Opinion
ID 0611019798.
August 29, 2007.
Paula T. Ryan, Esquire, David Hume, IV, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, DE.
E. Stephen Callaway, Esquire, Carole J. Dunn, Esquire, John P. Daniello, Esquire, Assistant Public Defenders, Georgetown, DE.
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Declare the Death Penalty Statute Unconstitutional and/or to Preclude its Application in the Instant Case ("Motion"). This is my decision denying that Motion.
The State correctly notes in its response that the Delaware Supreme Court has reviewed 11 Del. C. § 4209 in light of the post- Ring amendment to the statute. Delaware's capital sentencing scheme was referred to by the U.S. Supreme Court as a "hybrid system." See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2442 n. 6 (U.S. 2002) ("Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations.") The hybrid system uses the jury's determinations on punishment as a recommendation only. In 2002 the General Assembly of the State of Delaware amended 11 Del. C. § 4209 in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ring. Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 320 (De l. 2003). The 2002 amendments transformed the jury's role during the penalty phase of capital cases from one that was advisory under the 1991 version of Section 4209 to one that is now determinative as to the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances. Id. However, the final sentencing decision remains with the judge. Id.
The Arizona statute at issue in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (U.S. 2002), permitted the trial judge alone to find the existence o f an aggravating factor necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. Ring resolved a prior inconsistency in case law by "overrul[ing] Walton [ v. Arizona, 497 U .S. 639 (U .S. 1990),] to the extent that it allow[ed] a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (U.S. 200 2).
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003), addressed the very argument presented sub judice. In Brice, the Court stated as follows:
Once the jury determines that a statutory aggravating factor exists, the defendant becomes death eligible. Although a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, it is not that determination that increases the maximum punishment. Rather, the maximum punishment is increased by the finding of the statutory aggravator. At that point a judge can sentence a defendant to death, but only if the judge finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Therefore, the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances does not increase the punishment. Rather, it ensures that the punishment imposed is appropriate and proportional.Brice, 815 A.2d at 322 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This Court finds the reasoning in Brice to be both compelling and controlling, and sees no changed circumstances requiring discussion.
Further support for Delaware's sentencing framework can be found in the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539 (Del. 2004). In Ploof, the Court noted that "[a]lthough the federal courts have not specifically reviewed Delaware's post- Ring hybrid sentencing framework for due process compliance, . . . the similarity of that framework to 18 U.S.C .S. § 3951, et seq. provides ample support for its constitutionality." Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539, 544 (Del. 2004). This Court again applies this persuasive reasoning and adopts the Supreme Court's position as its own. For these reasons, the Court does not find Delaware's death penalty statute to be unconstitutional.
In the Motion it is argued that Delaware's chosen method of execution, lethal injection, is in violation of the United States and Delaware Constitutions. The Court finds no merit in these arguments. Similar argument was presented to this Court in State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del.Super. 1994). In Deputy, the lethal injection statute was challenged as a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as a violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution. The Court quickly dismissed such contentions by stating that the "Court has previously ruled that lethal injection is not, per se and "in fact," a violation of the United States and Delaware Constitutions." State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 420 (Del.Super. 1994) (citing State v. DeShields, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 355 (De l. Super . Aug. 1 7, 1992), aff'd sub n o m ., DeShields v. State, 1993 D el. Super. LEXIS 2 28 (Del.Super. June 10, 1 993); accord Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (D. Ark. 1992)). Consequently, the Court held that Deputy had not established that the Delaware statute violated the United States or Delaware Constitutions.
The Delaware statute on lethal injection reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Punishment of death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until such person sentenced to death is dead, and such execution procedure shall be determined and supervised by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction.
. . .
11 Del. C. § 4209(f).
The Court can find no reason to depart from precedent. The practice of using lethal injection as a method of execution has been sanctioned by the legislature as well as the Courts. Lethal injection has been found to be an appropriate method should capital punishment be imposed. The supervisory authority delegated to the Commissioner of the Department of Correction in implementing a death sentence does not alter the Courts opinion. Under the present state of the law, Delaware's use of lethal injection as a method of execution is not in violation of the U.S. or Delaware Constitutions.
The Motion seeks to preclude application of the death penalty in the instant case, given pending federal litigation referenced in paragraphs 14 and 18 of the Motion. This argument is premature given the present posture of this case, and the subject will be reviewed later, if necessary.
Jackson v. Danberg, 240 F.R.D. 145 (D. D el. 2007).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Declare the Delaware Death Penalty Unconstitutional and/or to Preclude its Application in the Instant Case is denied with respect to constitutionality. With regards to application of the death penalty in the instant case, Defendant's Motion is premature at this stage, and is also premature given the pending federal litigation in this area.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Sever Charges ("Motion") pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rules 8 and 14. This is my decision granting that Motion.
An Indictment was filed on January 22, 2007, charging Latrez D. Williams with the following alleged offenses said to have occurred on or about November 27, 2006: Count 1-Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony; Count 2 — Murder in the First Degree; and Count 3 — Possession of a Deadly Weapon by Person Prohibited. The Court has now been asked to sever the Possession of a Deadly Weapon by Person Prohibited charge from the two remaining charges.
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 14 states, in relevant part, the following:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for severance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988). The prejudice that may be experienced from a joinder of offenses has been described in the following terms: (1) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and (3) the defendant may be subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to different charges. Id.
The prejudice that could result from joinder of the claims presently before the Court falls, in some respect, in each of the three previously mentioned categories, but mainly in the second. Given the fact that proof of the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited will involve the presentation of Defendant's prior criminal record, the jury may be unable to compartmentalize their judgment of guilt or innocence with regard to each of the separate counts in the indictment, and may infer a general criminal disposition. See State v. Loper, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 228 (Del.Super. June 19, 1990). The potential for such prejudice impairs Defendant's due process right to a fair trial so long as the charges are tried together in the guilt phase of this capital trial. The counter interest of judicial economy does not outweigh such potential prejudice
Of course, should the case proceed to a penalty phase, the parties recognize that the State will be presenting evidence concerning the Assault in the Second Degree conviction as an aggravating circumstance under 11 Del. C. § 4209(d).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Sever Count 3 is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.