Opinion
No. COA15-826
04-19-2016
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY LEE WILLIAMS, Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholaos G. Vlahos, for the State. Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Richmond County, Nos. 12 CRS 50120 and 13 CRS 519 Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 18 March 2014 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 December 2015. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholaos G. Vlahos, for the State. Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant. DIETZ, Judge.
Defendant Jimmy Lee Williams appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. Williams and his girlfriend had a heated argument in his girlfriend's bedroom. Witnesses in a nearby room heard the victim yell, "don't do it, don't do it," and Williams yell, "do it again, do it again, do it again" and "say it again, say it again." Then, witnesses heard a gunshot and, when they rushed into the room, they saw the victim dead from a gunshot wound to the head and Williams standing over the body holding a gun.
On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. As explained below, the circumstantial evidence in this case is sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer premeditation and deliberation. We thus reject this argument.
Williams also argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the testimony of the State's gunshot residue expert. Williams relies largely on scientific literature not submitted to the trial court. We cannot consider this evidence and, when setting it aside, Williams has not shown that the trial court's decision to admit the testimony was error, much less plain error. Accordingly, we reject this argument and find no error in the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
On 14 January 2012, Defendant Jimmy Lee Williams and his girlfriend, Kayetina Little, got into a heated argument while at Little's house. Williams and Little were behind closed doors in her bedroom but houseguests could overhear some of the argument. Those witnesses heard Little yell, "don't do it, don't do it," to which Williams responded, "do it again, do it again, do it again" and "say it again, say it again." A gunshot then rang out from the bedroom and the houseguests discovered Little dead on the bed with blood running out of her nose. Williams was standing over the body holding a gun. Williams left the scene and called another girlfriend to pick him up, explaining that "he had done something crazy." Police searched for Williams for more than 18 hours before he turned himself in. The State charged him with first-degree murder.
At trial, the State argued that Williams pushed Little onto her bed and shot her through the right side of her head at close range. The State relied on some physical evidence, including a bullet lodged in the floor near Little's feet and a wad of fiber and hair in the baseboard beneath the bed. The State also called a forensic pathologist who testified that Little was killed in the same position in which witnesses found her—laying on the bed.
The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Williams timely appealed.
Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Williams first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge for insufficient evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we reject this argument.
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence de novo. State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d 615, 621 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is "substantial evidence" to support each element of the charged offense. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Talbot, 123 N.C. App. 698, 699, 474 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1996).
Williams contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that he shot the victim and to prove that he did so with premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 383, 156 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1967). Premeditation means that the act was thought out beforehand for some length of time, however short, but no particular amount of time is necessary for the mental process of premeditation; it is sufficient if the process of premeditation occurred at any point prior to the killing. State v. Hunt, 330 N.C. 425, 427, 410 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1991). Deliberation exists when intent to kill is carried out in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. Id. Moreover, "[a] perpetrator may intend to kill after premeditation and deliberation, although prompted to a large extent and controlled by passion at the time." State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 178, 449 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1994) (overruled on other grounds).
It is well-settled that premeditation and deliberation may be proved through circumstantial evidence such as statements and conduct of the defendant before and after the killing, threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased, and ill will or previous difficulties between the defendant and the deceased. State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 565, 411 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1992).
Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion to dismiss. The evidence established that Williams and Little had an unstable and angry relationship; that on the night of her death, Little argued with Williams and threatened to leave with her children; that Williams and Little argued so loudly in the moments before her death that witnesses could hear from another room; that just before the gunshot, witnesses heard Williams yell at Little to "Do it again, do it again," and "Say it again, say it again"; and, finally, after hearing the gunshot, Little's daughters immediately ran into the bedroom and saw Williams standing over Little's dead body with a gun in his hand.
The State also introduced forensic evidence, including a bullet with Little's DNA recovered on the floor, lumps of hair and fiber from the baseboard, and other evidence taken from the scene. The State's forensic experts discussed this evidence and established that Little likely was on the bed in an unusual position when she was shot, suggesting that Williams held her down and shot her at close range.
Finally, when police caught Williams roughly 18 hours after the incident, his jacket, jeans, and shoes all tested positive for gunshot residue.
All of this circumstantial evidence, taken together, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Williams killed the victim with premeditation and deliberation. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied Williams's motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence.
II. Gunshot Residue Testimony
Williams next argues that the testimony of the State's gunshot residue expert, David Freehling, should have been excluded under Rule 401, 402, 403, and 702 of the Rules of Evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we reject this argument.
Williams did not object to the admission of Freehling's testimony and concedes on appeal that we must review this argument for plain error. "For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial." State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). "To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plain error should be "applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case" where the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.
Williams's argument relies largely on scientific literature not presented to the trial court and cited for the first time on appeal. We cannot consider this evidence because it was not presented to the trial court. State v. Anderson, 175 N.C. App. 444, 449, 624 S.E.2d 393, 398 (2006). Williams's remaining arguments fall far short of satisfying the plain error standard. The trial court's determination that Freehling's testimony was the product of reliable principles or methods, that it was relevant, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice all were within the trial court's sound discretion. Accordingly, we hold that Williams has not shown the admission of the challenged testimony was error, much less plain error.
Conclusion
We find no error in the trial court's judgment.
NO ERROR.
Judges STROUD and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).