alan T. Fogleman, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
William F. Dunn, of Kansas City, for appellant.
Alan T. Fogleman, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., BRUNS and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BRUNS, J.
Robert A. Wilson appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence stemming from a police stop of his car that led to the discovery of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. After a bench trial, the district court found Wilson guilty of possession of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance without a tax stamp, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The district court also found that Wilson failed to stop at a red light. On appeal, Wilson argues that the evidence seized should have been suppressed because the initial stop was unlawful. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
Facts
At approximately 11 p.m. on February 7, 2013, Officer Brandon Holloway of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department observed from his car, a Chevy Malibu leave a “known narcotics house.” According to Officer Holloway, he followed the Malibu until it:
“Came up to the traffic control signal at 18th Street. The light had turned yellow. The vehicle proceeded through the intersection. The front clip of the car—I would say around the driver's door area—was across the line to stop when the light turned red. And then the vehicle continued on through the red light and made a left-hand turn to go southbound on 18th Street.”
Officer Holloway further described the position of the Malibu when the light turned red: “The vehicle was pretty much 50/50 on that white line. Half of that vehicle was on [the line] and the other half was behind it.” In Officer Holloway's opinion, there was enough time for the Malibu to stop before entering the intersection, saying, “[T]he issue was it was one of those beating-the-light-type deals. He had proceeded through the intersection, made it past the stop line, and then it turned red. And he was well within the ability to stop that car prior to that light being red.”
Officer Holloway stopped the Malibu and discovered that the driver was Wilson. Evidently, Wilson consented to the search of his car, and Officer Holloway found a small glass pipe in the driver's door pocket. In searching Wilson, Officer Holloway also found a baggie of methamphetamine. Although Wilson denied having any knowledge regarding the pipe, he admitted that the methamphetamine belonged to him.
Subsequently, the State charged Wilson with possession of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance without a tax stamp, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to stop at a red light. Prior to trial, the district court denied Wilson's motion to suppress the evidence seized following the traffic stop, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the district court found Wilson guilty on each of the charges.
In finding Wilson guilty of running a red light—as well as finding the traffic stop to be legal and proper—the district court found:
“[Wilson] was in the act of passing the white line delineating the beginning of the intersection ... when the [stop] light turned red. It was yellow, but it immediately turned red when, in the officer's judgment and opinion and experience, [Wilson] had an opportunity to stop his vehicle safely. He chose not to do so and, in effect, ran a red light.”
Subsequently, the district court sentenced Wilson to 18 months' probation with an underlying 11–month sentence for the possession of methamphetamine. The district court also sentenced Wilson to a concurrent sentence of 18 months' probation with a 6–month sentence underlying for failure to affix a drug tax stamp, as well as a concurrent 18 months' probation with an underlying 11–month sentence for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. Finally, the district court imposed a $25 fine for failure to stop at a red light.
Analysis
On appeal, Wilson contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized because the traffic stop was unlawful. In particular, Wilson argues that Officer Holloway did not articulate an objectively reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. In response, the State contends that based on the totality of the circumstances, the traffic stop was valid.
We use a bifurcated standard to review a district court's decision on a motion to suppress. Our review of a district court's legal conclusions is unlimited. State v. Sanchez–Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 54, 272 P.3d 34 (2012). But we review a district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. 294 Kan. at 54, 272 P.3d 34. “Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.” State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 862, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides the same protection as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 349, 154 P.3d 1 (2007). It is well-settled that a traffic stop is a seizure under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; K.S.A. 22–2402(1) ; State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 659, 664, 847 P.2d 1280 (1993). Accordingly, a traffic stop must be objectively reasonable. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
“To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.’ “ Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2014) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, reh. denied 338 U.S. 839 [1949] ). Accordingly, an officer's reasonable suspicion may be based on a reasonable mistake about the underlying facts. See Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 638, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). “But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion.” Heien, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 536, ––– L.Ed.2d ––– –. Thus, if it was reasonable for a law enforcement officer to suspect that a person's conduct was illegal at the time of the traffic stop, “there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first place.” Heien, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 539, ––– L.Ed.2d ––– –.
Whether an officer's suspicion is reasonable must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Coleman, 292 Kan. 813, 817–18, 257 P.3d 320 (2011). “In considering the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court should employ common sense and ordinary human experience and should accord reasonable deference to a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” 292 Kan. at 818, 257 P.3d 320. We must also keep in mind that an officer may be faced with “a situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is unclear—however clear it may later become.” Heien, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 539, ––– L.Ed.2d ––– –.
Here, the reason articulated by Officer Holloway for the traffic stop was that Wilson ran a red light—an offense for which Wilson was subsequently convicted at trial—in violation of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1508(c)(1). Wilson argues, however, that Officer Holloway lacked reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop because he started to enter the intersection while the traffic light was still yellow. Pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1508(b)(1), a yellow light is a warning that “a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection.” In other words, a yellow light cautions drivers that they should clear the intersection.
As the Minnesota Court of Appeals found when addressing a similar statute in State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 611, (Minn.App.2007), drivers do not “have a carte blanche privilege to enter an intersection on a yellow light or that there might not be circumstances in which such entry could become illegal.” In other words, a yellow light serves as an admonition to drivers to “clear the intersection before the light finally changes to red. It is not an invitation to all drivers to continue along their way until the light finally turns red and then to clear the intersection. ” (Emphasis added.) Jackson v. Camp & Brown Produce Co., 92 Ga.App. 359, 362–63, 88 S.E.2d 540 (1955).
We agree that simply entering an intersection on a yellow light is not—in and of itself—a legitimate basis for a traffic stop. In fact, Officer Holloway recognized that entering an intersection on a yellow light that turns red before the intersection can be completely cleared can be an “understandable occurrence” depending on the circumstances. But Officer Holloway went on to testify-based on his observations on the night of the traffic stop—that “it wasn't just a mere fact of going through a yellow light and it turned red while he was in the intersection.... [T]he issue was it was one of those beating-the-light-type deals.” Moreover, Officer Holloway testified that Wilson “was well within the ability to stop [the] car prior to [the] light turning red.” Thus, although Wilson characterizes his actions as having simply “ ‘nosed’ “ into the intersection just prior to the light turning red, Officer Holloway's testimony—which was believed by the district court—was that Wilson attempted to beat the red light and had sufficient time to stop.
When we consider the totality of the circumstances—employing common sense and ordinary human experience—we find that it was objectively reasonable for a law enforcement officer in the field to believe that Wilson's actions constituted a violation of Kansas law. Accordingly, even if Officer Holloway was mistaken about the law, the traffic stop he conducted did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Wilson's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
PIERRON, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Wilson was charged with a violation of K .S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1508 which reads in pertinent part: “(b) ... Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection. Subsection (c) notes that when vehicular traffic is facing a steady circular red or red arrow signal alone it shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if there is not one then before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then before entering the intersection.
In this case, the vehicle had entered the intersection while the yellow light was still on. This statute clearly states that a yellow light means that a red light is coming but the vehicle may still proceed into the intersection while the yellow light is visible. Under the facts of this case Wilson's vehicle was lawfully crossing the intersection since it had already entered the intersection while the light was yellow.
The majority correctly states that under Helen v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536–39, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2014), the exclusionary rule will not be enforced in car stop cases, where the stop was unjustified, if it was made due to a reasonable mistake about the underlying facts or the law involving the incident. The law is at issue here.
This case is distinguishable from Helen. While the mistake of law in Helen was due to a confusing statute, which gave the officer fair leeway for enforcing the law, the statute here was clear. The officer may well have believed he could stop the vehicle under these facts but the law here stated clearly the vehicle was not violating any law. Where the law is clear under these circumstances the officer's belief in his own interpretation of the law does not provide justification for the officer's action. Therefore, the stop was not justified and the subsequent search was inappropriate. The evidence should be suppressed.