Id., subds. 3(2)-3(3); see also State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159-6O (Minn. 1982) (discussing permissive nature of this inference). The theft-by-check statute, on the other hand, requires that the defendant issue a check knowing that she was not entitled to issue it.
We agree a jury instruction on burden of proof concerns a fundamental principle of law, and may be raised on appeal regardless of whether an objection was made at trial. See State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982) (where intent is element of an offense, trial court may not prejudge the issue by a jury instruction). However, we do not agree that the challenged jury instruction shifted the burden of proof.
Jury instructions also guard against erroneous convictions by ensuring that the State establishes each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn.1982). When faced with an improper instruction and an improper restraint on vigorous advocacy regarding the State's burden of proof, a jury is ill equipped to determine whether the State met the burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1984); State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. 1982). Finally, the trial court's jury instructions must adequately instruct the jury on the state's burden to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Sandstrom, however, the same general instructions were held not to have removed the potential that the jury interpreted the instructions as a mandatory presumption. 442 U.S. at 518-19 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2456-57 n. 7. Moreover, in the recent Minnesota case of State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1982), a lack of qualifying instructions to the effect that the jury could consider the explanation or that it could disregard the presumption was important to the finding that the instruction given was "tantamount to an irrebuttable presumption that denies due process." Id. at 160 citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). If a failure to appropriately instruct as a matter of fundamental law results in substantial and material prejudice to defendant, a new trial is necessary. State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1982). We do not believe that the erroneous instruction in this case resulted in material and substantial prejudice to the defendant.
"Instructions that allow the trier of fact to remain free to credit or reject inferences do not violate principles of due process." State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982). In this case, the district court did not instruct the jury to make a mandatory inference.
Because this instruction fairly and correctly stated the applicable law, we see no error. Appellant's reliance on State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1982), is misplaced. Williams reversed and remanded a defendant's conviction because the jury instruction had not included intent to defraud as an element of theft by false representation, specifically by check. Id. at 157-59.