Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2021-0001-PR
03-01-2021
COUNSEL Cochise County Office of the Legal Advocate, Bisbee By Xochitl Orozco, Legal Advocate Counsel for Petitioner
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Cochise County
Nos. CR8800393 and CR8800417
The Honorable John F. Kelliher Jr., Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Cochise County Office of the Legal Advocate, Bisbee
By Xochitl Orozco, Legal Advocate
Counsel for Petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
ESPINOSA, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Raymond Williams seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that order unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Williams has not shown such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Williams was convicted "of escape, burglary, two counts of theft, armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault and unlawful flight." State v. Williams, 169 Ariz. 376, 377 (App. 1991). He was sentenced to "two concurrent life sentences plus 24 years, of which he must serve a minimum of 41 years." Id. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal and denied relief on review of his first petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 380. Williams again sought and was denied post-conviction relief in 1997, and this court denied relief on review. State v. Williams, No. 2 CA-CR 97-0263-PR (Ariz. App. May 19, 1998) (mem. decision).
¶3 Williams sought post-conviction relief for a third time in July 2020, arguing the Disproportionality Review Act ("DRA") constituted a significant change of law under Rule 32.1(g), entitling him to a reduction in his sentence. The DRA was intended to remedy the problem that "[t]hose convicted of violating certain laws before 1994 were treated much more harshly than those convicted of the same violations after the effective date of [extensive] amendments" to Arizona's sentencing laws. McDonald v. Thomas, 202 Ariz. 35, ¶ 3 (2002); see also 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 365, § 1. The act "authorized the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to recommend to the governor commutations of sentences for certain pre-1994 offenses." Galaz v. Stewart, 207 Ariz. 452, ¶ 4 (2004). "The Act went into effect in July 1994 and was repealed on June 30, 1996." McDonald, 202 Ariz. 35, ¶ 3.
¶4 The trial court summarily dismissed the proceeding, determining Williams's claim was precluded. Williams filed a motion for rehearing, asserting his claim was not precluded because he had not previously raised it. He included with that motion an unsigned declaration claiming he had not learned of the DRA's existence until 2020. The court denied the motion for rehearing, and this petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Williams repeats his argument that he is entitled to relief under the DRA pursuant to Rule 32.1(g) and that the court erred in finding his claim precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) as not previously raised. We agree with Williams that his claim is not precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). But, even if we agreed he could raise a claim under Rule 32.1(g) based on a statute that was repealed nearly twenty-five years ago, his post-conviction proceeding nonetheless warranted summary dismissal. See State v. Banda, 232 Ariz. 582, n.2 (App. 2013) ("We can affirm the trial court's ruling for any reason supported by the record.").
¶6 Because this was a successive proceeding, Williams was required to provide in his notice "sufficient reasons why [he] did not raise the claim in a previous notice or petition, or in a timely manner" or face summary dismissal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Williams's combined notice and petition did not contain the required explanation. And the trial court was not required to consider his belated attempt to provide an explanation in his motion for rehearing. See State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 577 (App. 1991) ("[A] court will not entertain new matters raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing.").
¶7 Although we grant review, relief is denied.