¶ 9 We review a district court's decision to revoke a defendant's suspended sentence to determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 258, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 1, ¶ 11. In revoking a suspended sentence, the district court must be reasonably satisfied that the defendant's conduct "has not been what he agreed it would be if he were given liberty," and this determination must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the State. Williams, ¶ 11 (citations omitted).

¶ 19 We review a district court's determination to revoke a suspended sentence for an abuse of discretion and whether the court's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the State. State v. Averill, 2001 MT 161, ¶ 22, 306 Mont. 106, ¶ 22, 30 P.3d 1059, ¶ 22 (citing State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 258, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 1, ¶ 11). See also, State v. Lundquist (1992), 251 Mont. 329, 331, 825 P.2d 204, 206.

State v. Lundquist (1992), 251 Mont. 329, 331, 825 P.2d 204, 206 (citing State v. Robinson (1980), 190 Mont. 145, 148-49, 619 P.2d 813, 815.) See also State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 258, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 1, ¶ 11; State v. Baisch, 1998 MT 12, ¶ 10, 287 Mont. 191, ¶ 10, 953 P.2d 1070, ¶ 10. We review a district court's determination to revoke a suspended sentence for an abuse of discretion and whether the court's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the State. Williams, ¶ 11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 7 We review a district court's determination to revoke a suspended sentence for an abuse of discretion and whether the court's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the State. State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 258, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 1, ¶ 11. The standard for revoking a suspended sentence requires that a district court be reasonably satisfied that the probationer's conduct was not what he agreed it would be if he was given liberty.

The District Court had no affirmative duty to find Miesmer an appropriate treatment program in the community after finding him unsuitable for available programs. State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶¶ 22-23, 296 Mont. 258, 993 P.2d 1. It acted within its discretion to determine that, based on Miesmer's circumstances and behavioral history, treatment with Nicholson was not an alternative to incarceration that would adequately further the purposes of Miesmer's suspended sentence.

¶ 28 Despite our conclusion in Lee, we have subsequently rejected analysis based upon fault when an alleged good faith effort to comply with conditions nevertheless results in the violation of conditions related to the defendant's rehabilitation or the protection of the public. See e.g. Tirey, ¶ 24 (revocation affirmed over defendant's allegation that his good faith effort was frustrated by his probation officer's unreasonable demands, his poverty, and bad weather); State v. Senn, 2003 MT 52, ¶¶ 24–26, 314 Mont. 348, 66 P.3d 288 (revocation affirmed despite argument that good faith effort to comply was derailed by poor health and poverty); State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, ¶ 24, 296 Mont. 258, 993 P.2d 1 (defendant's inability to secure sex offender treatment frustrated purpose of probation). ¶ 29 Our holding in Williams is instructive in this case.

¶ 20 We have previously discussed the element of willfulness with regard to the violation of probationary conditions that do not involve the failure to pay a fine or restitution. In State v. Williams, 1999 MT 240, 296 Mont. 258, 993 P.2d 1, we held that a court could revoke a suspended sentence even though the probationer's failure to comply with the terms of his suspended sentence was not willful. Williams, ¶ 17.