Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4497-13T1
06-24-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTONIO WILLIAMS, a/k/a ALTONIA WILLIAMS, ASA FANN, ATONIOY WILLIAMS, ANTONIO FANN, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, SHY GUY, ALTONIA D. WILLIAMS, and ASA WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Anderson D. Harkov, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Special Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief; Mark W. Morris, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Simonelli and Sumners. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment Nos. 10-08-1426, 10-11-2217, 10-12-2276, 10-12-2321, 11-04-0757. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Anderson D. Harkov, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Special Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief; Mark W. Morris, Legal Assistant, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Antonio Williams appeals from a Law Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
On June 15, 2011, defendant pled guilty to the following charges arising from five Monmouth County indictments: second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) (Indictment No. 10-08-1426); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Indictment No. 10-11-2217); two counts of third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (Indictment Nos. 10-12-2276 and 11-04-0757); and third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a) (Indictment No. 10-12-2321). Defendant's plea agreement called for the dismissal of all remaining charges in the indictments, and recommended an aggregate seven-year custodial term with no parole disqualifier. Defendant reserved the right to ask the court for a flat five-year term.
However, prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On March 26, 2012, a different judge than the one who accepted the plea heard the motion. After considering the parties' arguments and applying the Slater factors, the judge denied the request. Specifically, the judge held that defendant did not "clarify or state why he was innocent," did not "dispute the facts," and made no "prima facie case to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to the case law." After denying the motion, the judge sentenced defendant to a flat seven-year term of imprisonment in accordance with the plea agreement, despite defendant's request for a flat five-year term.
State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009).
Defendant filed a direct appeal, which was limited to a challenge to his sentence, and was heard on an Excessive Sentencing Oral Argument calendar. He argued there was no factual basis for his eluding charge because "there was no realistic threat to the police, other motorists or [himself,]" and he should not have been given a sentence in excess of five years, which is the lowest term for second-degree eluding. We rejected this argument and affirmed his sentence.
Defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition based upon ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Assigned counsel for defendant later filed an amended PCR petition, alleging that defendant's trial counsel: 1) failed to conduct an adequate investigation; 2) gave him erroneous advice prior to the entry of his guilty plea; 3) failed to pursue a speedy trial; 4) failed to discuss the facts of the case with him; 5) failed to show him discovery; and 6) that cumulative errors amounted to IAC. It was furthered contended that PCR should be granted by allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
Following argument, Judge Joseph W. Oxley issued an oral decision and written order denying defendant an evidentiary hearing and dismissing his PCR petition. The judge ruled that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of IAC as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).
Judge Oxley noted that defendant did not provide any certifications or affidavits in support of his IAC claim as required by State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002), and that the information defendant asserted his trial counsel should have collected did not overcome the State's strong evidence concerning the eluding and burglary charges (Indictment Nos. 10-08-1426, and 10-12-2276, respectively). As for the former charge, defendant was identified by the police officer as the driver of the vehicle that the officer stopped, but then drove away. Also, defendant's assertion that Joseph Fawlkes was the driver was not supported by a certification from Fawlkes or anyone other than defendant. With regards to the burglary charge, defendant's assertion that Fawlkes committed the burglary was also not supported by a certification from Fawlkes or anyone other than defendant. Moreover, defendant's fingerprints were found on a flashlight left by the burglar at the crime scene. Thus, defendant provided no competent evidence establishing that trial counsel had reason to advise him not to plead guilty and go to trial.
The judge also rejected defendant's claim that he would have not pled guilty but for his attorney's advice. The judge found defendant's assertion that his attorney assured him he would be given a five-year prison sentence if he pled guilty was contradicted by defendant's plea form and plea colloquy. The judge further found that, under State v. Ball, 381 N.J. Super. 545, 558 (App. Div. 2005), defendant failed to allege any facts in support of his claims that his attorney failed to pursue a speedy trial, failed to discuss the facts of the case with him, or failed to show him discovery.
Next, Judge Oxley found no merit in defendant's contention that his attorney was deficient under State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 231 (2013), for allowing him to plead guilty without an adequate factual basis for each element of the offenses pled. The judge reasoned it was the court's responsibility to determine the adequacy of the factual basis for a plea, not defense counsel. The judge also noted that defendant's yes or no responses during his plea colloquy demonstrated his understanding of the charges and the crimes he admitted committing.
Finally, Judge Oxley considered defendant's contention that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the eluding charge and the two burglary charges, and found that defendant could not establish any of the four factors under Slater to warrant withdrawal of his guilty pleas. He specifically determined: defendant did not assert any colorable claims of innocence; there was no fair and just reason for withdrawal, considering the seriousness and strong evidence against defendant; enforcement of the plea agreement was not unfair; and the State did not have to show it would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea. See Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 157-58. This appeal followed.
Procedurally, this contention is without merit because it could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not. See State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009); see also R. 3:22-4. Also, the record is barren of any reasons justifying relief from being procedurally barred. See R. 3:22-4(a). --------
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
POINT II
THE COMBINED FAILURES OF TRIAL COUNSEL, TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES AFTER DEFENDANT TOLD HIM THEY HAD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, AND TO ASSURE THERE WAS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CRIMES DEFENDANT WAS PLEADING GUILTY TO, DESPITE THE FACT COUNSEL HIMSELF ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT THE FACTUAL BASIS, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant a discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Oxley in his well-reasoned oral opinion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION