Opinion
2017 KA 0339
09-15-2017
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. NOEL WILLIAMS, JR.
Ricky Babin District Attorney Donald Candell Joni Buquoi Assistant District Attorneys Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Brent M. Stockstill Philip B. Adams Andre' Belanger Baton Rouge, Louisiana Pegram J. Mire, Jr. Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Noel Williams, Jr.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Ascension State of Louisiana
No. 35,258 Honorable Jason Verdigets, Judge Presiding Ricky Babin
District Attorney
Donald Candell
Joni Buquoi
Assistant District Attorneys
Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana Brent M. Stockstill
Philip B. Adams
Andre' Belanger
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Pegram J. Mire, Jr.
Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Noel Williams, Jr. BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. McCLENDON, J.
Defendant, Noel Williams, Jr., was charged by bill of information with felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:80A(1). Defendant initially entered a plea of not guilty, but he later withdrew that plea and entered a plea of guilty as charged. In exchange for his plea, defendant received an agreed-upon sentence of five years at hard labor. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant filed a motion to amend or modify his sentence and a separate motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. The trial court held a hearing and ultimately denied defendant's motions. Defendant now appeals, alleging a single assignment of error regarding the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
Because defendant pled guilty, the facts of his offense were not developed at a trial. At the time of defendant's plea, the trial court recited the basic facts of defendant's offense as related by the district attorney's office:
On or about October 27, 2015, in the Parish of Ascension[,] Noel Williams committed the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile by having vaginal intercourse with a 13[-]year[-]old juvenile in the backseat of his car.Defendant agreed with those facts.
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
In his sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Specifically, defendant argues that his plea in exchange for a five-year sentence was not knowingly and intelligently made because he was led to believe that he would receive a misdemeanor plea offer until the day before he pled guilty. Defendant claims that he agreed to a five-year sentence because he believed he had no other option.
Defendant recognizes that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Williams, 16-0007, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16) (unpublished).
Normally, a defendant's plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects. State v. Fields, 95-2481 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96), 686 So.2d 107, 108. Upon motion of the defendant and after a contradictory hearing, which may be waived by the State in writing, the court may permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn at any time before sentence. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 559A. In State v. Lewis, 421 So.2d 224, 225-26 (La. 1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a trial court may permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing if the court finds that the guilty plea was not entered freely and voluntarily, or if there was an inadequate Boykin colloquy advising the defendant of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, making the guilty plea constitutionally infirm. See also State v. O'Brien, 14-0899 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 627, 631. There is no absolute right to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty. State v. Barnes, 97-2522 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 923, 925. The withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal only if that discretion is abused or arbitrarily exercised. See State v. Johnson, 406 So.2d 569, 571 (La. 1981).
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
For a guilty plea to be found valid, there must be a showing that the defendant was informed of and waived his constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury, right of confrontation, and right against compulsory self-incrimination. A guilty plea must be entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; see also State v. White, 517 So.2d 461, 462 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 521 So.2d 1184 (La. 1988). In determining whether the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary, the court must not only look to the colloquy concerning the waiver of rights, but also other factors that may have a bearing on the decision. See, e.g., State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, 416 So.2d 82 (La. 1982); State v. Galliano, 396 So.2d 1288 (La. 1981); State v. Calhoun, 96-0786 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 909. Similarly, in reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion, courts have looked to the guilty plea colloquy to determine whether the defendant was advised of the consequences of his plea and whether he voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights. What the accused understood is determined in terms of the entire record and not just certain "magic words" used by the trial judge. State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 543 (La. 1991). Everything that appears in the record concerning the offense, as well as the trial judge's opportunity to observe the defendant's appearance, demeanor and responses in court, should be considered in determining whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights occurred. See State v. Cadiere, 99-0970 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 294, 297, writ denied, 00-0815 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 971. Factors bearing on the validity of this determination include the age, education, experience, background, competency, and conduct of the accused, as well as the nature, complexity, and seriousness of the charge. O'Brien, 168 So.3d at 631.
Defendant argued in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea that he had been promised a misdemeanor plea offer under LSA-R.S. 14:80.1, that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered or made after having been informed of his rights under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 556.1, and that he was not adequately represented by counsel. On appeal, defendant notes that he does not raise any issues concerning the advice of his Boykin rights or the effectiveness of his counsel. Rather, defendant's argument focuses on what he alleges to be his understanding at the time of the plea.
Nor does defendant make any argument in his brief concerning any advice under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 556.1.
Defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant described the court appearances that he made leading up to or in connection with his plea. Defendant's first court appearance was his arraignment in February of 2016, at which time he pled not guilty. Defendant testified that at his next appearance, in April of 2016, he was represented by counsel other than the one he had retained. He described that at this hearing, counsel approached the bench and stated his satisfaction with the motions that had been filed. Defendant testified that he met with counsel in the hallway after this hearing, at which time counsel stated he would "get" him a misdemeanor.
Defendant then testified that on June 10, 2016, the Friday before his next scheduled court appearance, he spoke with his retained counsel, who informed defendant that he was sick and had not been able to speak with the district attorney. Defendant asked his retained counsel about the statement the stand-in counsel had made about possibly getting him a misdemeanor plea offer. Defendant's retained counsel informed him that the State was offering five years of jail time with fifteen years of sex offender registration. Defendant testified that on June 13, 2016, he met with his retained counsel, who said he was going to talk to the district attorney about a "lower" offer. At some point later that day, retained counsel brought defendant back into the hallway and informed him that the district attorney did not have a "lower" offer. When defendant asked what would happen if he were to "deny it," retained counsel said that the State would take him to trial and that defendant would be "facing 10 years." Defendant stated that he was not given the option of pleading guilty with a presentencing investigation report and was not given the opportunity to inform the court about himself.
As part of defendant's testimony, defense counsel introduced several documents, including letters from defendant's military supervisors and certificates from his military training. Finally, defendant testified that at the time he agreed to a five-year sentence, he did not know he could agree to something different.
The State cross-examined defendant about his age at the time of the offense (25) compared to the victim's (13). The State showed defendant his completed Boykin form, which defendant stated he did not read prior to his plea. Defendant also answered affirmatively when the State asked him if he understood he would be going to jail for five years and would be required to register as a sex offender for fifteen years as a result of his plea, that this plea was the result of his having sex with a teenage girl, and whether he had previously initialed stating his satisfaction with his attorney's handling of the case. Defendant also confirmed that he understood that a five-year sentence was not the maximum possible sentence for this offense. Defendant testified that his attorney told him there was no way he would win at trial and, at that point, he would be "facing 10 years." Defendant stated he was not informed by his attorney that the district attorney was not agreeing to a misdemeanor plea until his final court date, but he did understand that he would have had to go to trial if he did not accept the plea.
After hearing arguments from the State and the defense, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea (and the motion to modify sentence). The trial court found that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea, filled out all of the paperwork, and participated in the Boykin colloquy. The trial court determined that defendant had "more than adequate intelligence." The court also disbelieved defendant's claim that he did not know what he was doing. Finally, the court noted that defendant could have had a sentence of ten years, but agreed to a five-year sentence, which it found reasonable.
Considering the above and the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. As the trial court stated, defendant was properly informed of his Boykin rights at the time of his plea. Further, defendant explicitly confirmed that he understood the sentence he was accepting by pleading guilty, and he indicated that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation.
Nothing that defendant argues now concerning the length of his sentence has any relevance to the validity of his guilty plea. While defendant might have been under the impression for some time that his counsel was attempting to secure a misdemeanor plea, defendant was plainly aware that a misdemeanor disposition was not going to be available at the time he chose to plead guilty. Further, defendant's five-year sentence was imposed in conformity with a plea agreement set forth in the record at the time of the plea, making it unreviewable on appeal. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.2A(2). Defendant knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea agreement for a five-year sentence, and the trial court properly concluded that defendant should not be allowed to withdraw this plea.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.