Opinion
No. 3-009 / 01-2005.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Patrick R. Grady, Judge.
Williams appeals from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse, contending his trial counsel was ineffective. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Victoria Dominguez, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A jury found Curtis Anthony Williams guilty of third-degree sexual abuse See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, .4(1) and 702.17 (1999). On appeal, Williams contends trial counsel was ineffective in: 1) failing to make a specific motion for judgment of acquittal and 2) failing to obtain the victim's medical records. He also contends the district court applied the wrong standard in ruling on his new trial motion. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Curtis Williams and the victim shared a two bedroom apartment in Iowa City. Early one morning, while recuperating from rotator cuff and vaginal surgery, the victim awoke to find Williams on top of her. According to the victim, Williams proceeded to have sex with her over her objection.
After the victim reported the incident to police, the State charged Williams with third-degree sexual abuse. During trial, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing generally that there was insufficient evidence to establish the elements of the charge. The district court denied the motion. A jury found Williams guilty.
Following trial, defense counsel moved to obtain the victim's medical records on the ground they might contain information exonerating his client. The district court denied the motion. The court also denied a motion for new trial filed by defense counsel.
Williams appealed his judgment and sentence.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Williams claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. He must prove 1) counsel breached an essential duty and 2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984).
A. Judgment of Acquittal. Williams contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to articulate the grounds for his motion for judgment of acquittal and, specifically, in failing to argue that the victim consented to sex. We determine the record is adequate to address this claim. See State v. Smith, 543 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
We believe trial counsel had no duty to raise the issue of consent because that theory was inconsistent with William's testimony that he "never had sex with that lady, never." Therefore, we reject this ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
B. Medical Records. Williams contends defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain the victim's medical records. In his view, if those records made no mention of the sexual assault, they would have corroborated his claim that the assault never occurred. We preserve this claim for postconviction relief to permit development of the record. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Iowa 1984).
III. New Trial Motion
Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)( b)(6), the district court may grant a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the law or the evidence. In State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998) the Iowa Supreme Court held that the phrase "contrary to the evidence" means "contrary to the weight of the evidence, rather than "insufficient evidence."
Williams contends the district court applied the old insufficiency standard rather than the standard prescribed by Ellis. We disagree. In ruling on Williams's new trial motion, the district court stated:
The Court is mindful that there are different standards with regard to ruling on a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and a Motion for New Trial after a conviction in a criminal case. The Court finds with regard to the Motion in Arrest of Judgment that as the Court ruled when the Defendant moved for a directed verdict that there was certainly sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed every element of the offense of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree.
Further, after hearing all the evidence, the Court also finds with regard to the Motion for New Trial that the jury's verdict of guilty was not against the weight of the evidence. They had adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of the complaining witness. It was obvious to all in the courtroom that she was, I guess, rough at a minimum, that she was a street hardened person, and the jury heard substantial evidence attacking her credibility through her prior convictions.
The Court also again heard the testimony of the police officer that was fully cross-examined by defense counsel about alleged admissions made by Mr. Williams as to an act of consensual sex and were able to evaluate Mr. Williams' testimony at trial that he did not engage in sex of [any] kind with the complaining witness.
Given all that, the jury was clearly able to reach the conclusion that the complaining witness was credible and Mr. Williams was not, and for that conclusion, is supported by the weight of the evidence, so in that regard, the Motions in Arrest of Judgment and for New Trial are overruled.
This ruling comports with Ellis.
IV. Disposition
We affirm Williams's judgment and sentence for third-degree sexual abuse and preserve for postconviction relief proceedings his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain the victim's medical records.