Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0080-PR
03-27-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Melvin Williams Jr., Petitioner.
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Thomas C. McDermott, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Respondent Melvin Williams Jr., Tucson In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CR201802705 The Honorable Patrick K. Gard, Judge
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Thomas C. McDermott, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Respondent
Melvin Williams Jr., Tucson In Propria Persona
Presiding Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Kelly and Judge Sklar concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 Melvin Williams Jr. seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb this ruling unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Williams has not established such abuse.
¶2 After a jury trial, Williams was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia and two counts of possession of a dangerous drug for sale. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which are twenty-two years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Williams, No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0226 (Ariz. App. May 7, 2021) (mem. decision).
¶3 Williams then sought post-conviction relief, arguing various purported improprieties in the execution of a search warrant violated his constitutional rights, the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, he was denied his constitutional right to a grand jury because he was charged by complaint, and his trial counsel had been ineffective. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. It concluded that, because the bulk of Williams's constitutional claims could have been raised on appeal, they were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). The court additionally concluded those claims were not colorable, and neither was Williams's claim that his trial counsel had been ineffective. The court noted that Williams had not shown prejudice from any of counsel's purported shortcomings. This petition for review followed.
¶4 On review, Williams first argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him because he should have been charged in justice court. Williams did not raise a jurisdiction claim below under Rule 32.1(b). We thus decline to address his jurisdiction argument for the first time on review. See State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980).
¶5 Williams also argues the trial court erred in concluding his claims were precluded because he could have raised them on appeal. First, he asserts that he attempted to raise these claims on appeal, but his appellate counsel refused and this court rejected his request to file a pro se supplemental brief. Criminal defendants do not have a right to hybrid representation. State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, ¶ 63 (2015). And Williams could have but did not seek review of our order denying his request.
¶6 Williams next asserts the trial court erred in finding his claims precluded because, as we understand his argument, they involve constitutional rights. Some constitutional claims are waived if counsel fails to raise them. See Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, ¶¶ 9-10 (2002). Williams does not develop any argument that his claims involve a constitutional right that requires personal waiver and are thus exempt from preclusion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). We thus need not address this argument further. See State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (claim waived on review because defendant cites no relevant authority and does not develop argument in meaningful way).
¶7 In any event, Williams also fails to meaningfully address the trial court's additional conclusion that none of his constitutional claims merit relief. For example, although he repeats his claim that he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing, he does not identify any error in the court's conclusion that no preliminary hearing was necessary because the court had found probable cause existed during a bail hearing. Similarly, Williams restates his claim that his waiver of counsel at his bond hearing was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. But he does not address the court's determination that he "ha[d] not shown how [his high blood pressure] rendered him unable to understand his waiver or its consequences" in light of his conduct at the bond hearing.
¶8 Last, Williams asserts the trial court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. But he does little more than broadly describe his claims. He does not identify any error in the court's reasoning. Thus, we need not address this argument further. See id.
¶9 We grant review but deny relief.