Summary
concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury an instruction on the defense of entrapment, because, although the defendant gave written notice of her intent to rely on the defense of entrapment, no evidence in support of the defense was offered by the defendant and the state's evidence did not support the defense
Summary of this case from State v. MayoOpinion
No. C-72-06-1832
Argued November 28, 1972
Affirmed December 8, 1972 Petition for rehearing denied January 10, 1973 Petition for review denied April 17, 1973
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
PAT DOOLEY, Judge.
Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
John W. Burgess, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and John W. Osburn, Solicitor General, Salem.
Before SCHWAB, Chief Judge, and LANGTRY and THORNTON, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Defendant appeals from conviction on jury trial of prostitution. ORS 167.007. She gave written notice before trial of intent to rely upon the defense of entrapment. There is entrapment if
ORS 167.007 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of prostitution if he engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct in return for a fee.
"(2) Prostitution is a Class A misdemeanor."
"(1) * * * the actor * * * was induced * * * by a law enforcement official * * * [to do the illegal act] for the purpose of obtaining evidence * * *.
"(2) * * * '[I]nduced' means that the actor did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in the proscribed conduct. Merely affording * * * opportunity to commit * * * [is] not * * * entrapment." ORS 161.275.
Defendant offered no evidence, but through the metropolitan public defender, demanded a jury instruction that the state was required to disprove entrapment. The defender urged that the written notice of intent raised the defense and thereafter there was no need of evidence in support of it in order to submit it to the jury, citing ORS 161.055:
"(1) When a 'defense,' other than an 'affirmative defense' as defined in subsection (2) * * * is raised at trial, the state has the burden of disproving * * *.
"* * * * *
"(3) The state is not required to negate * * * [under] subsection (1) * * * unless it is raised by the defendant. 'Raised by the defendant' means either notice in writing to the state before commencement of trial * * *."
The trial court ruled that unless some evidence in support of the defense were offered, no instruction should be given, and refused the demand. On appeal, the state public defender correctly concedes the trial court's ruling was proper, but urges that the state's evidence supported the defense; therefore, the instruction should have been given. The evidence was, essentially, that an officer in civilian garb approached defendant in a public place where she was walking in the early morning hours and greeted her. She responded, asking him if he wanted a "date" and after his affirmance asked how much money he had. He responded "$24," and she got in his vehicle, and, inter alia, asked him what he wanted; he said "BJ" (meaning oral sodomy), she said "O.K." and the arrest followed. This is not evidence of entrapment.
Affirmed.