Because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of his due process claims, we decline to review them. See State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 183 n. 9, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim.
Because the defendant has failed to provide a separate analysis of his state constitutional claim, we decline to review it. See State v. Faust, 237 Conn. 454, 465 n. 10, 678 A.2d 910 (1996); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 183 n. 9, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). This court, as well as numerous federal courts, has squarely held that administrative sanctions, like those meted out to the defendant in this case, serve the purpose of maintaining institutional order and security and do not give rise to a double jeopardy clause violation.
Because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of his state constitutional claim, we decline to review it. See State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 183 n. 9, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996); State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 122 n. 3, 635 A.2d 762 (1993). "The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury panels be drawn from a source representing a fair cross section of the community in which the defendant is tried.
The defendant also makes his claim under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of his state constitutional claim, we decline to review it. See State v. Faust, 237 Conn. 454, 465 n. 10, 678 A.2d 910 (1996); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 183 n. 9, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). "`When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court's charge is not whether it is accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.'. . . State v. Denby, 235 Conn. 477, 484-85, 668 A.2d 682 (1995)."
Although the defendant refers to the Connecticut constitution in his brief, he does no more than that and we need not address it. See State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 183 n. 9, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996); State v. Williams 231 Conn. 235, 247 n. 16, 645 A.2d 999 (1994); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 66 n. 12, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). Initially, we note that defense counsel did not object at trial to any of the comments made by the prosecutor.
This inconsistency requires resolution. It is well established that a defendant must demonstrate harmful error by showing that "it is more probable than not" that the erroneous evidentiary ruling affected the result; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996); accord State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 544, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994); State v. Payne, 219 Conn. 93, 103, 591 A.2d 1246 (1991); State v. Sierra, supra, 213 Conn. 436; State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 47, 540 A.2d 42 (1988); State v. Artieri, 206 Conn. 81, 88, 536 A.2d 567 (1988); or that the erroneous evidentiary ruling "would have been likely" to affect the result. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
. . . One line of cases states that the defendant must establish that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result. . . . [See, e.g.] State v. McIntyre, 242 Conn. 318, 329, 699 A.2d 911 (1997); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). . . . A second line of cases indicates that the defendant must show that the prejudice resulting from the impropriety was so substantial as to undermine confidence in the fairness of the verdict.
One line of cases states that the defendant must establish that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result. [E.g.] State v. McIntyre, 242 Conn. 318, 329, 699 A.2d 911 (1997); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). . . . A second line of cases indicates that the defendant must show that the prejudice resulting from the impropriety was so substantial as to undermine confidence in the fairness of the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Askew, 245 Conn. 351, 371-72, 716 A.2d 36 (1998).
One line of cases states that the defendant must establish that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result. . . . [E.g.] State v. McIntyre, 242 Conn. 318, 329, 699 A.2d 911 (1997); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996). . . . A second line of cases indicates that the defendant must show that the prejudice resulting from the impropriety was so substantial as to undermine confidence in the fairness of the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Askew, 245 Conn. 351, 371-72, 716 A.2d 36 (1998).
We recognize that we have not been fully consistent in our articulation of the standard for establishing harm. One line of cases states that the defendant must establish that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result. . . . State v. McIntyre, 242 Conn. 318, 329, 699 A.2d 911 (1997); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996); State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 721-22, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). Another line of cases states that the defendant must establish that the trial court error caused him substantial prejudice. State v. Askew, 245 Conn. 351, 371, 716 A.2d 36 (1998).