Opinion
05-02-2014
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRANDON GERRARD WILLIAMS
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney and Allison Miller Rutzen Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Phyllis M. Williams Hammond, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Brandon G. Williams
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 1-10-0584, SECTION 3, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. ERWIN, JUDGE
Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
and
Allison Miller Rutzen
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Phyllis M. Williams
Hammond, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Brandon G. Williams
BEFORE: KUHN, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND THERIOT, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
KUHN, J.,
The defendant, Brandon Gerrard Williams, was charged by bill of information with possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance (marijuana) (count 1), a violation of La. R.S. 40:966A; possession with intent to distribute a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (Alprazolam) (count 2), a violation of La. R.S. 40:969A; and illegal carrying of weapons (count 3), a violation of La. R.S. 14:95E. He initially entered a plea of not guilty. He filed various motions, including motions to suppress the confession and the evidence, motions to quash, and a motion in limine, all of which were denied by the district court. The defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty as to count one and entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to "look into the pretrial decision" under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). The State dismissed the charges in counts two and three. The district court deferred imposition of sentence under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 and placed the defendant under active supervised probation for a period of three years. The defendant now appeals, alleging six assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
FACTS
The facts of the case were not fully developed because the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere. According to the bill of information, Boykin colloquy, and the hearings on the motions to suppress, the defendant was arrested relative to a search warrant executed on August 26, 2009, at his apartment on College Drive, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant alleged that a controlled buy took place wherein a confidential informant purchased marijuana from the defendant at his apartment. After conducting their search, officers found marijuana, $3,111.00, weapons, ammunition, and a digital scale in the apartment. The defendant stated that he would take responsibility for what was found inside of the apartment.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
CROSBY PLEA
The defendant tendered his plea of nolo contendere pursuant to Crosby. A plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to an admission of guilt and is treated as a guilty plea. La. C.Cr.P. art. 552(4); State v. Gordon, 04-0633 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/29/04), 896 So.2d 1053, 1061, writ denied, 04-3144 (La. 4/1/05), 897 So.2d 600. It is well settled that a plea of guilty normally waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea. Crosby, 338 So.2d at 586. However, the defendant is allowed to condition his guilty plea upon the appellate review of specified pre-plea errors. The defendant must specifically reserve the right for appellate review of any rulings of the district court prior to entering his guilty plea. See State v. Aguiltard, 357 So.2d 535, 537 (La. 1978); see also Crosby, 338 So.2d at 588.
When the defendant tendered his plea, defense counsel stated that he was pleading subject to Crosby so that he could still pursue his "right to look into the pretrial decision." Contrary to Crosby, the defendant did not state which specific adverse ruling he wished to appeal. Although the defendant did not state with specificity which ruling he wished to reserve for appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that "[a] defendant's failure to specify which pre-trial rulings he desires to reserve for appeal as part of a guilty plea entered pursuant to [ Crosby ], may limit the scope of appellate review but should not preclude review altogether." See State v . Joseph, 03-315 (La. 5/16/03), 847 So.2d 1196 (per curiam). Absent a detailed specification of which adverse pretrial rulings the defendant reserved for appellate review as part of his guilty plea, an appellate court should presume that the district court permitted a Crosby reservation no broader than necessary to effectuate the underlying purpose of conditional guilty pleas, i.e., to preserve review of evidentiary rulings that "go to the heart of the prosecution's case" that a defendant would otherwise waive by entering an unqualified guilty plea. Such rulings typically include denial of a motion to suppress evidence or a confession and exclude rulings which may affect the conduct of trial but "which do not substantially relate to guilt, such as the denial of a continuance or severance." Joseph, 847 So.2d at 1196-97.
Because the defendant failed, at the time that he entered his plea pursuant to Crosby, to specify which pretrial rulings he desired to preserve for appeal, this court is limited to a review of evidentiary rulings that "go to the heart of the prosecution's case." Joseph, 847 So.2d at 1196-97.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE, TWO, AND THREE
In his first two assignments of error, the defendant complains that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for discovery without conducting an in camera inspection of the evidence to determine whether the police report that described the controlled buy between the confidential informant and the defendant contained favorable evidence that was relevant to the issue of guilt. In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony or evidence relative to the confidential informant and the controlled buy due to the denial of his discovery request for the police report. According to the defendant, he was entitled to discovery of the report and, because it was not provided, any evidence from the controlled buy should have been excluded at trial.
The defendant filed a "Motion to Compel/Traverse Discovery" on January 26, 2011. The matter was heard on April 4, 2011, and the defendant complained that the State failed to comply with discovery by not turning over a police report detailing the controlled buy referenced by Detective Drew White at the January 13, 2011, motion to suppress hearing. The State responded that open- file discovery had been provided and that the report in. question was not in its file because the defendant was not being charged with the sale of marijuana to the confidential informant or for possession during the controlled buy. The State further argued that the report would not come into the trial as evidence and was not germane to its file. The court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant sought review by this court of that ruling and was denied relief. See State v. Williams, 11-0790 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/5/11) (unpublished).
Detective White, with the Baton Rcuge Police Department, authored the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant executed at the defendant's apartment and the police report.
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On May 17, 2013, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony relative to the confidential informant and the controlled buy. In his motion, the defendant argued that the evidence should be excluded because he was denied pretrial discovery relative to the buy. A hearing was held on the matter on May 20, 2013. At the hearing, the State argued that the controlled buy was part of the res gestae of the case and had to be introduced. The defendant argued that the report should have been provided to him in discovery if the State planned to introduce evidence of the controlled buy. According to the defendant, without the report, he had no information relative to the controlled buy. However, as pointed out by the State, two motion to suppress hearings were held wherein officers testified in detail about the controlled buy and were subject to cross-examination. Based on the State's arguments, the district court denied the motion in limine.
The defendant did not request that the district court conduct an in camera inspection at either the April 4, 201L or May 20, 2013, hearings. His "Motion to Compel/Traverse Discovery" also does not request an in camera inspection. The last paragraph of the motion "reiterates [the defendant's] original request for discovery." The defendant's original 'Motion for Discovery" from the State prays that the court order the production of the requested materials or, in the alternative, "order their production for the inspection, in camera[,] to determine whether disclosure is required by law." Arguably, because the defendant was provided open-file discovery and because he failed to put the district court on notice that he was requesting an in camera inspection, he is precluded from complaining that the district court erred in failing to conduct such an inspection on appeal.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals that the defendant failed to proffer the police report by requesting that the State place it in the record for review by this court. To preserve the right to appeal a district court ruling that excludes evidence, the defendant must make the substance of the evidence known to the district court. See La. C.E. art. 103A(2). Because the defendant failed to make a proffer, he is barred procedurally from advancing assignments of error numbers one, two, and three on appeal. State v. Lynch, 94-0543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 470, 480, writ denied, 95-1441 (La. 11/13/95), 662 So.2d 466. Only matters contained in the record can be reviewed on appeal. See State v. Vamp ran. 491 So.2d 1356, 1364 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 496 So.2d 347 (La. 1986). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to preserve for review the district court's alleged errors in connection with the police report.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR
In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash wherein he alleged that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial because more than three years elapsed since the institution of prosecution. The defendant also contends that the two-year statutory time limit provided by La. C.Cr.P. art. 578A(2) for commencement of trial was violated by the delay.
Statutory Time Limitations
Prosecution of this matter was instituted by the filing of a bill of information on January 21, 2010. Because the defendant was charged with a non-capitai felony, La. C.Cr.P. art. 578A(2) required commencement of his trial within two years of that date. After trial was scheduled for May 20, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to quash based on the State's failure to commence trial within two years of the institution of prosecution. The district court denied the motion on May 20, 2013, based on suspensions of prescription due to motions filed by the defendant as well as other delays caused by the defendant.
Upon expiration of the time limitations provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 578A(2) for commencement of trial, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the indictment, and there shall be no further prosecution against the defendant for that criminal conduct. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 581. Moreover, when the defendant has brought an apparently meritorious motion to quash based on a violation of the statutory time limits, the State bears a heavy burden to demonstrate either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit such that prescription will not have tolled. State v. Lathers, 05-0786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 1038, 1043, writ denied, 06-1036 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So.2d 659.
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 580A, the statutory time limits are suspended when a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea. When the prescriptive period is suspended, the relevant period is not counted, and the running of the time limit resumes when the court rules on the pending motion, although in no case shall the State have less than one year after the ruling to commence trial. La. C.Cr.P. an. 580A; Lathers, 924 So.2d at 1043. A preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense that has the effect of delaying trial, including properly filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for continuance. See Lathers , 924 So.2d at 1043. Joint motions to continue likewise suspend the period of limitation. State v. Simpson , 506 So.2d 837, 838 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 512 So.2d 433 (La. 1987).
When a district court denies a motion to quash, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the district court's discretion. See State v. Odom, 02-2698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03), 861 So.2d 187, 191, writ denied, 03-2142 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 765. However, a district court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So,2d 501, 504.
As noted, prosecution was instituted in this case by the filing of a bill of information on January 21, 2010. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 934(7). Thus, absent a suspension or interruption of the statutory time limit, the State had until January 21, 2012, to commence the defendant's trial. The matter came before the court for arraignment on February 18, 2010, and was set. for motions on April 27, 2010. The record reflects that the defendant filed a motion to suppress on March 2, 2010. On April 27, the defendant moved to have the matter continued to August 19, 2010. At the August 19 hearing, the State moved for a continuance, and the defendant objected. The matter was continued until January 13, 2011. The defendant's motion to suppress was denied on January 13, 2011.
The defendant filed another motion for continuance on March 18, 2011, requesting a continuance of the trial date, set for March 28, 2011. On March 28, neither the defendant nor defense counsel appeared in court. The court issued a bench wairant for defendant's failure to appear. On April 4, 2011, the parties appeared before the court and defense counsel explained that she had filed a motion to continue and accepted responsibility for the defendant's failure to appear on March 28. The court recalled the bench warrant.
On April 29, 2011, the defendant filed notice of intent to file a writ application seeking review of the denial of his motion to compel discovery. As previously noted, the defendant was denied relief by this court on July 5, 2011. The parties returned to court that day, and the matter was continued to October 12, 2011, on joint motion of the State and defendant.
The defendant filed a second motion to suppress on September 20, 2011. When the parties returned to court on October 12, 2011, the defendant requested a continuance, and the matter was continued until February 22, 2012. On February 15, 2012, the defendant was remanded for a positive drug screen. The matter was reassigned to February 24, 2012. When the parties returned to court on that date, the matter was reassigned to March 21, 2012. On motion of defense counsel, the matter was continued to August 1, 2012. The State requested a continuance on August i, and the matter was continued until January 28, 2013. On January 28, 2013, the district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress and assigned trial for May 20, 2013.
Based on the above motions filed by the defendant suspending prescription, the district court correctly concluded that the two-year limitation provided by La. C.Cr.P. art. 578A(2) had not tolled. Prosecution was instituted on January 21, 2010. Defendant's first motion to suppress, which was filed on March 2, 2010, was not ruled on until January 13, 2011. During that time, the defendant filed a motion to continue. The defendant then filed a second motion to continue on March 18, 2011. A joint motion to continue was filed on July 5, 2011. Defendant's second motion to suppress was filed on September 20, 2011, and was not ruled on until January 28, 2013. The defendant requested two continuances during that time. During the period the motions were pending, the statutory time limits for commencement of trial were suspended. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 580A. Therefore, no violation of the statutory time limitation occurred in this case.
Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). See also La. Const. art. 1, § 16. In determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts are required to assess the following factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Love, 00-3347 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210. Under the rules established in Barker, none of these four factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Instead, they are related factors that must be considered together "in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
The first of the Barker factors, the length of the delay, serves as a "triggering mechanism" and if it is determined that the delay is not "presumptively prejudicial," the remaining Barker factors need not be considered. Love, 847 So.2d at 1210. In this case, the delay between the institution of prosecution and the scheduled trial date was approximately three years and four months. While we find that a delay of this length is not necessarily presumptively prejudicial, we will consider the remaining Barker factors. Cf. State v. Bell, 13-0117 (La. 9/27/13), 122 So.3d 1007 (per curiam); Love, 847 So.2d at 1211.
The second Barker factor to be considered is the reason for the delay. The procedural history of the case is outlined above. It appears that there were various reasons for the delay, most of which were attributable to the defendant. Considering the procedural history, we conclude that the record indicates that the delay in this case was prompted by legitimate reasons.
The third Barker factor requires consideration of whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. The defendant's failure to do so will make it difficult to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. In this case, the defendant raised no formal speedy trial claim until April 23, 2013, when he filed his motion to quash on the grounds of a speedy trial violation.
The final Barker factor to be considered is prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. The assessment of prejudice involves weighing three of the defendant's interests: (1) To prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193
In the Instant case, the defendant was out on bail for most of the delay preceding trial, with the exception of the time he served for contempt of court due to a positive result on his drug screen. The defendant asserts his defense was impaired by the delay because the ability of witnesses to recall details was affected by the lapse of time. He notes that two State witnesses had difficulty recalling specific details surrounding the execution of the search warrant and the crime scene. A review of the record indicates that one of those witnesses, Detective Joseph Rawls, did have difficulty recalling some details. However, when he was unable to recall details, he so indicated. These were factors that went to the weight of the testimony, which is a matter for the trier-of-fact. Accordingly, we do not believe that the defendant has shown sufficient prejudice to establish that his right to speedy trial was violated. Considering this factor together with the other three factors of the Barker balancing test, we find that there has been no showing that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS FIVE AND SIX
In his last two assignments of error, the defendant contends that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress the evidence. Specifically, the defendant argues that Detective White falsified the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant by stating that he could see the defendant's apartment door from the parking lot during the controlled buy. The defendant also argues that if the information in the affidavit was true, the officers would not have executed a search on the wrong apartment in his complex (Apartment 172), which he claims they did prior to searching his apartment (Apartment 176).
When a search and seizure of evidence is conducted pursuant to a search warrant, the defendant has the burden to prove the grounds of his motion to suppress. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703D; State v. Hunter, 632 So.2d 786, 788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-0752 (La. 6/17/94), 638 So.2d 1092. When a district court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81; State v. Letell, 12-0180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/12), 103 So.3d 1129, 1147, writ denied, 12-2533 (La. 4/26/13), 112 So.3d 838. However, a district court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See Letell 103 So.3d at 1147.
Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution requires that a search warrant issue only upon an affidavit establishing probable cause to the satisfaction of an impartial magistrate. See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 162A. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place to be searched. State v. Johnson, 408 So.2d 1280, 1283 (La. 1982). The facts establishing the existence of probable cause for the warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit. State v. Green, 02-1022 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 962, 969; State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105, 1108 (La. 1982).
An issuing magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a "fair probability" that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Green, 831 So.2d at 969. The process of determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant does not involve certainties or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even a prima facie showing, but rather involves probabilities of human behavior, as understood by persons trained in law enforcement and as based on the totality of circumstances. The process simply requires that enough information be presented to the issuing magistrate to enable him to determine that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal justice system. See State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 832-33 (La. 1983).
The review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause prior to issuing a warrant is entitled to significant deference by reviewing courts. "[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Further, because of "the preference to be accorded to warrants," marginal cases should be resolved in favor of a finding that the issuing magistrate's judgment was reasonable. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d at 833.
The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant in the instant case provided, in pertinent part:
Affiant informs the Court that within the past 48 hours Affiant was contacted by a confidential and previously proven reliable informant, hereafter referred to as C.I. The C.I. advised that a black male known to the C.I. as "Brandon1' is trafficking in marijuana from the residence located at 2245 College Dr #176. In order to verify the C.I.'s claims, Affiant conducted a controlled purchase with the C.I. purchasing a quantity of marijuana from "Brandon" at the residence located at 2245 College Dr #176. Prior to conducting the controlled purchase, Affiant searched the C.I., and no monies nor contraband was located. Affiant then provided the C.I. with a quantity of narcotics funds . . . . Affiant then conducted surveillance of the C.I. and observed the C.I. proceed directly to 2245 College Dr #176 and enter the residence. Affiant observed the C.I. exit the residence a short time later, and proceed directly to a predetermined location. The C.I. then surrendered to Affiant a quantity of marijuana and related the following: The C.I. contacted "Brandon" inside the residence, asked him for some marijuana, and provided him with the narcotics funds. The C.I. advises that "Brandon" then went into another room in the residence and retrieved an amount of marijuana, then came back into the front room and handed it to the C.I. The C.I. advises that "Brandon" then asked the C.I. when the C.I. was going to come get some more. The C.I. then stated that the C.I. would be back to get some more in a few days. The C.I. stated that the C.I. then left the residence. The C.I. stated that firearms have been seen, and are readily available inside of the residence. Affiant then searched the C.I. and no additional monies nor contraband was located.
The defendant claims that Detective White's statement that he could see the defendant's apartment door from the parking lot of the apartment complex was untruthful. He contends that Detective White could not have observed from his position the confidential informant enter and exit the defendant's apartment during the controlled buy. He also claims that if Detective White had observed a controlled buy at the defendant's apartment, then the officers would not have executed a search on the wrong apartment (Apartment 172).
The defendant filed his first motion to suppress the evidence on March 2, 2010, and a hearing was held on the motion on January 13, 2011. At the hearing, Detective White testified that he observed a controlled buy at 2245 College Drive, Apartment Number 176, on August 26, 2009. He stated that the informant had no drugs on his person when he entered the apartment, and that he observed the informant enter the apartment. He also observed the informant exit the apartment and immediately proceed directly to him with the marijuana. Detective White testified that the buy took place during the daytime and that he could see the defendant's apartment from where he was sitting in his vehicle. Detective White also denied that, prior to searching the defendant's apartment, he entered and searched Apartment 172. Detective White explained that officers did go downstairs to check on the occupants in Apartment 172 to ensure that no one was injured after a shotgun belonging to one of the detectives fell and accidentally discharged. The district court found that there was probable cause for the warrant.
The defendant filed a' motion to quash the search warrant and a second motion to suppress the evidence on September 20, 2011, and a hearing was held on the motion on January 28, 2013. The defendant reiterated the same argument that Detective White falsified the affidavit to obtain the search warrant. At the motion hearing, Detective White again testified that he could clearly see the defendant's apartment from the parking lot and that he did not search Apartment 172 prior to entering the defendant's apartment. According to Detective White, the occupants in Apartment 172 were "checked" on because of the accidental discharge of the shotgun, but he did not know who among the officers, if anyone, entered the apartment. Additionally, Detective Rawls, one of the officers involved in the search of the defendant's apartment, testified that he did not go into Apartment 172 on the day of the search nor did he see anyone enter that apartment.
The defendant presented the testimony of Gary Murray who lived in Apartment 172 on the day of the search. According to Murray, officers pounded on his door, told him to get on the ground, and came into his apartment before they went upstairs to the defendant's apartment. He stated that whether the defendant's door could be seen from the parking lot depends on the angle of view. The defendant also presented the testimony of Murray's friend, Jacob Mitchell, who was at Murray's apartment on the day of the search. Mitchell testified that officers banged on the door, rushed the occupants of the apartment outside, and told them to sit down after throwing them against the wall. Shortly thereafter, Mitchell heard a "bang." After hearing all of the testimony, the court denied the defendant's second motion to suppress the evidence.
Considering all of the information that Detective White had, including the details that a black male, named Brandon, was trafficking marijuana from 2245 College Drive, Apartment Number 176, in addition to his observations during the controlled buy, we find that the search warrant was properly issued based on the probable cause that the defendant was in possession of marijuana:
Moreover, even had the search warrant been based on less than probable cause, under the Leon good-faith exception, the evidence seized pursuant to that search would not be suppressed. It is well settled that even when a search warrant is found to be deficient, the seized evidence may nevertheless be admissible under the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418-19, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in an objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.
Under Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, four instances In which suppression remains an appropriate remedy are: (1) where the Issuing magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard for the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in. its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient - in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized - that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
The instances delineated in Leon in which suppression remains an appropriate remedy clearly reflect that suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant is not a remedy to be lightly considered. Furthermore, the jurisprudence presumes good faith on the part of the executing officer, and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the necessity for suppression of evidence by establishing a lack of good faith. State v. Maxwell, 09-1359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/10), 38 So.3d 1086, 1092, writ denied, 10-1284 (La. 9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1056.
Applying these factors to this case, we find that even if the search warrant was to be considered defective, the good-faith exception would apply. The defendant did not establish a lack of good faith on the part of Detective White. There were no misleading statements contained in the affidavit. There was no evidence that the issuing magistrate abandoned his neutral role in his issuance of the search warrant; nor was there anything on the face of the warrant that would make it so deficient that it could not be presumed valid. Detective White provided the judge with information that he had gathered after observing the controlled buy confirming the confidential informant's statement that the defendant was trafficking marijuana from his apartment. Detective White was not unreasonable in believing he had provided the judge with sufficient information to issue a search warrant. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence would not be appropriate considering the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Maxwell, 38 So.3d at 1092. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motions to suppress. These assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.