See State v. Gilbert, 48 Or App 419, 617 P2d 288 (1980); State v. Stubblefield, 42 Or App 201, 600 P2d 469 (1979); State v. Clark, 39 Or App 63, 591 P2d 752 (1979). Although those cases do support defendant's position, they were superseded by State v. Willy, 155 Or App 279, 963 P2d 739 (1998). In Willy, we observed that, rather than following the PGE methodology for statutory interpretation (which had not yet been announced), Clark, Stubblefield, and Gilbert were based on a particular canon of construction. That canon holds that, when "borrowing a statute from another state, the legislature is assumed to adopt the then existing case law interpretation of that statute in the state of origin."
To the extent that defendant intends to argue that, because his actions only affected one member of the public, the truck following him, and because it is unclear whether the truck was intentionally following him, he could not have caused inconvenience to the public, our prior decisions have clearly rejected that argument. In State v. Willy , the defendants were convicted by a jury of disorderly conduct for making unreasonable noise for firing guns at night in their neighborhood. 155 Or App 279, 282, 963 P.2d 739 (1998). At that time, existing case law held that evidence of actual inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to a substantial number of people was required to prove disorderly conduct, and the defendants argued that the state did not prove that their conduct actually annoyed or alarmed more than two people.
But, regardless of defendant's view that the encounter was private, and unlike a "private" dispute inside a mobile home described in Love, 271 Or.App. at 555, the evidence of an altercation in a public place near several businesses and an apartment complex, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendant disregarded the risk of inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to the public. See State v. Willy, 155 Or.App. 279, 283, 963 P.2d 739 (1998) (Second-degree disorderly conduct only "requires proof that defendant[!] either intended to cause one of those conditions or recklessly created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance[,] or alarm to the public[.]" (Emphasis in original.)).
Paragraph (1)(f) is the only provision of the statute that potentially applies in this case. Defendant argues that the phrase “hazardous or physically offensive condition” does not include “trivial annoyances,” citing our opinion in State v. Clark, 39 Or.App. 63, 67, 591 P.2d 752, rev. den., 286 Or. 303 (1979), overruled, on other grounds by State v. Willy, 155 Or.App. 279, 963 P.2d 739 (1998). He further contends that, for a condition to be hazardous or physically offensive, it must create some physical harm or danger.