Opinion
No. 5-528 / 04-1316
Filed August 31, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary Jane Sokolovske, Judge.
Robert Williams III appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and James G. Tomka, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Patrick Jennings, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Robert Williams III appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(2) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On August 6, 2004, Sioux City police officers questioned Williams concerning allegations that he sexually abused his six-year-old half-sister. The interview was conducted by Officer Jay Fleckenstein and Detective John Kayl and took place in an interview room at the police department. Although Williams was not under arrest at that time, he was nevertheless read a Miranda advisory, and he acknowledged that he understood the rights explained in the advisory.
Williams initially denied any sexual contact with his half-sister, insisting that any contact with her genitalia would have been innocent or incidental to otherwise appropriate conduct. However, after four hours of intense interrogation, Williams admitted intentional sexual contact with his half-sister. As a result, Williams was arrested and charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Williams waived his right to a jury trial and, as the record indicates, filed no pretrial motions challenging the admissibility of his incriminating statements made during the August 6 interrogation.
At trial the State called Kayl and Fleckenstein to testify concerning Williams's interrogation. After the prosecutor offered a videotape and transcript of Williams's interview, Williams's attorney made the following objection:
Your Honor, I — as we told the court in the pretrial conference, I will object to the admission of this videotaped interview, and there are essentially two reasons for it: The first reasons is that I'm asking the court to make a determination under Rule of Evidence 5.104( a) as to the admissibility of the — of the interview particularly related to the voluntariness of the statements that were made by Mr. — Mr. Williams with the police officers. The interview was a rather lengthy interview. There were a number of things the police officers talked about before he even finally made the statements that I think the State is interested in, and so I'd urge that as a preliminary matter this was not a voluntary statement.
The judge did not rule on counsel's objection, noting her intention to take "this all under advisement." Kayl then testified concerning Williams's interview, including Williams's initial denials and eventual admission to two separate intentional sexual contacts with his sister. Officer Fleckenstein also testified concerning the interview and Williams's incriminating statements. At the close of the State's evidence, Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal, citing the State's failure to prove a sex act occurred because Williams's incriminating statements were inadmissible. Counsel also argued that even if the statements were admissible, Williams's confessions were not corroborated by other evidence and were insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction. The court, as noted earlier, reserved ruling on the underlying issues controlling the resolution of Williams's motion for judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, Williams rested his case without presenting any evidence, and the entire motion, including Williams's challenge to the admissibility of his statements, was submitted.
After considering the record concerning Williams's interview, the trial court found Williams's statements were voluntarily made and accordingly denied Williams's motion to exclude those statements and related testimony. The court also denied Williams's motions for judgment of acquittal and found him guilty of one count of sexual abuse in the second degree. A judgment of conviction on that count was subsequently entered by the court, and Williams was sentenced accordingly.
On appeal, Williams raises the following issue for review:
"I. WILLIAMS WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL-A 6TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION-DUE TO COUNSEL'S FAILING TO PROPERLY MOTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF WILLIAMS' STATEMENT; THE MOTION BASED UPON A [sic] INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION VIOLATION."
II. Standard of Review
Because Williams raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 2003).
III. The Merits
Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premised on counsel's failure to timely file a pretrial motion challenging the admissibility of his incriminating statements to investigators. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4) (requiring motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence to be filed no later than forty days after arraignment). We, however, need not consider whether counsel was ineffective in the particulars claimed because the trial court heard and ruled on Williams's challenge to the admissibility of his incriminating statements. See State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 540 (Iowa 2003) (supreme court reviewed trial court's ruling on merits of motion to suppress when trial court heard and ruled on untimely motion to suppress).
The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was obtained voluntarily. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Iowa 1997). "The ultimate test is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the statements were the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the subject at a time when that person's will was not overborne or the capacity for self-determination critically impaired." State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 2002). With no one factor being determinative, the court looks at the following:
the defendant's age, experience, prior record, level of education and intelligence; the length of time the defendant is interrogated; whether physical punishment was used; defendant's ability to understand the questions; defendant's physical and emotional condition; whether any deceit or improper promises were used in gaining the admission; and any mental weaknesses the defendant may possess. In the event the questioning was custodial, defendant's knowledge and waiver of his Miranda rights and the length of his detention would also be considered.
State v. Jennett, 574 N.W.2d 361, 364 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (quoting State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1989)).
Williams argues the State "broke him" during the lengthy interrogation using deception, implied promises to let him go home, and a "tag-team of officers [that] verbally bludgeoned" him. The State contends the officers never suggested Williams would be treated more leniently if he confessed, but instead made it clear throughout the interview that if the actions were intentional, there was nothing they could do to help him.
In overruling Williams's motion, the court held:
The defendant has a date of birth of January 22, 1984. At the time of the police interview he was nineteen years old. He maintained employment and was, in fact, working on the date of the interview. He agreed to accompany officers from his employment to the Sioux City Police Department for purposes of the interview. At the outset of the interview the defendant was advised of his Miranda warning. He indicated that he understood his rights. He further responded that he did not have questions for the officer concerning those rights. The defendant is not "mentally subnormal." A review of the videotape showed that the defendant was able to understand the questions of the interviewer and make appropriate responses.
Solely for purposes of the defendant's motion to suppress the confession, the court has considered that the defendant has been previously adjudicated a delinquent child in juvenile court. The defendant has had contact with the criminal justice system from the perspective of a juvenile defendant for a criminal act. The defendant did during the course of the interview mention his fear of being placed on the sex offender registry.
The interview lasted nearly four hours. During the course of the interview, the defendant was provided with a drink. He was also allowed a restroom break. The videotape does not show that he was subjected to any physical deprivation. The defendant was also left alone in the room for several minutes during the course of the interview. The defendant did become emotional at certain points throughout the interview but he was able to recover his composure and continue with the interview in a rational manner.
The defendant has urged that he was promised leniency during the course of the interview. Throughout the course of the interview, the officers repeatedly emphasized the need to obtain help for the victim, the defendant's brother, family and the defendant himself. Officer Fleckenstein stated in the interview the following discourse:
OFFICER FLECKENSTEIN: Because I couldn't handle that, okay? I'm only — I'm only one guy, okay? One time I can bring you back, I can bring [your half-sister] back, I can bring [your brother] back, and I can get the family back together. Okay? I have numerous resources. I have resources to counselors, to therapists, to doctors, DHS. I have those resources at my — in my hands. The department and the state of Iowa has been great enough and gracious enough to give me those things. Those things since you are being honest with me I can give to you, okay? I can kind of be out here watching the help go around you and bringing you guys together.
. . . .
OFFICER FLECKENSTEIN: If — like I said, we're not talking about a thousand times, okay?
WILLIAMS: Yeah, I know.
OFFICER FLECKENSTEIN: Because if we are you got to tell me because I can't deal with that right now.
WILLIAMS: No.
OFFICER FLECKENSTEIN: I don't have enough resources. If it happened once I can deal with that. If it happened twice I can deal with that. If it happened just a couple of times I can deal with that. I can't deal with a thousand times and I can't deal with an intentional act, okay?
. . . .
In considering the totality of the interview of the defendant and the attendant circumstances, the court concludes that the statements to the police were not made under promises of leniency. At no time was the defendant promised that charges would not be filed. At one point he was told that if the acts were intentional the officer could not help him. The court concludes that the motion to suppress the defendant's confession is denied on all grounds asserted.
Our de novo review of the record confirms these findings, and we adopt them as our own.
As noted by the district court, Williams was nineteen at the time of the interview, suffering no physical or mental impairments, and familiar with the interrogation/charging process. Officers read Williams his a Miranda advisory before the interview began, and although the interview lasted nearly four hours, it is apparent Williams understood the questions asked and was not subjected to unduly harsh treatment by his interrogators.
We further find there were no improper promises of leniency made to induce Williams's statements. Throughout the interview officers discussed the possibility of getting help for Williams and his family, and further told him it would be best for everyone if he came clean and told the truth. Officers may tell a defendant it is better to tell the truth, and may also tell the defendant that they can recommend psychiatric help or inform the prosecutor of defendant's cooperation. State v. Nolan, 390 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986). When Williams asked whether the officers just wanted him to go to therapy, Detective Kayl stated, "What I want is the best result of this whole thing. I want what is best for everybody involved." Moreover, officers told Williams they could not help him if his acts were intentional, and that they would never want him to confess to something he did not do. After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Williams's interrogation, we find his incriminatory statements were voluntarily made. The district court's decision denying Williams's challenge to the admissibility of his incriminatory statements is affirmed.