Opinion
No. COA12–753.
2013-02-19
STATE of North Carolina v. Shakoor Quayon WILLIAMS.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Lehman, for the State. Harrington, Gilleland, Winstead, Feindel & Lucas, LLP, by Anna S. Lucas, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 December 2011 by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Philip A. Lehman, for the State. Harrington, Gilleland, Winstead, Feindel & Lucas, LLP, by Anna S. Lucas, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Shakoor Quayon Williams (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder. We find no error.
I. Background
Around 10:00 p.m. on 24 June 2009, defendant and his friends Stephen Braxton (“Braxton”), Stanley Generette, and Antoneli White (“White”) went to a party at the home of Tacara Davis (“Davis”) in the Cape Fear Village Mobile Home Park (“Cape Fear Village”) in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Defendant was carrying a long-barreled, AK–47 style of rifle which he referred to as a “chopper” and White was carrying a Glock semi-automatic handgun.
About an hour after the men arrived at the party, Braxton left. Defendant and White made other arrangements for transportation and stayed behind. Sometime later, a fight broke out. During the fight, Tremayne Wayne Council (“Council”) fired a handgun into the air. White and defendant then both shot Council, who fell to the ground.
Officers from the Cumberland County Sheriff's Office (“the Sheriff's Office”) arrived at Cape Fear Village around 1:30 a.m. on 25 June 2009. Council was lying in a pool of blood in Davis's driveway. He had died from his injuries.
Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Maryanne Gaffney–Kraft (“Dr.Gaffney–Kraft”) performed an autopsy on Council's body and found two gunshot wounds. The first bullet entered Council's upper back and lodged in his rib. The second bullet entered Council's left upper back and re-entered on the left side of his neck, piercing the base of his skull and fragmenting into the top of his head. Dr. Gaffney–Kraft determined that this was the fatal bullet. Gene Bishop (“Bishop”), a firearms examiner with the Sheriff's Office, determined that the bullet recovered from the fatal wound in Council's head was from an AK–47 style of semi-automatic rifle.
On 4 January 2010, defendant was indicted for first degree murder. On 12 December 2011, defendant's attorney gave notice to the State of his intent to offer the defense of self-defense at trial. Beginning that same day, defendant was tried by a jury in Cumberland County Superior Court. At trial, defendant testified in his own defense. According to defendant's testimony, during the fight at the party, Council began shooting at he and White, and they fired back. After defendant fired three or four shots, Council fell to the ground. Defendant then dropped his gun and left Cape Fear Village with White. Defendant further testified that he had never met Council before that night and had no desire to harm him prior to the shooting.
During cross-examination, the State questioned defendant regarding his gang involvement. Specifically, the State asked defendant whether he had been affiliated with the Valentine Bloods (“Bloods”) gang or had told anyone that he was involved with the Bloods. Defendant denied that he was involved with gangs. Defendant also denied any knowledge about the Bloods except that he had heard the name and had also seen it spray-painted on a wall. He did acknowledge that he lived in a Bloods area, stating, “where I stay at, Ramsey Street, it's Bloods around there.”
After defendant rested his case, Corporal Charles Ansin (“Cpl.Ansin”), the security threat group officer in the Cumberland County Detention Center, testified for the State as a rebuttal witness. Cpl. Ansin testified that he had spoken with defendant and that defendant admitted starting his own Bloods group in the area, with White as his second in command.
Detective Tony Bergamine (“Det.Bergamine”) of the Sheriff's Office also testified during rebuttal. Det. Bergamine testified that a gang known as the 1300 Hit Squad Clique (“the Hit Squad”) operated in the Cape Fear Village area. He further testified that the Hit Squad, of which Council was an original founding member, was affiliated with larger groups known as the Crips and Folk Nation gangs. During his testimony, Det. Bergamine identified photographs, over defendant's objection, showing White and Braxton together wearing red, the color of the Bloods, and making hand gestures associated with the Bloods and People Nation gangs. Det. Bergamine explained that the Bloods and Crips were rival gangs.
After all of the evidence had been presented, the trial court conducted the jury charge conference. Defendant requested a special instruction that defendant's gang affiliation should not be considered for the purposes of defendant's credibility. The trial court denied this request. The State requested an instruction on flight, and the court gave this instruction over defendant's objection.
On 15 December 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum of 157 months to a maximum of 198 months in the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.
II. Evidence of Gang Involvement
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting, over defendant's objection, statements defendant made to Cpl. Ansin regarding his involvement with gangs. Specifically, defendant contends that Cpl. Ansin's testimony was improper because (1) it was extrinsic evidence intended to impeach defendant on a collateral matter; and (2) its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant. We disagree.
A. Prior Inconsistent Statement
Defendant first contends that the State could not use Cpl. Ansin's testimony in order to attack defendant's credibility. Under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 607 (2011). However, our Supreme Court has placed limitations on impeaching the credibility of a witness using matters which are not material to the case being tried:
A witness may be cross-examined by confronting him with prior statements inconsistent with any part of his testimony, but where such questions concern matters collateral to the issues, the witness's answers on cross-examination are conclusive, and the party who draws out such answers will not be permitted to contradict them by other testimony.
State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 192, 250 S.E.2d 197, 203 (1978). Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has also recognized an exception to this general rule “where the cross-examination is as to a matter tending to show motive, temper, disposition, conduct, or interest of the witness toward the cause or parties.” State v. Long, 280 N .C. 633, 639, 187 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1972).
“[O]ur standard of review for rulings made by the trial court pursuant to Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence is abuse of discretion.” State v. Banks, 210 N.C.App. 30, ––––, 706 S.E.2d 807, 814 (2011). “A trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985).
In the instant case, defendant was asked during cross-examination whether he had previously told Cpl. Ansin that defendant was involved in gang activity. Defendant testified that he had never been involved in a gang and that he had never told Cpl. Ansin that he had been involved in any gang activity. Defendant subsequently rested his case.
The State called Cpl. Ansin as a rebuttal witness over defendant's objection. Cpl. Ansin testified that he had spoken with defendant in the detention center and that defendant had informed him that he had started his own sect of the Bloods gang in Fayetteville.
The State then called Det. Bergamine as a rebuttal witness. Det. Bergamine testified that Council was a founding member of the Hit Squad and that Council's gang was a rival with defendant's gang. Det. Bergamine also testified that the Hit Squad had a significant presence at Cape Fear Village. Thus, the State used its evidence of defendant's gang membership to attack defendant's claim of self-defense and establish a motive for defendant bringing a firearm to Cape Fear Village and shooting Council. Since the State's evidence contradicting defendant's denial of any gang membership was used to establish a possible motive for Council's murder, the trial court properly allowed the evidence under the exception stated in Long. This argument is overruled.
B. Rule 403
Defendant also contends that Cpl. Ansin's testimony should have been prohibited under Rule 403,
which states that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 403 (2011). “We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.” State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008).
In his brief, defendant cites several portions of testimony from both Cpl. Ansin and Det. Bergamine that defendant contends were erroneously admitted into evidence under Rule 403. However, defendant only specifically made a Rule 403 objection to Cpl. Ansin's testimony that defendant was the leader of the Valentine Blood sect. Consequently, we only address defendant's argument regarding this evidence. SeeN.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(1) (2011).
Defendant argues that evidence of defendant's involvement in gang activity should have been excluded because it was “minimally probative and highly prejudicial.” However, as previously noted, the State properly introduced this evidence in order to contradict defendant's claim of self-defense and provide a motive for Council's murder. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit this probative evidence. This argument is overruled.
III. Photograph of Braxton and White
Defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting photographs of Braxton and White wearing gang colors and making gang symbols. Specifically, defendant contends that this impeachment evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.
In the instant case, Det. Bergamine testified about gang activity in Fayetteville and in particular about gangs to which Council and defendant were known to belong. He then identified a photograph depicting White and Braxton together, wearing red bandanas and making a symbol with their hands. Det. Bergamine stated that both the color red and the symbol made by the two men were commonly associated with the Bloods gang.
Defendant contends that this photograph was erroneously admitted under Rule 403. Defendant notes that the photograph was retrieved from a social networking site and that it was unclear where and when it was taken, making it minimally probative. However, the photograph provided further evidence of defendant's gang membership as well as a possible motive for shooting Council. Specifically, the photograph depicted two men closely connected with defendant who were with him on the night of the shooting displaying signs of gang affiliation. Braxton was the man who drove defendant to the party. Although White, according to defendant's testimony, had no gang affiliation, he was the man who shot Council at the same time as defendant. White and defendant then fled the scene together. Since the photograph clearly depicted these two individuals, who were connected with defendant, displaying signs of gang affiliation, it further undermined defendant's denial of any personal gang affiliation and his assertion of self-defense when he shot Council. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit the photograph. This argument is overruled.
IV. Jury Instruction on Gang Membership
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant's gang membership should not be considered as evidence of defendant's credibility. We disagree.
“If a request is made for a jury instruction which is correct in itself and supported by evidence, the trial court must give the instruction at least in substance.” State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 364, 432 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1993). “[Arguments] challenging the trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo by this Court.” State v. Osorio, 196 N.C.App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009).
In the instant case, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that “[e]vidence about the defendant's gang membership may not be considered by [the jury] on the issue of the defendant's credibility.” However, the evidence regarding defendant's gang membership, in and of itself, was not presented to damage defendant's credibility in the presence of the jury. Instead, as noted above, the State's rebuttal evidence regarding defendant's gang involvement was only presented in order to respond to defendant's testimony denying any involvement with gangs. The State introduced this evidence for the proper purpose of contradicting defendant's testimony claiming self-defense and for establishing a motive for Council's killing. Since the evidence of defendant's gang membership was not presented to specifically damage defendant's credibility, the trial court properly declined to give the jury defendant's proposed instruction. This argument is overruled.
V. Instruction on Flight
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. We disagree.
A jury instruction on flight is proper as long as there is “some evidence in the record reasonably supporting the theory that the defendant fled after commission of the crime charged.” State v. Fisher, 336 N.C. 684, 706, 445 S.E.2d 866, 878 (1994). “The relevant inquiry concerns whether there is evidence that defendant left the scene of the [crime] and took steps to avoid apprehension. If we find some evidence in the record reasonably supporting the theory that defendant fled after commission of the crime charged, the instruction is properly given.” State v. Ethridge, 168 N.C.App. 359, 362–63, 607 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (2005)(internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the instant case, defendant's own testimony reasonably supports a flight instruction. Defendant testified that after he shot Council and saw him fall to the ground, he immediately left the scene. Specifically, defendant stated, “[a]nd then after [Council fell to the ground], I looked at his body, looked at [White], I dropped the gun, and we ran.” Defendant neither attempted to assist Council nor contact law enforcement to tell them about the shooting. This is sufficient evidence to support an instruction on flight. See State v. Eubanks, 151 N.C.App. 499, 503, 565 S.E.2d 738, 741 (2002) (evidence was sufficient to support a flight instruction when the defendant (1) left the scene without rendering aid or assistance to the victim; (2) disposed of his weapon; and (3) “did not voluntarily contact ... or turn himself into [law enforcement] but, rather, merely cooperated with their investigation once he was contacted....”). Accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury on flight. This argument is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court properly allowed the State to present evidence of defendant's involvement in gang activity, since the evidence contradicted defendant's assertion of self-defense and provided a motive for Council's murder. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a photograph of Braxton and White wearing gang colors and displaying signs of gang affiliation. The trial court properly denied defendant's request for an instruction that defendant's gang membership should not be considered by the jury to determine defendant's credibility. Finally, the trial court properly instructed the jury on flight. Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.
No error. Judge HUNTER, ROBERT C. concurs.
Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N. concurs in the result only.
Report per Rule 30(e).