In order for a police officer's investigative stop of a vehicle to be valid, the officer must have had reasonable grounds, based on specific and articulable facts, for making the stop. Hansen v. State, 222 Ga. App. 537, 538 (1) ( 474 SE2d 735) (1996); see also State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736, 737 (2) ( 484 SE2d 775) (1997). The officer initiating the stop must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity, because a stop that is based only on an unparticularized suspicion or a mere hunch is invalid.
See Riding v. State, 269 Ga.App. 289, 603 S.E.2d 776 (2004); State v. Noble, 179 Ga.App. 785, 347 S.E.2d 722 (1986). See also Register, 315 Ga.App. at 778, n. 1, 728 S.E.2d 292 (distinguishing anonymous tip from one “where [the] individual reported to [the] police in person”); State v. Williams, 225 Ga.App. 736, 738(2), 484 S.E.2d 775 (1997) (distinguishing anonymous tip from one where “the citizen spoke directly to the investigating officer”). As we have explained, face-to-face communication is “inherently more reliable than an anonymous telephone tip because the officer receiving the information had the opportunity to observe the informant's demeanor and perceived credibility.”
Sergeant Holloway had known the visitor well for "a couple [of] months," and he testified that the visitor was trustworthy. See State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) ( 484 SE2d 775) (1997). Sergeant Holloway and appellee are not related.
See also State v. Williams (unidentified concerned citizen who speaks directly to police officer not considered anonymous tipster). State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736, 738 ( 484 SE2d 775) (1997). In this case, the concerned citizen, in person, spoke directly to the police.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) ( 484 SE2d 775) (1997). In this case, the arresting officer testified in a motion hearing that he read the implied consent warning to Shoemake after he arrested him. He further testified on cross-examination that it is his habit to always read the implied consent warning "before we get to the ride," meaning before he transports them from the scene.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) ( 484 S.E.2d 775) (1997). In this case, the record shows that the arresting officer testified in a motion hearing that he thought he gave the implied consent warning to Swanson at the scene of his arrest, but could not swear to it.
On this basis, I concur that the investigative stop did not contravene Peck's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure. Compare State v. Williams, 225 Ga. App. 736 ( 484 S.E.2d 775) (1997), where the information which prompted the invalid stop came only from an anonymous tipster, was not corroborated, and was not detailed.