Opinion
Def. ID No. 0202005008.
Submitted: July 1, 2006.
October 23, 2006.
Elwood M. Willis, SBI No. 00464240, Smyrna, Delaware.
Dear Mr. Willis:
This is my decision on Elwood M. Willis' ("Willis") Motion for Postconviction Relief. Willis pled guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Forgery in the Second Degree, Theft, and Resisting Arrest. I sentenced Willis on August 7, 2002, to seven years and 30 days at Supervision Level V, suspended for declining levels of probation. Willis has violated his probation a number of times. After Willis' second violation of his probation, I sentenced him on August 6, 2004, to seven years and 30 days at Supervision Level V, suspended for one year at Supervision Level IV, Home Confinement, followed by declining levels of probation. Willis then allegedly violated his probation a third time by absconding from Home Confinement. A violation of probation hearing was held on August 6, 2004. Willis was represented at the hearing by Carole J. Dunn, Esquire. Willis admitted to violating his probation. He removed his ankle bracelet, left his residence and did not return. I found Willis in violation of his probation, revoked it and resentenced him to seven years and 30 days at Supervision Level V, suspended after his successful completion of the Supervision Level V Family Problems program for declining levels of probation.
Willis seeks relief based upon three grounds. Grounds one and two are related to the Family Problems program. One, Willis argues that his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because he was asked by the Department of Correction to discuss his sexual history as part of his placement into the Family Problems program. Two, Willis argues that he was denied entry into the Family Problems program because he was not a sex offender. Three, Willis argues that his due process rights were violated because the Court did determine if he was competent before proceeding with the violation of probation hearing. Willis' first two arguments are now moot because he has been admitted into the Family Problems program without any apparent violation of his rights.
Willis argues that the Court should have held a hearing to determine if he was competent before going forward with his violation of probation hearing. The conviction of a person while he is legally incompetent violates due process. "The test for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
United States v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342 (1976), citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Willis does not allege that he was unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. Indeed, neither Willis or Dunn ever raised the issue of competency. Willis now merely asserts that he has mental health problems. This is nothing new. Willis has bipolar disorder. This is a brain disorder that causes unusual shifts in a person's mood, energy and ability to function. However, bipolar disorder can be treated, allowing a person with it to lead a normal life. The Court has been aware of Willis' psychological condition since he pled guilty on August 7, 2002, and was also aware of it at the violation of probation hearing on August 6, 2004. Willis disclosed his psychological condition on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form at the time of his original sentencing. Dunn reminded the Court of it at the violation of probation hearing. Willis told the Court during the hearing that he is stabilized when he is on his medication. Dunn told the Court that Willis was being given his medication at the prison and was on it at the time of the hearing. Thus, Willis' psychological condition, as well as the fact that he was being treated for it and was stabilized, was known to everyone involved in the violation of probation hearing.
Willis was obviously competent to go forward with the violation of probation hearing, as evidenced by his conversations with Dunn and the Court. Dunn told the Court at the start of the hearing that Willis was aware of the allegations against him and that he admitted to violating his probation. Dunn also told the Court that Willis told her that he preferred to do more time at Supervision Level V instead of Level IV Home Confinement because of the problems he had with his host. It is obvious that Willis was able to effectively communicate with Dunn so that she could adequately represent him and convey his wishes to the Court. Willis also carried on a coherent conversation with the Court. Willis told the Court that he was unable to live with certain family members and that he was having problems with his fiancé and her family. Willis also told the Court that it was the pressure from these situations which led him to leave his residence and violate his probation. At no point did it appear to either the Court or Dunn that Willis was not competent to proceed. This allegation is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Willis' Motion for Postconviction Relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.