State v. Willy

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Love

    271 Or. App. 545 (Or. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 5 times
    In Love, there was no evidence- such as how loud the fight was or whether the windows of the mobile home were open-to "suggest that defendant knew of a risk that his conduct would affect the public."

    See State v. Gilbert, 48 Or App 419, 617 P2d 288 (1980); State v. Stubblefield, 42 Or App 201, 600 P2d 469 (1979); State v. Clark, 39 Or App 63, 591 P2d 752 (1979). Although those cases do support defendant's position, they were superseded by State v. Willy, 155 Or App 279, 963 P2d 739 (1998). In Willy, we observed that, rather than following the PGE methodology for statutory interpretation (which had not yet been announced), Clark, Stubblefield, and Gilbert were based on a particular canon of construction. That canon holds that, when "borrowing a statute from another state, the legislature is assumed to adopt the then existing case law interpretation of that statute in the state of origin."

  2. State v. Moore

    327 Or. App. 91 (Or. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times
    In State v. Moore, 327 Or.App. 91, 533 P.3d 1123, rev den, 371 Or. 771 (2023), the defendant was found intoxicated, walking down the middle of a two-lane road with a truck following behind him.

    To the extent that defendant intends to argue that, because his actions only affected one member of the public, the truck following him, and because it is unclear whether the truck was intentionally following him, he could not have caused inconvenience to the public, our prior decisions have clearly rejected that argument. In State v. Willy , the defendants were convicted by a jury of disorderly conduct for making unreasonable noise for firing guns at night in their neighborhood. 155 Or App 279, 282, 963 P.2d 739 (1998). At that time, existing case law held that evidence of actual inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to a substantial number of people was required to prove disorderly conduct, and the defendants argued that the state did not prove that their conduct actually annoyed or alarmed more than two people.

  3. State v. Bradford

    335 Or. App. 264 (Or. Ct. App. 2024)

    But, regardless of defendant's view that the encounter was private, and unlike a "private" dispute inside a mobile home described in Love, 271 Or.App. at 555, the evidence of an altercation in a public place near several businesses and an apartment complex, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendant disregarded the risk of inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to the public. See State v. Willy, 155 Or.App. 279, 283, 963 P.2d 739 (1998) (Second-degree disorderly conduct only "requires proof that defendant[!] either intended to cause one of those conditions or recklessly created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance[,] or alarm to the public[.]" (Emphasis in original.)).

  4. State v. Lang

    359 P.3d 349 (Or. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    In Lang, a police officer applied for a warrant to search the defendant's apartment for evidence of second-degree disorderly conduct, relying on statements by the defendant's neighbors that they had repeatedly smelled marijuana emanating from the apartment and on the officer's experience smelling marijuana emanating from the apartment earlier that day. The warrant was issued and executed.

    Paragraph (1)(f) is the only provision of the statute that potentially applies in this case. Defendant argues that the phrase “hazardous or physically offensive condition” does not include “trivial annoyances,” citing our opinion in State v. Clark, 39 Or.App. 63, 67, 591 P.2d 752, rev. den., 286 Or. 303 (1979), overruled, on other grounds by State v. Willy, 155 Or.App. 279, 963 P.2d 739 (1998). He further contends that, for a condition to be hazardous or physically offensive, it must create some physical harm or danger.