On appeal, Schoenrock argued that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that intent to defraud is a distinct element of theft by false representation. Schoenrock relied heavily on State v. Williams , 324 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1982), a case involving payment by a check from an account with insufficient funds. The court of appeals affirmed Schoenrock's convictions, concluding that Williams was distinguishable.
Id., subds. 3(2)-3(3); see also State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159-6O (Minn. 1982) (discussing permissive nature of this inference). The theft-by-check statute, on the other hand, requires that the defendant issue a check knowing that she was not entitled to issue it.
The lesser offense of issuance of a worthless check is proved by evidence that the defendant issued a worthless or bad check, intending at the time of issuance that the check not be paid. State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Minn. 1982); Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 2; 10 Minnesota Practice, Minnesota District Judge's Association CRIMJIG 16.30-.31 (1985). The greater offense of theft by check involves a defendant issuing a check knowing he is not entitled to do so ( i.e., knowingly issuing a bad check) as part of a scheme whereby he intentionally defrauds another person into transferring property to him.
Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 327, 12 N.W.2d 608, 614 (1943). Appellant argues, relying on State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. 1982), that the state failed to show that she intended to deprive her employer of property by deceit, which was required to convict her of aggravated forgery. In Williams, a case involving charges of theft by false representation, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the required element of specific intent to defraud, defined as the intention to defraud by permanently depriving another of his property.
Amcon contends that this interpretation conflicts with the common-law rule that, "a corporate officer is criminally liable for his own acts, even if done in his official capacity, and he is liable either directly as a principal or as an aider and abettor." State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1982). A prior version of section 514.02, subdivision 1, imposed criminal liability on any "person" who committed a theft of proceeds. Minn. Stat. § 514.02, subd. 1 (1998).
We agree a jury instruction on burden of proof concerns a fundamental principle of law, and may be raised on appeal regardless of whether an objection was made at trial. See State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982) (where intent is element of an offense, trial court may not prejudge the issue by a jury instruction). However, we do not agree that the challenged jury instruction shifted the burden of proof.
Intent must be shown by inference or presumption. State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982), held that when the intent of an accused is an element of the crime, its existence is a jury issue. If certain basic facts are proved, a presumption is created that the intent existed. See id. The defendant may produce evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the basic facts and intent.
Minn.Stat. § 609.535, subd. 3(2) (2014). We have said that the defendant must be given the opportunity to rebut such a presumption at trial, State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn.1982), but we have never directly addressed the constitutionality of allowing the fact-finder to infer intent from a presumption, see id. at 160 n. 4. Schouweiler's sole contention is that her check was “given for a past consideration” and is therefore subject to the exception in the dishonored-check statute.
Jury instructions also guard against erroneous convictions by ensuring that the State establishes each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn.1982). When faced with an improper instruction and an improper restraint on vigorous advocacy regarding the State's burden of proof, a jury is ill equipped to determine whether the State met the burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 85-86, 103 S.Ct. 969 (footnote omitted). See also State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982) (holding that when intent is an element of the offense, the court may not withdraw the issue from the jury by instructing that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act). Yet the Supreme Court and our court have also concluded that under particular circumstances, the failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is harmless.