Opinion
ID No. 0410023783.
March 2, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
Martin B. O'Connor, Esquire James J. Kriner, Esquire Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building, Wilmington, DE.
Michael C. Heyden, Esquire, Wilmington, DE.
James J. Haley, Jr., Esquire Ferrara Haley Bevis, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel:
The problem is that the jury convicted Williams of conspiring with his co-defendants, Lamar Comer and Clifford Reeves, to assault Frank Johnson. Yet, the jury acquitted Williams (and Reeves) of attempted assault, the predicate offense. It also acquitted him (and Reeves) of weapons offenses and felony murder in connection with an innocent bystander's death during the attempted assault on Johnson. Meanwhile, the jury convicted Comer of everything, including the murder. Williams argues that the verdict is inconsistent as to him because he was convicted of conspiracy yet acquitted of the underlying offense.
I.
As you recall, sentencing was scheduled for January 19, 2007, but the parties reminded the court that Defendant had a pending motion for judgment of acquittal. That prompted the court to review the record more carefully. When oral argument was held on June 16, 2006, the court expressed concern about justifying, on the basis of lenity, Williams's conviction for Conspiracy Second Degree and his acquittal on all other counts. While the court accepted lenity as a way to generally account for an inconsistent verdict, the court did not see how lenity could justify the verdict here, and it was leaning toward granting a new trial. Then, the court called for the State to file a submission explaining the verdict.
Specifically, at the close of oral argument on June 16, 2006, the court announced that it would:
hold the record open for ten days in which time the State has to file for transcripts and if the State has not filed for transcripts then the court is granting a new trial. If the State filed for transcripts, then the court would want to hear from the State ten days after the transcripts have been received.
As it happens, the closing argument's transcript was on order as of the June 16 argument, and it was filed on July 14, 2006. That means, not counting weekends, the State's submission was due on July 28, 2006. On August 4, 2006, the State filed its Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial. And so, the submission was late. Nonetheless, the court has considered the State's submission and Williams's August 17, 2006 reply.
II.
As it did at oral argument and in its supplemental submission, "the State concedes the verdict is logically inconsistent." The State, however, continues to argue that, as a matter of law,"no matter how illogical or irrational a jury verdict is, a Court should not disturb the verdict as long as it is supported by sufficient evidence." According to the State, the court is not obligated to explain the verdict, but rather, the court's scrutiny is directed to the evidence supporting the conviction. And, as discussed briefly below, the evidence proved that Williams (and Reeves) conspired with Comer to assault Johnson.
Defendant, however, relies on Priest v. State and Johnson v. State. In Priest, the jury found Priest guilty of a weapons offense, but not guilty of the predicate crime. Relying on Johnson, Priest holds that in cases involving weapons offenses, acquittal on the predicate count mandates acquittal on the weapons offense. Johnson knocked out a conspiracy conviction after the jury acquitted on the predicate burglary.
Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005).
Johnson v. State, 409 A.2d 1043 (Del. 1979).
Priest, 879 A.2d at 588.
Id. at 584-88.
Johnson, 409 A.2d at 1044.
Basically, the court agrees with the State. Under Tilden v. State, as a matter of law, "the rule of jury lenity finds proper application in cases of verdict inconsistency in this State." The court must determine if "the State presented sufficient evidence . . . which viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution established that a rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the [underlying offense]." Tilden holds:
Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302, 1307 (Del. 1986).
inconsistent verdicts-even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense while convicting on the compound offense-should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.
Id. at 1306 (citing US v. Powell, 469 US 57, 65 (1984)).
Similarly in Stewart v. State, Stewart was found guilty of conspiracy, but acquitted of the underlying drug charge. Stewart distinguished Johnson because
Stewart v. State, 437 A.2d 153, 155-57 (Del. 1981).
[t]he overt act of burglary in Johnson was alleged to have been committed only by Johnson, himself. Since Johnson alone was alleged to have committed the overt act, and since he was acquitted of that offense, he could not be convicted of conspiracy in the absence of that essential element.
Id. at 156.
In Stewart a co-conspirator committed the overt act. Therefore, the jury found "the defendant engaged in conduct sufficient to convict her of the conspiracy; but that since she did not personally engage in the overt act, she could not be convicted of the substantive offense."
Id.
Id.
The court understands that the rule favoring the court's upholding verdicts is not unqualified, as shown in Priest and Johnson. In this case, however, Williams's co-conspirator, Comer, was convicted of committing an overt act. Therefore, this case is controlled by Stewart and Tilden, not Priest and Johnson.
III.
In denying Comer's motion for acquittal, the court explained how the evidence pointed toward Comer as the fatal shooter. Moreover, the evidence against Williams tied him to the incident's beginning, when Johnson drove onto the scene. But, as the confrontation moved around the corner where the victim was shot, the evidence against Williams was weaker. Thus, considering the evidence, the problem does not concern the State's presenting insufficient evidence to prove every element of the conspiracy. Rather, the evidence showed too much. If it proved the conspiracy, the evidence also proved that Williams actually attempted the assault, while armed.
State v. Comer, 2007 WL 313574 (Del.Super.).
In summary, the court is satisfied that the jury held Comer accountable for the murder, the crimes leading up to it — including conspiracy to assault Johnson — and the related weapons offenses. That decision probably was based on the evidence connecting Comer directly to the shooting. Meanwhile, the jury decided to hold Williams (and Reeves) accountable only for being in on it at the beginning by lending support to Comer. In that way, the verdict's inconsistency is attributable to lenity or mistake, not to failure of proof.
IV.
For the foregoing reaso ns, Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED .
IT IS SO ORDERED.