A person who acts directly through an agent is responsible as a principal, not as an aider and abetter, which merely requires assistance to the direct actor. See State v. Wilson, 180 Wis.2d 414, 422-423, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130-131 (Ct. App. 1993) ("direct actor could constructively deliver a substance by means other than a physical hand-to-hand transfer"; "direct actor can use another person" to effectuate transfer); but cf. State v. Hecht, 116 Wis.2d 605, 618, 342 N.W.2d 721, 728 (1984) ( dictum) (distinguished by Wilson, 180 Wis.2d at 421-422, 509 N.W.2d at 130). The dissent disagrees with the proposition noted in Wilson that a person who acts through an agent can be responsible as a principal, not merely as an aider and abettor.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. State v. Wilson , 180 Wis. 2d 414, 424, 509 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993). We will not "reverse a conviction unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Although Rogers’ complaint alleged that Forest City “placed” RABC in the Stapleton roads rather than “caused to be placed,” I view the use of the word “placed” as including the direction or use of other entities to accomplish the act of placing. See United States v. Brandom, 320 F. Supp. 520, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (noting that the word “places” in mail fraud statute may have the meaning of “cause to be placed”); see also State v. Wilson, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (“A direct actor can use another person, a place or an object to indirectly transfer a substance. The essence is the intent to transfer and the ability to cause that transfer.”).
Although Rogers’ complaint alleged that Forest City “placed” RABC in the Stapleton roads rather than “caused to be placed,” I view the use of the word “placed” as including the direction or use of other entities to accomplish the act of placing. See United States v. Brandom, 320 F. Supp. 520, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (noting that the word “places” in mail fraud statute may have the meaning of “cause to be placed”); see also State v. Wilson, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (“A direct actor can use another person, a place or an object to indirectly transfer a substance. The essence is the intent to transfer and the ability to cause that transfer.”).
Although Rogers' complaint alleged that Forest City "placed" RABC in the Stapleton roads rather than "caused to be placed," I view the use of the word "placed" as including the direction or use of other entities to accomplish the act of placing. SeeUnited States v. Brandom, 320 F.Supp. 520, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (noting that the word "places" in mail fraud statute may have the meaning of "cause to be placed"); see alsoState v. Wilson, 180 Wis.2d 414, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130–31 (App.1993) ("A direct actor can use another person, a place or an object to indirectly transfer a substance. The essence is the intent to transfer and the ability to cause that transfer.").
Instead, the defendant's intent to transfer and the effectuation of that transfer are the determinative factors." State v.Wilson, 180 Wis. 2d 414, 422, 509 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993). "A direct actor can use another person, a place or an object to indirectly transfer a substance.
¶ 3 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. SeeStatev. Wilson, 180 Wis. 2d 414, 424, 509 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
Our review of a request for a jury instruction is limited to whether the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to give the requested instruction. SeeState v. EarlannWilson, 180 Wis.2d 414, 420, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Ct.App. 1993).
¶ 6. The trial court has wide discretion over the decision whether to give a requested jury instruction. SeeState v. Wilson, 180 Wis.2d 414, 420, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Ct.App. 1993). We will uphold a discretionary determination so long as the trial court considered the facts of record under the proper legal standard and reasoned its way to a rational conclusion.
Our review of a request for a jury instruction is limited to whether the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to give the requested instruction. State v. Wilson, 180 Wis.2d 414, 420, 509 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Ct.App. 1993). We will reverse and order a new trial only if the instructions, taken as a whole, communicated an incorrect statement of the law or otherwise probably misled the jury.