The petitioner, John Edward Williams, was indicted by the Marshall County grand jury in March, 1974, for the murders of Carlton and Dorothy Harris. Williams was tried for the death of Dorothy Harris in April of 1975, and on May 14, 1975, he was convicted of murder in the first degree. That judgment was subsequently appealed to this Court and in a decision filed December 5, 1978, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. State v. Williams, ___ W. Va. ___, 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978). The basic facts surrounding the case are set forth in the earlier opinion of this Court, State v. Williams, supra, and will not be repeated here.

John Edward Williams appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of the murder of Carlton Harris, and sentencing him to the State Penitentiary for life. Several confessions were used as evidence against appellant at the trial. In State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 249 S.E.2d 758 (1980), we ruled that a first confession by the appellant was inadmissible, and that the State therefore had the burden of rebutting a presumption that subsequent confessions were the product of the first and were also inadmissible. The State has failed to meet this burden, and we must reverse appellant's conviction. I

While the custodial status of an individual giving consent is a factor to be considered when determining whether consent is voluntarily given, there is no concomitant implication that a person lawfully detained or in the custody of police can never give voluntary consent to search. See State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 316, 249 S.E.2d 758, 763 n. 4 (1978). It is not necessary, as a prerequisite to obtaining a voluntary consent to a noncustodial search, that law enforcement officers give Miranda warnings or similar warnings relating to Fourth Amendment rights, although the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a relevant factor in determining whether the consent was voluntary and knowledgeable.

First, based on the totality of all the circumstances, was the consent to search freely and voluntarily given, rather than being the product of duress or coercion? See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Farmer, 173 W. Va. 285, 315 S.E.2d 392 (1983); State v. Craft, 165 W. Va. 741, 272 S.E.2d 46 (1980); State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978). Second, the trial court must make a factual determination whether the consenting party possessed the requisite authority over or relationship to the premises to be searched to justify his allowing the police to conduct a search.

The crucial issue is whether there was "a break in the causative link running between" this confession and the one taken by police approximately forty-five minutes later. State v. Williams, 171 W. Va. 556, 301 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1983), quoting, State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 249 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1980). "The standard that the State must meet in order to use subsequent confessions is that the connection between them and the inadmissible first confession must have become `so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.

" 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 359, p. 66 (12th ed. 1955) (citing cases). See also Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 669, 672-673 (CA5 1964); State v. Edwards, 284 N.C., at 80-81, 199 S.E.2d, at 462; State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 318, 249 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1978); 1 W. LaFave J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 9.4, p. 747, § 9.5, p. 767 (1984); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 157, pp. 345-346 (2d ed. 1972). This reasoning is unpersuasive for two reasons.

Syl. pt. 8, State v. Craft, 165 W. Va. 741, 272 S.E.2d 46 (1980). See also State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 315, 249 S.E.2d 758, 762 (1978). Moreover, "the defendant's knowledge of a right to refuse to consent is one of the relevant factors in determining whether the consent was voluntary[.]"

See Parker, 722 F.2d at 186; People v. Hines, 575 P.2d 414, 416 (Colo. 1978); State v. Abdouch, 434 N.W.2d 317, 328 (Neb. 1989); State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368-69 (R.I. 1983); Hart, 269 S.E.2d at 809; State v. Williams, 249 S.E.2d 758, 764 (W.Va. 1978). The voluntary waiver of Miranda rights is but one factor to be considered in assessing attenuation.

In such instances, the results of the search would be suppressed. See Syllabus Point 1, State v. Williams, 162 W. Va. 309, 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978). We disagree with appellants' characterization of the situation.

384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 918. Aldridge's primary argument is that he was subjected to an unconstitutional nonconsensual search when he was required to remove his gloves, see, e.g., State v. Williams, W. Va., 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978); State v. Thomas, 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), and that the officers' testimony about seeing the wound was therefore inadmissible. He also contends this illegal search tainted subsequent blood tests. There was no contention either prior to trial, at trial, or in Aldridge's motion for a new trial that the blood testing evidence was tainted by the police officers' observation of Aldridge's hand. The thrust of the argument below went to a claimed Miranda violation.