Opinion
No. 3-273 / 02-26
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James C. Bauch, Judge.
Defendant Willie Williams appeals from his conviction and sentence of first-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Linda Myers-Fangman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Willie Williams appeals from his conviction and sentence of first-degree theft, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.2(1) (2001). He contends the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the specific intent required to commit the offense of theft by deception and in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. Williams also contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
In June 2001, Williams went to Community Motors dealership to buy a car. To secure financing for a vehicle, he presented a forged letter from a local attorney stating Williams would be receiving a settlement in excess of $80,000. Based on the unsigned letter and other false representations, Williams was allowed to take a 1998 Buick Riviera, worth approximately $19,200, home for the weekend. Williams was to return the car Monday to complete a purchase contract and provide the dealership with a $7500 down payment. Williams did not return to the dealership. He was arrested on July 31, 2001, and the Buick was recovered in the garage of a house in Chicago. The vehicle had extensive damage.
Williams first contends the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that specific intent is required to commit theft by deception. We review this claim for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. Theft by deception occurs when a person "[o]btains . . . a transfer of possession, control, or ownership of the property of another, or the beneficial use of the property of another, by deception." Iowa Code § 714.1(3). Although intent to defraud was an element of the predecessor statute, comparable language does not appear in the present statute. State v. Smith, 300 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1981). Williams notes the definition of deception in section 702.9 requires "knowingly" engaging in certain behavior. However, the use of the term "knowingly" does not make theft be deception a specific intent crime. See State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1996). Instead, we look to the legislative intent. Id. at 294.
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.
Id. (emphasis in original). We conclude theft by deception is not a specific intent crime. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Williams's request to so instruct the jury.
Williams next contends the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he had the intent to deceive Community Motors at the time of the transaction. Because his counsel failed to point out specific deficiencies in the evidence sufficient to preserve error, State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996), Williams submits this claim under an ineffective assistance of counsel theory. We review such claims de novo. State v. Allison, 576 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Iowa 1998). We conclude Williams is unable to show how he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to preserve error because there is substantial evidence in the record that would convince a rational trier of fact that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, Williams contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to properly investigate, failing to take depositions of the witnesses, and failing to obtain a lien letter. In order to preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for postconviction review, a defendant must make a minimal showing by which this court can assess the viability of the claim. State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Iowa 1987). Finding Williams has failed to make a minimal showing by which we can access his remaining ineffective assistance claims, we find no basis for preserving them for postconviction relief. See id. Williams's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are dismissed, and his conviction affirmed.