Opinion
No. A07-1835.
Filed November 25, 2008.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 06049919.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara Lynne Martin, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Nordame Williams was convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence and his case was then submitted to the court on stipulated facts under State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980). Appellant argues that the conviction should be vacated based on insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Because appellant stipulated to the facts supporting his conviction only to obtain appellate review of a pretrial ruling, he cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and we therefore affirm.
DECISION
This appeal results from the parties' apparent confusion over whether the district court treated proceedings on March 23, 2007 as a Lothenbach proceeding or a court trial on stipulated facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. Appellant concedes that he intended that the case be submitted under Lothenbach, but he argues that the district court appeared to treat this case as a stipulated facts trial by including findings that stated the matter was "tried to the court based on testimony and evidence previously submitted at a Rasmussen Hearing . . . [,]" and by referring to rule 26.01 in determining timing issues.
In State v. Riley, 667 N.W.2d 153, 157-58 (Minn.App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003), this court held that a defendant's submission of his case under Lothenbach, precludes further review of sufficiency of evidence issues. There, we observed, however, that "continuing confusion [exists] over the distinction between a stipulated-facts trial under Rule 26.01 and a stipulated-facts trial under Lothenbach." Id. at 158. Following a trial on stipulated facts under rule 26.01, a defendant may raise any issue on appeal that is allowed from any trial to the court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. At the time of the Riley decision, the reach of this rule had not been specifically determined, and a comment to the rule referred to Lothenbach, possibly suggesting an interrelationship between the two types of proceedings. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 cmt. (stating that under the rule a denial of a motion to suppress evidence or other pretrial order may be preserved, referring to Lothenbach).
An amendment to rule 26.01, which took effect on April 1, 2007, just days after the proceeding at issue here, specifically addressed Lothenbach proceedings. The rule now provides that after a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, stipulates to the evidence, and concedes to a finding of guilt on that evidence, the defendant must also acknowledge that appellate review will be of the pretrial issue, "but not of the defendant's guilt, or of other issues that could arise at a contested trial." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (emphasis added).
We conclude that the proceedings here were consistent with a Lothenbach proceeding. The trial transcript shows that (1) appellant was advised both by his counsel and the court as to the rights he was waiving; (2) appellant acknowledged and agreed to the waiver; (3) appellant's attorney specifically advised him on the record that "it is assumed the court would be finding [him] guilty" of the charged offense and that the only dispositive issue that would remain was whether or not the police properly searched the vehicle; (4) appellant's attorney advised him that the appellate court would review only the issue of whether police violated his constitutional rights in searching the vehicle; and (5) the district court advised appellant that the issue for the appellate court to address was the lawfulness of the vehicle search and explained that the Lothenbach trial would preserve that issue for appeal.
We also conclude that the law in effect at the time of appellant's conviction supports that he received a Lothenbach proceeding. Minnesota courts recognized a distinction between the Lothenbach procedure and a stipulated-facts trial under rule 26.01, even before the amendment of the rule. Riley, 667 N.W.2d at 158; see In re Welfare of R.J.E., 642 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Minn. 2002). An appellant is not allowed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence after a Lothenbach submission on stipulated facts because the Lothenbach procedure is used specifically to submit a case to the district court while "preserving pretrial issues for appeal." Riley, 667 N.W.2d at 157 (quotation omitted). The rationale for Lothenbach is to avoid the expense of a trial when facts are not in dispute, but a trial is necessary to obtain appellate review of a pretrial ruling. We conclude that appellant was convicted under Lothenbach for the sole purpose of preserving a pretrial search-and-seizure issue, which precludes our review of appellant's claim of insufficient evidence.
Affirmed.