Opinion
ID. No. 1110018657
03-09-2017
STATE OF DELAWARE v. LIONEL J. WILLIAMSON Defendant.
Susan G. Schmidhauser, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware. Lionel J. Williamson, Pro se.
RK11-12-0159-01 Murder 2nd (F)
LIO: Murder 1st
RK11-12-0160-01 PFDCF(F)
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
Susan G. Schmidhauser, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware. Lionel J. Williamson, Pro se. FREUD, Commissioner
The defendant, Lionel J. Williamson ("Williamson"), pled guilty on March 7, 2013 to one count of Murder Second Degree lesser included offense of Murder First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 635(1) and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 11 Del. C. § 1447A. He was also facing two counts of Possession of a Firearm or Firearm Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, one count of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, and one count of Conspiracy First Degree. Nolle prosequis were entered by the State on the additional five charges in exchange for Williamson's plea. A presentence report was ordered. Williamson faced a minimum mandatory sentence of life in prison and a potential death sentence had he gone to trial and been found guilty as charged of murder in the first degree. On May 15, 2013 Williamson was sentenced to a total of fifty-three years (20 years minimum mandatory) at Level V, suspended after serving thirty-three years for one year at Level IV halfway house followed by two years at Level III probation.
FACTS
On October 8, 2011 at 3:12 a.m., Dover Police Department responded to a shooting complaint that occurred at Sunoco, 837 N. Dupont Highway, Dover, Delaware. The investigation revealed that Williamson shot victim Marcus Ware ("Ware") three times with a .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun. His codefendants were Warren Brooks and Kurt Dupree. Ware was pronounced dead at Bayhealth Hospital. The Police collected several pieces of evidence from the gas station where the shooting occurred, including a surveillance video and an important statement by a witness, Maria Brunson ("Brunson"), who was there at the time of the shooting. The surveillance video depicted the shooting, although the police could not immediately identify the shooter. Brunson provided information that led to their first suspect. Brunson stated that she was at the Sunoco gas station when she received a phone call from Brooks just prior to the shooting. Brooks told her to get out of the way because 'something was about to happen."
State v. Williamson, Del. Super., ID No. 1110018657 (Feb. 21, 2012) Tr. at 19.
Id. at 19, 34.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Police interviewed Brooks and executed a search warrant on his house. At his home, they recovered a magazine that would fit a ".380 type handgun," which matched the caliber of shell casings found at the crime scene. During his interview with police, Brooks stated that he had been with Dupree on the night of the incident. The police then interviewed Dupree.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 24.
Dupree and Brooks provided inconsistent information about who was with them on the night of the shooting. Brooks indicated that it was just Dupree and himself, while Dupree state that he, Brooks and two other men named "Chris" and "Black" were together that evening. As police continued to investigate the instant offense, they discovered that the shell casings found at the Sunoco matched shell casings linked to another shooting which had occurred a month prior. A suspect in that shooting had been identified only by nickname: "Bloodhound." Police investigating the instant offense ascertained that the nickname belonged to Dupree. That discovery ultimately led to Dupree's arrest.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
After his arrest, Dupree provided another statement to police. In that statement, he said that Williamson had been with him on the night of the Sunoco shooting. While awaiting extradition from Maryland, Dupree made a phone call during which he spoke with Williamson and told him to "leave the trailer park". Dupree told Williamson that a photograph had been found on his cell phone which depicted Williamson "holding the trigger." The "trigger" was a gun similar to the one witnesses described as being used in the Sunoco shooting.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Police then interviewed Williamson. Williamson indicated that he had been at a party on the night of the shooting. When police recovered photographs that were taken at the party, the pictures revealed that Williamson was wearing a hat seen worn by the shooter on the Sunoco video surveillance.
Id.
Id. at 31
Id. at 32
Police looked into the cell phone records of Williamson and Brooks and discovered that both of their phones were in the area of the Sunoco at the time the shooting occurred.
Id. at 32-33.
On February 16, 2012, the State expressed its intent to proceed with capital cases against Williamson and Brooks. On August 29, 2012, Dupree took a plea deal and agreed to testify against Williamson and Brooks at trial. The record does not reflect a cooperation agreement between the State and Brooks, however, the State entered nolle prosequis on all of Brooks' charges on September 26, 2012 (Del. Super., ID No. 1110018834). A statement given by Dupree to Dover Police on March 4, 2013 implicated Williamson as the shooter.
State v. Williamson, Del. Super., ID No. 1110018657 (Feb. 16, 2012) D.I. 14.
Williamson did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court. On January 24, 2014 he filed a motion for postconviction relief. On February 26, 2014, the Court signed an order requesting that the Office of Conflicts Counsel appoint counsel for Williamson. After reviewing the file, Appointed Counsel, Patrick J. Collins, Esq. and Albert J. Roop, V, Esq. determined that there were no meritorious grounds for relief. On September 25, 2014, Appointed Counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2) with a supporting Memorandum. The memorandum detailed their review of the case and Williamson's arguments. On December 3, 2014 the Court granted appointed counsel's Motion to Withdraw.
WILLIAMSON'S CONTENTIONS
In Williamson's original Motion for Postconviction Relief he raises the following grounds for relief:
Ground one: Unfulled (sic) Plea Agreement
When the defendant signed the Plea Agreement, he was lead to believe by his counsel that he would receive a sentence of (25) years @ level (5) however the defendant was sentenced to (33) years @ level (5) which violates the plea agreement. For plea agreements are governed by contract principles. The principles include the implied covenant of good faith & fair dealing. A covenant of good faith & fair dealing is implied I plea agreements and other agreements into which State and defendant may enter. Plea agreements are undertaken for mutual advantage and are governed by contract principles. Therefore any agreement between the State and a defendant (movant) in any context is a contract. This is well supported by the common laws of other
jurisdiction (sic). So when the plea agreement was not honored, the contract principles of the plea agreement were violated, thus making the plea invalid.
Ground two: Ineffective assistance of counsel
The defendant's counsel became ineffective during the plea agreement process, for he lead the defendant into believing that the plea agreement would be honored without requesting that a cap be added not to go over the (25) years as agreed upon by both parties, being the State and the movant. Thus without the movant counsel wanton misconduct which return have caused a reckless disreguard (sic) for the right of the movant contract principles that in turned (sic) caused an injury to the movant.
Ground three: The defendant unknowingly & unintelligently waived rights
When the defendant signed the plea, his counsel did not provide him with other ways of pleading, such as nolo contendere (sic), Robinson plea, dilatory plea or a stipulated trial agreement with the State whereby I would have waived my trial rights and admitted guilt. However I would have preserved my rights to appeal all aspects of the superior court's decision for there are issues that I wised to raise but I was not able to.
These grounds represent all of Williamson's arguments. He did not file a memorandum with the motion.
DISCUSSION
Under Delaware law, this Court must first determine whether Williamson has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Williamson's first motion for postconviction relief, and it was filed within one year of his conviction becoming final. Therefore, the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) - requiring filing within one year and (2) - requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in initial Rule 61 motion, are met. None of Williamson's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing, or on direct appeal. Therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3), absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. To some extent each of Williamson's claims are based on ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised them earlier.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).
At this point, Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to Williamson's grounds for relief, provided he demonstrates that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Williamson must meet the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. The failure to establish that a defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that, when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 687.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997)(citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988))(citations omitted).
See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).
Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990)(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986)).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly clear that Williamson has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find trial counsel's affidavit and Appointed Counsel's motion to withdraw, in conjunction with the record, more credible that Williamson's self-serving claims that his counsel's representation was ineffective. Williamson's counsel clearly denies the allegations. Furthermore, Appointed Counsel thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and concluded that none of Williamson's claims were meritorious and that no other meritorious claims could be found.
As noted, Williamson was facing the possibility of life in prison or a death sentence had he been convicted, and the sentence and plea were reasonable under all the circumstances, especially in light of the evidence against him. Prior to the entry of the plea, Williamson and his attorney discussed the case. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Williamson. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Williamson entered his guilty plea, he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Williamson has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test. Additionally Williamson acknowledged his guilt and expressed remorse at his sentencing.
Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.)(citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel's representation of Williamson was somehow deficient, Williamson must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. In an attempt to show prejudice, Williamson simply asserts that his counsel was ineffective. His statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the evidence against him. Therefore, I find Williamson's grounds for relief are meritless.
Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2 (Del. Supr.)(citing Younger, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)).
To the extent that Williamson alleges his plea was involuntary, the record contradicts such an allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Williamson whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading guilty, and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty. The Court asked Williamson if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he pled guilty; if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form ("Guilty Plea Form"); and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Williamson if he had discussed the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Williamson if he was entering into the plea as he was guilty of the charges. The Court also asked Williamson if he was satisfied with this counsel's representation. Williamson answered each of these questions affirmatively. I find counsel's representations far more credible than Williamson's self-serving, vague allegations.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).
State v. Williamson, Del. Super., ID No. 1110018657 (March 7, 2013) Tr. at 5-11.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Williamson signed a Guilty Plea Form and Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Williamson's signatures on the forms indicate that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the Plea Agreement. Williamson is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form, unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. I confidently find that Williamson entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that Williamson's grounds for relief are completely meritless.
Sommerville, 703 A.2d at 632. --------
CONCLUSION
I find that Williamson's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Williamson has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Williamson's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny Williamson's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred and completely meritless.
/s/ Andrea M. Freud
Commissioner