¶ 11 To demonstrate accepted historical practices in Washington, the State cites State v. Wilson, 141 Wash.App. 597, 171 P.3d 501 (2007), which involved the in-camera questioning of an impaneled juror. In Wilson, an impaneled juror alerted the trial judge's assistant that she recognized one of the State's witnesses in a theft case.

Actual bias exists when "the juror's state of mind . . . satisfies the trial judge that the challenged person cannot try the issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging party."State v. Wilson, 141 Wn.App. 597, 606, 171 P.3d 501 (2007).

"The decision to grant or deny a particular challenge for cause is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Wilson, 141 Wash. App. 597, 606, 171 P.3d 501 (2007). A juror's relationship to a witness in the case does not necessarily disqualify a juror.

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be present during all critical stages of the criminal proceeding. State v. Wilson, 141 Wash.App. 597, 603, 171 P.3d 501 (2007) (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985)). “A critical stage is one ‘in which a defendant's rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or in which the outcome of the case is otherwise substantially affected.’ ”

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be present during all critical stages of the criminal proceeding. State v. Wilson, 141 Wn. App. 597, 603, 171 P.3d 501 (2007) (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1985)). "A critical stage is one 'in which a defendant's rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or in which the outcome of the case is otherwise substantially affected.'"

He also asserted that this procedure violated his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution and that the trial court had improperly sentenced him as a persistent offender. Relying on State v. Wilson, 141 Wn. App. 597, 171 P.3d 501 (2007), the Court of Appeals reversed Irby's convictions, holding that the trial court "violated Irby's right to be present and contribute to jury selection." State v. Irby, noted at 147 Wn. App. 1004, slip op. at 5, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2503, at *7.

The elements of a crime may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and one type of evidence is no more valuable than the other. State v. Wilson, 141 Wn.App. 597, 608, 171 P.3d 501 (2007). This court defers to the jury on credibility determinations, assessing discrepancies in the trial testimony, and weighing the evidence.

We review constitutional questions de novo. State v. Wilson, 141 Wn. App. 597, 603-04, 171 P.3d 501 (2007). State v. Castro, 141 Wn. App. 485, 490, 170 P.3d 78 (2007).

The party claiming juror bias has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to show bias. State v. Wilson, 141 Wn.App. 597, 606, 171 P.3d 501 (2007).

Indeed, " ‘[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’ " Pruitt, 145 Wash. App. at 798, 187 P.3d 326 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Wilson, 141 Wash. App. 597, 604, 171 P.3d 501 (2007) ). ¶ 116 In State v. Burdette, we considered whether a conference about a jury inquiry was a critical stage implicating the defendant's right to be present under the federal constitution.