Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Grayned v. Rockford, [supra, 408 U.S. 110] (`condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language'); see also State v. Eason, [supra, 192 Conn. 47]." State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 220, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a person must inquire further as to the precise reach of its prohibitions, nor is it necessary that a statute list the exact conduct prohibited.
We conduct our review of this claim mindful that "legislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and that a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984); State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 217-18, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). We conclude that the defendant has failed to meet that burden.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 224, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). Sections 53a-54a (a) and 53a-54b (8) and (9) applied to the defendant under the facts of the present case at the time the defendant acted. Under the common law, Antonia's death would fall under the rule that an action for homicide stands as long as the person was born alive before her death.
efed are deemed abandoned.... This rule applies to claims that the defendant is entitled to ... Golding review."); Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 528, n. 11, 729 A.2d 740, 753, n.11 (1999) ("Rather than analyze the trial court's reasoning with regard to any of these claims, the defendants merely assert, in a conclusory manner, that the trial court acted improperly. Consequently, they do not merit review.") (citations omitted); Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., 243 Conn. 454, 465, n. 11, 704 A.2d 222, 224, n.11 (1997) ("Claimed errors not adequately briefed and not fully developed will not be considered by this court.") (citations omitted); State v. Edward B., 72 Conn. App. 282, 302 n. 12, 806 A.2d 64, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 910, 810 A.2d 276 (2002) (it is a well-established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief); Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 48 n. 42, 717 A.2d 77 (1998) (same); State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 217 n. 7, 700 A.2d 1 (1997) (same). Because the Appellate Court declined to consider the sufficiency of evidence claim related to Perez's conviction for robbery in the first degree due to the failure of Perez to comply with established and regularly applied Connecticut rules of procedure, this Court considers the claim to have been procedurally defaulted.
Given the defendant's failure to sufficiently allege a state constitutional claim under State v. Geisler , 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we only consider his federal constitutional vagueness claim. See, e.g., State v. Wilchinski , 242 Conn. 211, 217 n.7, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). We note, however, that "we have applied the same analysis to vagueness claims brought pursuant to both the state and the federal constitutions."
Thus, we must analyze the language and purpose of § 29–38(a) to determine if it has a reasonably ascertainable, core meaning such that, as applied to the defendant's possession of the weapons at issue in the present case, he had fair notice that those weapons fall within the proscription of that statutory provision. See, e.g., State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 221–23, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). A
Our case law also has suggested that it may be possible to bring a facial vagueness challenge outside of the context of free speech when a fundamental constitutional right is alleged to be violated by a law. See State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 217, 700 A.2d 1 (1997) ("[a]ssuming, without deciding, that [the challenged statute] implicates a fundamental constitutional right, and further assuming that we would be willing to engage in a facial vagueness analysis outside the context of the first amendment, we need not do so in this case"); State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 777, 695 A.2d 525 (1997) (implying in dicta that facial challenge is appropriate when any fundamental constitutional right is challenged on vagueness grounds); State v. Linares, supra, 232 Conn. 355 (same); State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 62-63, 428 A.2d 322 (1980) (same). In addition, a litigant who is able to establish that a law is vague as applied to himself or herself, may be able to bring a facial challenge to the ordinance outside of the first amendment context.
`It is a well established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.' Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 593 n. 26, 657 A.2d 212 (1995)." State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 217 n. 7, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). "As we have repeatedly reiterated, issues not properly raised before the trial court will ordinarily not be considered on appeal."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 217-18, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). "The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution ... The constitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement ... If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 219, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). "[T]he party attacking a validly enacted statute . . . bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and [the court indulges] in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality."