Opinion
ID No. 9703003627.
Date submitted: March 3, 1999.
Date decided: May 19, 1999. Motion Denied: February 8, 2000
Upon Review of Defendant's Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, DENIED.
Diane M. Coffey, Esq., State of Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Charles Williams, pro se.
ORDER
Upon review of Charles Williams ("Defendant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1) On November 10, 1998, Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on a plea to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Third Degree, Burglary Second Degree and Assault Third Degree. On December 18, 1999, Defendant filed the same pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief with a Memorandum of Legal Arguments. Because the second motion is a copy of the first motion but for additional case citations, this Order will treat the motions as one and address them as follows:
2) On May 27, 1997, the Grand Jury charged Defendant with Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree ( 11 Del. C. § 775) (IN97030600R1), Burglary Second Degree ( 11 Del. C. § 825) (IN97030601R1) and Assault Third Degree ( 11 Del. C. § 611) (IN97030602R1). Trial was scheduled for February 18, 1998. On February 18, 1998, Movant pleaded guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Third Degree, Burglary Second Degree and Assault Third Degree.
Defendant's Plea Agreement, dated February 18, 1998, states that Defendant would plead guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Third Degree, Burglary Second Degree and Assault Third Degree. The agreement further indicates that no charges would be dropped. The Sentence Recommendation section of the agreement states that a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") would be recommended, and that after the PSI, the recommended sentence would be 18 years Level V suspended after five years served for six months Level IV, then 18 months at Level III, then the balance of 11 years at Level II. The State and the Defendant agreed that restitution would be determined by the PSI, that Defendant would have no contact with the victim or her family, that he would comply with 11 Del. C. § 4120 (Registration of Sex Offenders) and with 11 Del. C. § 4336 (Community Notice of Released Sex Offenders) upon his release, that Defendant would receive psychological treatment and evaluation and that Defendant would stay more than 100 yards away from the victim.
Defendant's Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, dated February 18, 1998 and signed by Defendant, indicates that the statutory penalty for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Third Degree is 0-10 years, that the statutory penalty for Burglary Second Degree is 0-8 years and that the statutory penalty for Assault Third Degree is 0-1 year.
3) On August 21, 1998, Defendant was sentenced. As to the charge of Unlawful Intercourse Third Degree, Defendant was sentenced, effective May 21, 1998, to Level V for a period of 10 years, suspended for five years at Level IV. After six months at Level IV, suspended for four years at Level III; after 18 months at Level III, suspended for three years at Level II. As to Burglary Second Degree, Defendant was sentenced to Level V for four years, suspended for four years at Level II. As to Assault Third Degree, Defendant was sentenced to level V for one year, suspended for one year at Level II.
4) In this motion, Defendant asserts: (1) that his attorney presented him with an incomplete plea agreement; (2) ineffectiveness of counsel; and (3) illegal plea.
5) In reviewing motions for Postconviction Relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. This is Defendant's first Motion for Post Conviction Relief and the Court has determined that no procedural bars listed in Rule 61 are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's application.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
6) Defendant alleges that his plea is illegal because his attorney was allegedly presented movant with an incomplete plea agreement and then induced him to sign the plea agreement and accept it at sentencing.
The first issue to be considered is Defendant's claim that defense counsel purposely presented Defendant with an incomplete plea agreement so that Defendant believed he would be sentenced only to five years at Level V for all charges together. First, the plea agreement, signed by Defendant, clearly states the fUll sentence. In fact, the recommendation starts with "18 years Level V," which in no way indicates to this Court that Defendant agreed to a five year sentence. The "five years" to which Defendant refers is most likely the five years he would spend at Level V, not the entirety of his sentence.
The second issue to be considered is Defendant's claim that his attorney induced him to sign the plea and did not allow Defendant to speak on his own behalf at trial. In addition to the clarity of the plea agreement, the Court finds that Defendant participated fully in his plea proceeding and at his sentencing hearing. Defendant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, Burglary Second Degree and Assault Third Degree.
And, a review of the plea transcript reveals that the Court clearly had a factual basis for accepting the plea. During the guilty plea hearing, the Court reiterated the factual bases for charging and indicting Defendant and in response to the Court's questions, Defendant stated to the Court that he was guilty of the described crimes.
Hr'g Tr. of Feb. 18, 1998.
Defendant acknowledged that he was aware of the maximum time of imprisonment for the charges and the fines which they could carry. He responded that he understood the time of imprisonment that he would receive, that the plea was knowing and voluntary, that he was not being forced to plea and that he did not receive a promise in exchange for his plea. The Court offered Defendant an opportunity to address the Court. Moreover, at the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated to the judge the exact sentence as it reads on the plea agreement.
Defendant indicated that he understood the agreed upon sentence. He again indicated that he understood the maximum term of imprisonment for the charges. He stated that he understood that his guilty plea was made pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) and that if the Court did not follow the recommended sentence, that he could withdraw his plea and proceed. He further acknowledged that he entered into the guilty plea freely and voluntarily. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of his plea agreement. He was adequately advised in a timely and appropriate manner of the conditions of his plea, and he is bound by his written plea agreement and by his statements that he understood the plea to which he agreed.
At his sentencing hearing, Defendant told the Court "I know what I did was wrong . . . can you put me in a program to better myself." The Court responded that it would help Defendant, but that ultimately Defendant is responsible for his own betterment and success. Defendant responded that he understood this.
Hr'g Tr. of Aug. 21, 1998.
7) Defendant couches his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the allegations that his attorney was allegedly presented movant with an incomplete plea agreement and that his attorney induced him to sign the plea agreement and accept it at sentencing.
In order to establish trial counsel's assistance as so defective as to deprive a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, the defendant must show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective level of reasonableness; and (2) that the Defendant was prejudiced, i.e., that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1184, 1185 (1989
At each hearing Defendant was permitted to address the Court and ultimately did so. He had a full and fair opportunity to communicate to the Court his discontent with defense counsel. An alleged interruption by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing is Defendant's only supporting fact for ineffective assistance of counsel, and the transcript does not reflect that Defendant was interrupted by defense counsel. As such, this Court concludes that counsel's conduct did not fall below the standard set forth in Strickland.
Hr'g Tr. of Aug. 21, 1998.
8) For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the grounds upon which Defendant bases his Motion are without merit. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.