Opinion
ID No. 9311002909.
Submitted: December 13, 1999
Decided: February 28, 2000
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 28th day of February, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to this Court that:
1. Herbert Williams III (Defendant) has filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Defendant sets forth three grounds for relief. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. On November 5, 1993, Defendant was arrested and charged with three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse third degree and one count of noncompliance with the conditions of a recognizance. These charges arose from Defendant's alleged sexual relations with several minors who were under the age of sixteen. As a condition of his release on bail, pursuant to an order from the Court of Common Pleas, Defendant was prohibited from having any contact with his alleged victims. In 1994, Defendant was again arrested and later indicted on three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse third degree and one count of noncompliance with the conditions of recognizance. These charges stemmed from an alleged sexual encounter with one of the victims of the 1993 incident during a party in a hotel room.
Following a jury trial, Defendant was sentenced to three years incarceration at Level V, suspended after one year for six months supervision at Level IV, followed by eighteen months at Level III. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted several points of error. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court finding that Defendant's arguments were "wholly without merit."
Defendant alleged (1) that the Court of Common Pleas erred when it did not allow him to attend the bail hearing where conditions for his release which for the basis of the conviction at issue were initially established; (2) that the Superior Court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the intent element of the offense of noncompliance with the conditions of recognizance or bail; (3) that the Superior Court abused its discretion in allegedly using unreliable information when determining his sentence; and (4) that his arrest warrant was invalid because there was not a sufficient showing of probable cause made to supports its issuance. Defendant also attempted unsuccessfully to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Williams v. State, Del. Supr., No. 373, 1995, Hartnett, J. (July 1, 1996) (ORDER) at 2.
3. Defendant has filed this motion for postconviction relief asserting three grounds for relief. Ground One of the motion claims an "[a]buse of discretion for denying motion to continue motion to suppress." The claim in its entirety is that
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3.
[t]he Defendant's due process rights were violated by the trial court's denial of the defendant's request to continue the Motion to Suppress to allow 1) defense counsel time to review transcript of videotaped interview made by the defendant and 2) to allow expert witness to review transcript which would have been crucial to his opinion. Denial of this continuance request denied the defendant of 1) effective representation and 2) his right to expert testimony which may have resulted in his statement being suppressed.
Id. at 3-4.
In Ground Two of the Motion, Defendant contends that the "State's witness committed perjury." The claim in its entirety is that
Id. at 3.
[t]he lead detective investigating the alleged offenses, Det. Salters, committed perjury at the defendant's Suppression Hearing when he testified that he did not make any statements regarding getting defendant any help, yet during his trial testimony he repeatedly testified that he did, in fact, make statements to the defendant regarding getting him help. Had Det. Salters testified truthfully at the Suppression Hearing, the outcome would have been different. Det. Salters' perjury at the defendant's Suppression Hearing denied the defendant of his right to a fair trial and of his due process rights.
Id. at 3-4.
In Ground Three of the motion, Defendant alleges an "Evidence Violation/Due Process Violation." The claim in its entirety is that
Id.
During trial, the State introduced as evidence several letters written by one of the complaintants [sic], Kimberly Steele. The State introduced these letters as evidence that the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms. Steele in order to prove Counts 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Indictment. These same letters had previously been introduced as evidence by the State in the defendant's May 1995 trial, where the defendant was accused of having engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms. Steele during a different time period. At the trial, the defendant was found not guilty of having had sex with Ms. Steele. To use these same letters as evidence of different alleged offenses during different time periods, after having previously used them at a prior trial, violated the defendant's constitutional rights, right to a fair trial and due process rights.
Id. at 3-4.
Lastly, Defendant states in the motion that "these grounds were not previously raised due to ineffectiveness of appellate counsel."
Id. at 3.
4. When considering a motion for postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Rule 61(i) before considering the merits of the individual claims. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, ordinarily the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim where a procedural bar exists. Rule 61(d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified." Claims for postconviction relief which are entirely conclusory may be summarily dismissed on that basis.
Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)); see also Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 745 (1990); Winn v. State, Del. Supr., No. 257, 1992, Moore, J. (Feb. 9, 1993) (ORDER); Webster v. State, Del. Supr., No. 65, 1992, Horsey, J. (Apr. 1, 1992) (ORDER).
State v. Gattis, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN90-05-1017, Barron, J. (Dec. 28, 1995) ( citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 554; Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., No. 185, 1994, Walsh, J. (Jan. 13, 1995)(ORDER); Hicks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 417, 1991, Walsh, J. (May 56, 1992) (ORDER)).
Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4); See e.g., Jordan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1994, Walsh, J. (Aug. 25, 1994) (ORDER); State v. Brittingham, Del. Supr., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (Dec. 29, 1994) (ORDER) at 3 ( citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556) (holding that conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to warrant postconviction relief).
5. Defendant's allegations are conclusory. Defendant has merely claimed in a conclusory manner that his due process rights were violated based solely on the statements above. This Court finds these contentions vague and entirely conclusory, warranting summary dismissal.
See n. 12.
6. For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.