Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 14-0361
04-21-2015
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOHN ALLEN WILLIS, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee White Law Offices, PLLC, Flagstaff By Wendy F. White Counsel for Appellant John Allen Willis, Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CR201300456
The Honorable Cathleen Brown Nichols, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee
White Law Offices, PLLC, Flagstaff
By Wendy F. White
Counsel for Appellant
John Allen Willis,
Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Randall M. Howe joined. DOWNIE, Judge:
¶1 John Allen Willis appeals his conviction for first degree murder. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), defense counsel has searched the record, found no arguable question of law, and asked that we review the record for reversible error. See State v. Richardson, 175 Ariz. 336, 339, 857 P.2d 388, 391 (App. 1993). Defendant filed a supplemental brief in propria persona that we have considered, even though it was not timely filed. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
"We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant." State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 201, 953 P.2d 1252, 1254 (App. 1997).
¶2 On May 16, 2013, a body, later identified as victim M.Q., was discovered east of Ash Fork ("the scene"). M.Q. had been shot in the back of the head. The State charged Willis with one count of first degree murder, a class one felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1105(A)(1); one count of aggravated assault, a class three dangerous felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2); and one count of possession of marijuana for sale, a class four felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(2). The drug possession charge was severed before trial. At trial, witnesses testified to the following facts.
¶3 D.D. lived with his grandmother, C.O., in Ash Fork. Willis, a family friend, would often visit or stay at C.O.'s home. A few months before M.Q.'s murder, J.S. and M.Q. allegedly stole jewelry and coins from C.O.'s home. Willis was upset and threatened J.S., who returned some of the jewelry. M.Q. later returned some jewelry but, at the same time, reportedly stole additional coins from C.O. M.Q. also allegedly stole a pipe belonging to Willis that contained marijuana.
¶4 Late in the evening on the day of the murder, Willis stopped by C.O.'s house. At one point, he stated to C.O., "One down, two to go." Willis told D.D. that someone had "f---- up" and "double-crossed" him and that he wanted to show D.D. something. When D.D. declined to go with Willis, Willis pulled a knife, pointed it at D.D., and said, "You need to come with me . . . I'm going to show you something. And if you tell anyone at all that . . . I showed you this . . . I'll rip your heart out and I'll show it to you." D.D. complied, and Willis drove C.O.'s car to the scene. Upon arrival, Willis instructed D.D. to put his socks over the outside of his shoes, and the two men walked to M.Q.'s body.
¶5 Willis told D.D. to search M.Q.'s pockets and again threatened him with a knife. D.D. found a brass drill bit, a lighter, and a cell phone. D.D. discarded the lighter and gave the drill bit to Willis. Once back inside the vehicle, Willis told D.D. to take off his socks and search the cell phone to determine whether M.Q. said anything about "who he was hanging out with that day." Willis waved a gun at D.D. and said, "This is what you have to look forward to if you double-cross me or tell anyone."
¶6 On the return drive to C.O.'s house, Willis threw M.Q.'s cell phone out the window. Willis told D.D. that he saw M.Q. walking down the road, offered him marijuana, and M.Q. got into Willis' truck. Willis then drove to the scene and, when M.Q. walked away to urinate, Willis shot M.Q in the back of the head. Willis told D.D., "If you tell anyone, I'll go after your grandma, then I'll go after your mom, then your dad, and then eventually I'll make my way to you." D.D. testified that he feared for his own safety and that of his family, so he did not contact the police. In the days before Willis' arrest, when D.D. attempted to discuss M.Q., Willis got angry and stated, "If the cops come calling . . . just act oblivious. Don't say anything." D.D. eventually related the above facts to the police.
¶7 Witnesses testified that Willis drove a large white truck, and that only Willis drove the truck. Police officers testified that tire tracks at the scene matched the tire tread patterns on Willis' truck, and wheel base measurements from the scene matched Willis' truck within a small margin of error. The jury viewed photographs and casts of the tire and shoe tracks at the scene and photos from surveillance cameras at the motel where Willis worked and lived, depicting the times Willis arrived and departed.
¶8 At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Willis moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, but the Court denied the motion. The jury convicted Willis of first degree murder but acquitted him of aggravated assault. The Court sentenced Willis to imprisonment for natural life pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-752(A).
DISCUSSION
¶9 We have read and considered the briefs submitted and have reviewed the entire record. Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. We find no reversible error. All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the sentence imposed was within the statutory range. Willis was present at all critical phases of the proceedings and was represented by counsel. The jury was properly impaneled and instructed. The jury instructions were consistent with the offenses charged. The record reflects no irregularity in the deliberation process.
¶10 The record includes substantial evidence of guilt. See State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552, 633 P.2d 355, 361 (1981) (In reviewing for sufficiency of evidence, "[t]he test to be applied is whether there is substantial evidence to support a guilty verdict."). "Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290, 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (1996). Substantial evidence "may be either circumstantial or direct." State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229, 232, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 455, 458 (App. 2003).
¶11 To prove first degree murder, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Willis caused the death of M.Q.; intended or knew he would cause the death; and acted with premeditation. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1). Premeditation means Willis intended or knew he would kill M.Q., and such intention or knowledge preceded the killing by a length of time sufficient to permit reflection. A.R.S. § 13-1101(1).
¶12 Substantial evidence established that Willis caused M.Q.'s death. Willis' admission to D.D. that he took M.Q. to the scene and shot him in the back of the head while he was urinating corresponded with other evidence. The medical examiner testified M.Q. died from a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and urine remained in his bladder — consistent with a need to urinate. Details D.D. provided also matched evidence that law enforcement collected. For instance, officers found a lighter near the scene. M.Q.'s mother testified that M.Q. found a drill bit and put it in his pocket the morning of his murder. Officers testified the shoeprints at the scene were consistent with someone wearing socks over their shoes, and they found dirt-covered socks on the floorboard of C.O.'s car. Some shoeprints at the scene overlaid tire tracks near M.Q.'s body, consistent with D.D.'s testimony that he and Willis returned to the scene after the murder.
¶13 The bullet recovered from M.Q. and shell casing found at the scene were for a .25 caliber handgun. Although a gun was not recovered, D.D. testified that Willis showed him a "Raven .25 auto" about a week before the murder.
¶14 Documented tire tracks at the scene were consistent with the unique tread on Willis' truck tires. Willis had a street tread pattern on the two front tires and an aggressive tread pattern on the two rear tires. Additionally, his left front tire had significantly worn tread, causing a flatter track pattern than the other three tires. Officers also took measurements of the wheelbase from the tire tracks at the scene. The width of the tires measured at the scene came to eight inches, the length between the two front tires and between the two back tires came to about 60 inches, and the measurements between the front and rear tire tracks came to about 14 feet. These measurements were consistent with Willis' truck.
¶15 Police officers documented three types of shoeprints at the scene: prints from M.Q., D.D., and the suspected murderer. The prints of the suspected murderer had a tread consistent with a work boot. C.O. testified Willis always wore work boots, and D.D. testified Willis wore boots the night of the murder. Additionally, the State presented evidence that the gait of the third set of prints was similar to Willis' gait.
¶16 The State introduced surveillance photos of Willis at the motel on the day of the murder. He was pictured leaving the motel at 2:27 p.m. and returning at 6:24 p.m. The last text message M.Q. sent was at 6:01 p.m., and officers testified it would take an average of 15 minutes to drive from the scene to the motel. After returning to the motel at 6:24 p.m., Willis changed clothes, carried cleaning supplies to the parking lot where he normally parked his vehicle, and left the motel at 9:20 p.m. with a black trash bag. While in jail, Willis stated, "the last time I fronted something to somebody, they went on the last ride of their life," and "he thought that we were going to smoke some weed. Stupid little f-----."
¶17 Substantial evidence also supports the jury's determination that Willis intended to cause M.Q.'s death and acted with premeditation. Several witnesses testified Willis was upset about the thefts from C.O.'s home. Willis threatened J.S., stating, "If you want to keep breathing, get out of Arizona." Willis was also angry about his stolen pipe and accused M.Q. Additionally, the jury could have found that the murderer would have had to deliberately walk behind M.Q. while his back was turned in order to shoot directly into the back of his head, which Willis admitted doing.
¶18 Defense counsel's brief lists other issues "to avoid procedural default," but states that "after researching the issues counsel believes any argument in support of such issues would be frivolous." We have considered the enumerated issues but found no colorable claims or reversible error. Willis' supplemental brief asks this Court to reweigh the evidence presented at trial. For example, Willis argues he was "not at the hotel from 3:30 to 8:00 p.m.," as the surveillance photos depict, and he contends other witnesses lied. However, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine whether it would reach the same verdict as the jury. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). Additionally, "[n]o rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury." State v. demons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556-57, 521 P.2d 987, 988-89 (1974).
¶19 Willis suggests other errors, but his assertions lack clarity, support, or context. For example, he argues that after speaking with officers in Williams, he was taken "to Flagstaff no rights or arrestt [sic] after I said in Williams I was done." To the extent he is challenging the voluntariness of his statements, the record reveals no error. Before trial, the parties briefed the voluntariness issue, and the court held a hearing at which Officer Moran testified. Officer Moran stated that he went to Willis' motel, introduced himself, and asked Willis to speak to him. Willis pointed to a separate room and spoke with the officer for 20 to 30 minutes. Willis never stated he wished to end the interview. The record supports the superior court's determination that Willis' statements during his pre-arrest interview were voluntary.
¶20 Probable cause existed to arrest Willis. Law enforcement had matched Willis' unique truck tire tread and measurements to evidence at the scene. Officers had also spoken to D.D. about Willis' involvement in the murder. The record indicates Willis received Miranda warnings immediately after being taken into custody, which he waived. When Willis requested an attorney, the post-arrest interview ended.
¶21 Willis also argues a photograph of a tin box found inside a gun case at his motel room was "wrongfully implemented evidence that was used in trial, that was not even in court . . . [a]nd should not have been alouwd [sic]." However, we will not consider an evidentiary objection raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 145, 945 P.2d 1260, 1276 (1997). The photo was admitted without objection, and Willis does not explain why he believes the exhibit was wrongfully admitted.
CONCLUSION
¶22 Counsel's obligations pertaining to Willis' representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do nothing more than inform Willis of the status of the appeal and his future options, unless counsel's review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). On the court's own motion, Willis shall have thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with an in propria persona motion for reconsideration or petition for review.