Opinion
Crim. I.D. No. 0509018511.
This is the date the Court received the transcript.
Decided: June 5, 2007.
ORDER TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY PURSUANT TO SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL RULE 62.
Defendant shall be competent to stand trial.
Marsha White, Esq., Deputy Attorney General.
David Facciolo, Esq., Attorney for the Defendant.
The Commissioner presided at a hearing to determine the competency of the defendant on March 12, 2007 The Court enters the following order pursuant to Criminal Rule 62:
I. TESTIMONY REGARDING DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR:
The Defendant, Cheryl White ("Defendant") is accused of fraudulently returning items to 18 T.J. Maxx stores in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey over the course of several months. She was indicted on a single charge of Felony Theft for transactions between May and July 2005.
Both parties agree that Defendant has some form of mental illness and that she has suffered more than one head trauma during her life. While Defendant produces competency evaluation testimony that supports her contention that she is unable to stand trial for this charge, the State's evaluation must rely on the doctor's interpretation of Defendant's actions and history because Defendant refused to answer any of the questions posed by the State's doctor. There is a stark contrast between the State and Defendant as to the reasons for Defendant's non-responsive answers. The State opines that Defendant is malingering and that she possesses a mental illness known as factitious disorder, in which a person with this illness seeks to remain in someone's care. The Defendant, through her attorney, argues that she is unable to provide those answers and is, therefore, unable to adequately assist her counsel in a defense. Because the Defendant does not answer the questions, the question of competency must be gleaned from the witnesses' testimony and the evidence presented at the hearing, as well as an historical information available to the Court.
The State produced a surveillance video clearly showing the defendant returning merchandise. While there was no audio on the tape, Defendant appears to have engaged in conversation with the T.J. Maxx salesclerk and behaved in a manner similar to any other customer at the return desk. According to the State's witness, Mr. William Sanders ("Sanders"), an organized theft investigator, he observed her acting "normally" during the alleged refund transactions. Sanders followed Defendant on a number of occasions after he became aware of her transactions at the return desk. According to Sanders, he observed Defendant from about one or two feet away. At no time, did Sanders perceive anything wrong with Defendant's behavior or speech patterns. Additionally, he followed her after she completed her return and received cash from the clerk. He stated that she established a pattern whereby she would play the slot machines at Delaware Park, then drive several hours later to a different T.J.Maxx and make further cash returns.
Comp. Hrg. Tr. at 17.
Sanders described the transactions as "sophisticated," and he explained the scheme by which Defendant allegedly provided false receipts and took advantage of a flaw in T.J.Maxx's merchandise return policy. He alleged that Defendant used seven aliases and provided false addresses when making the returns, that she erased portions of the receipts in order to make non-cash transactions appear to be cash transactions, and that she managed to do this several times to several stores.
Id. at 20. Sanders indicated she "rarely signed her own name," and enumerated the names used of Terry Whitaker, Terry Conaway, and Terry Calloway. Number of aliases gleaned from Donohue's evaluation.
II. TESTIMONY REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MENTAL HEALTH
Defendant has a long and complicated history of head injury trauma, but did not seek mental health treatment until 2003. Several incidents in Defendant's past, including driving over a cliff, being hit in the head with a sledgehammer, and being injured in other motor vehicle accidents, have resulted in her family seeking to declare her disabled. She is receiving Social Security Disability income. Prior to the alleged criminal behavior, Defendant sought mental health evaluations from several doctors, all of whom found her to have a cognitive deficit. Defendant proffered the testimony of Dr. Carol A. Tavani, M.D., a neuropsychiatrist, who testified to Defendant's previous mental health treatment. Dr. Tavani related to the Court what she believed was "the most compelling factor" in understanding Defendant's alleged behavior, that she had been tested and retested and that she had a "downward progression in her cognitive skills, . . . despite the fact that a clear [cause hadn't] been found."
Id. at 156.
Id. at 156.
The State's doctor, Dr. Andrew Donohue, D.O., opined that Defendant was suffering from factitious disorder, a mental illness in which a person wishes to be cared for and, thus, develops a dependent behavior or personality. When Dr. Donohue attempted to administer several tests to determine Defendant's competency, he found her uncooperative, responding "I don't know" to nearly all his questions. After such responses, Dr. Donohue administered tests for malingering, which he states show Defendant was, indeed, malingering, or feigning an inability to answer the questions. FN. On the first test of 19 questions, which were meant to determine the Defendant's competency, Defendant scored only 1 point out of the total 30. She was unable to do basic things such as spell "cat" and identify the year or season. Her only point was scored when she correctly identified a pen which Dr. Donohue was holding. According to Dr. Donohue, a score on this test below 24 would identify the patient as having dementia. A score below 10 indicated severe dementia. With severe dementia, Dr. Donohue explained, a person could not perform daily living functions such as shower, use the bathroom, or feed one's self. He stated that one with a score of 1 would certainly not be able to drive.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Upon receiving such a score, Dr. Donohue administered the Rey Test, a test which screens for malingering and cognitive impairment. Dr. Donohue administered this test after determining that Defendant met the criteria for malingering, as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV). According to Dr. Donohue, Defendant "attempted nothing" when the Rey Test was given. He testified that he believed that the Defendant did not try to answer any questions. Defendant scored a zero on a test where persons with severe brain injuries score at least a 12.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 81. The DSM IV gives the requirements for a diagnosis of memory malingering as:
a. . a medical or legal context
b. a marked discrepancy between the person's claimed distress or disability and objective findings.
c. a lack of cooperation during the diagnostic interview.
d. the presence of antisocial personality disorder.
DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000 Halligan, P.W., Bass, C., Oakley, D.A. (Eds.) (2003). Malingering and Illness Deception. Oxford University Press, UK.
Comp. Hrg. Tr. at 85.
Id.
After the Rey Test, Dr. Donohue administed the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) which tested the patient's memory as to which pictures have been shown to her and which have not. He attempted this test three times. The average score for persons with dementia on the first trial of this test is 41. On the second trial, those same persons with dementia score 45.7 on average. And, after the third trial, the average score increases to 47. Defendant scored a zero on all three trials.
Id. at 98.
III. DETERMINING COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL A. Guatney Factors
In determining competency, due process requires that a the Court ensure that the defendant be able (1) to consult with defense counsel rationally, (2) assist in preparing her defense, and (3) have both a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings against her. To assist with this determination, the Court has adopted the use of the twenty Guatney factors.
St. v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 1004 (Del. Super. 1990) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
State v. Guatney, 299 N.W.2d 538 (Neb. 1980).
This Court has often considered each of the Guatney factors and determined a defendant's competency based on how many of those factors are affirmatively met by the defendant's mental status and behavior. Painstakingly, the Court enumerated each criteria, weighs the testimony of the State's doctor and the defendant's doctor, and ultimately determines that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, finding the defendant's doctor's testimony more compelling.
See e.g., St. v. Irving, 2003 WL 21357601 (Del. Super.) at *3.
Id. at *4.
The Guatney factors are examined as follows:
A. Whether the Defendant has sufficient mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things;
Dr. Donohue, despite receiving "I don't know" as a response nearly 200 times during his evaluation of Defendant, opines that she meets the requirement of this first criteria. He bases this on his interview with others who have observed her, including Sanders, who observed her as engaging in "goal-directed behavior" while at the store, navigating the roads, and gambling in the casino.
Donohue, Dr. Andrew, Delaware Psychiatric Center Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation for Cheryl White, ("Donohue") ID# 0509018511, (March 20, 2006) at 4.
Comp. Hrg. Tr. at 112.
Dr. Tavani disagrees. She testified that Defendant could not give her the exact date and could not identify where she was. She stated that one way she could reconcile those factors which persuaded Dr. Donohue to conclude that she meets this criteria is that Defendant does "much better at familiar things she does over and over again."
Id. at 169.
While it is uncertain as to whether Defendant is aware of the exact date, it is apparent from the video, from her behavior in the courtroom, and from the testimony of Sanders that Doctor Donohue's assessment is more accurate. Defendant has the presence of mind to change lanes, drive to various destinations, wait in line, accept cash in return for receipts, sign her own name or multiple other names, and use various addresses when asked. There are too many variables involved in these actions for the Court to consider Dr. Tavani's testimony as a reasonable assessment of Defendant's appreciation of her presence in relation to place and things.
Defendant did, indeed, have a single outburst, but it was not extremely disruptive. She understood that she had to sit in the courtroom and often looked back at her daughter for guidance. These all gave the appearance of a person who understood her surroundings and understood what acceptable behavior included.
B. Whether her elementary mental processes are such that she understands that she is in a court of law charged with a criminal offense;
Dr. Donohue bases his evaluation of Defendant's ability to understand that she is being charged with a criminal offense on the fact that she demanded a lawyer after Sanders confronted her with the alleged fraudulent returns. He surmises that a person aware of the fact that she has the right to an attorney is, thus, aware of the fact she has a criminal charge against her. Dr. Tavani agrees with this assessment, basing her evaluation on Defendant's comments that she "didn't do anything wrong."
Comp. Hrg. Tr. at 170.
The Court agrees with both doctors.
C. Whether she realizes that there is a judge on the bench;
Dr. Donohue bases his evaluation for this third criteria on the previous one. He believes that requesting a lawyer can also mean that there is an understanding of the legal process and, thus that a judge would preside.
Dr. Tavani opines that the statement "God is judge," which Defendant had stated to Dr. Donohue is indicative of a lack of understanding of the court system. She further states that when Defendant was before a magistrate, she referred to the magistrate as a "lady." To Dr. Tavani, this indicates that there is no understanding as to what a judge is or does.
Id. at 171.
The Court disagrees with both doctors. Understanding one needs a lawyer is not an automatic understanding of a judge's role in the process. However, if the statements that "God is judge" and a magistrate is a "lady" are comments which show a lack of understanding of the court system, many Defendants would be deemed incompetent. There is nothing in those words which precludes an understanding of the system.
As it is the State's burden of proof, Dr. Donohue's assessment here does not carry that burden.
D. Whether she understands that there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict her of a criminal charge;
Dr. Donohue again relies upon her statement that she wanted a lawyer to determine she understands the role of the prosecutor. Dr. Tavani hesitantly agrees that Defendant has a partial understanding that she is charged with a crime and, thus, that someone is trying to prove she committed that crime.
The Court, based upon Dr. Tavani's testimony, is unsure as to why the Doctor is hesitant to find this criteria met. It seems very clear to the Court based on both doctors' comment that this criteria is certainly met. Defendant has an understanding that she is in trouble and that someone will try to prove she did something wrong. She requested an attorney to assist her in combating whoever that person might be. E. Whether she understands that she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend her against that charge;
Again, Dr. Donohue argues that Defendant's request for a lawyer presupposes an understanding that this lawyer will defend her. Dr. Tavani, however, stated that, when she interviewed Defendant, she did not even remember she had met with her lawyer. Dr. Tavani also claimed that Defendant did not remember her.
The Court will accept Dr. Donohue's assessment. The Defendant's comments upon apprehension that she was "not talking to [Sanders]" and that she "wanted a lawyer," shows a good understanding that she did not need to fight this fight alone. The Court is aware that Dr. Tavani's comments are not irrelevant. However, the Court agrees with Dr. Donohue that Defendant deliberately did not cooperate with the evaluation and tests which he gave her and believes she was malingering and might very well have been malingering with Dr. Tavani when she claimed she did not know her attorney or the doctor. It is obvious to the Court by watching the Defendant on video and in the courtroom that she does not have the level of dementia which her test scores represent.
F. Whether she knows that she will be expected to tell her lawyer all she knows or remembers about the events involved in the alleged crime;
Dr. Donohue's response to this criteria is a bit puzzling. "I have no reason to think she doesn't know that she is expected to tell her lawyer these things. She did request a lawyer, so probably she wanted to talk to the lawyer about something." The doctor's testimony seems to be a bit cavalier in his assessment. This criteria is most important, in that it goes to the crux of the competency issue. If Defendant is unable to help her attorney, she will not receive due process or an appropriate defense.
Id. at 114.
Dr. Tavani, more appropriately, analyzes Defendant's abilities with regards to her working with an attorney. She believes Defendant does understand the expectation that she is supposed to tell what happened and what she remembers. Dr. Tavani, however, does not believe Defendant has the ability to cooperate with counsel. She claims Defendant becomes frequently upset when confronted with matters she doesn't want to discuss and becomes disruptive.
Despite Sanders' testimony, the Court did not notice any emotional breakdown or disruptive behavior by the Defendant. Of course, the Court also did not observe any meaningful interaction with her attorney. But, this particular criteria is about an ability to appreciate her responsibilities and expectations, not necessarily a willingness to participate in that defense. The Court believes that Defendant can provide information to her attorney, based upon what appears to be an ability to communicate and function within society at a store, a casino and on the roads. G. Whether she understands that there will be a jury present to pass upon the evidence in determining her guilt or innocence;
Dr. Donohue argues that a jury is such a common concept that he inferred Defendant understood what a jury could do. Dr. Tavani respectfully disagreed, stating that Defendant's lack of cognitive skills precluded her from understanding what a jury does.
Whether or not Defendant understands the concept of a jury is unclear to the Court. Dr. Donohue's inference is not well-reasoned. Despite this, however, the Court does not necessarily believe Defendant lacks the cognitive skills to understand what a jury does, as it has already established she has the capacity to understand what a lawyer and prosecutor does.
H. Whether she has sufficient memory to relate answers to questions posed to her;
Because Defendant did not cooperate with her evaluation by Dr. Donohue, he uses his interview with Sanders and his own observations of the video to determine that she possesses an ability to answer questions posed to her.
Dr. Tavani, in her own words, agrees that Defendant "did not cooperate with Dr. Donohue enough to get any meaningful information." She goes on to state that "where she did cooperate, her memory was impaired significantly" and claims that behavior refutes Dr. Donohue's assessment. Surprisingly, Dr. Tavani does not relate to the Court what exactly Defendant did to cooperate and where that showed impairment.
Id. at 175.
Without any real explanation from Dr. Tavani, the Court is unable to refute Dr. Donohue's assessment. Clearly, he was faced with using extraneous interviews and his own perception of the Defendant's behavior on the video, as the Defendant did not cooperate in the evaluation. Moreover, the Court watched the same video that Drs. Donohue and Tavani watched in the courtroom. It is incomprehensible that someone could state unequivocably that Defendant was so impaired that she could not answer questions. While there is no audio on that videotape, the Court is certain that the return process involves dialogue, that the defendant had to respond to questions by the clerk, and that she acted appropriately, although allegedly not truthfully, when asked for a name and address. This shows an understanding and an ability to interact with others and to recall some information which is asked of her.
I. Whether she has established rapport with her lawyer;
Again, Dr. Donohue refers to her request for an attorney, then makes inferences from her interaction with store clerks to state that Defendant has the ability to establish a rapport with her attorney. Dr. Tavani disagrees, stating that she cannot establish rapport "consistently." She cites that when one discusses with Defendant the charges, she "becomes rather deteriorated." Still, she stated that Defendant has "periods where she converses."
Id. at 175.
It is unclear whether the Defendant has established a rapport with her attorney or not. However, from the testimony of Dr. Donahue and even, in part, from Dr. Tavani, it appears that Defendant has the ability to establish a rapport. She certainly has that ability with her family and some of her doctors. It appears to the Court that Defendant chooses with whom she wishes to establish a rapport. Clearly, she did not establish one with Dr. Donohue. But, the Guatney criteria should be considered as one which is pertinent and important to the Defendant in the future, not the past. This case has not yet reached the point in which she must defend herself. Because it is a future-looking criteria, it is not so much whether rapport has been established, but whether it may be established and the Court believes that Defendant can establish a rapport with her attorney and lodge a defense in her case.
J. Whether she can follow the testimony reasonably well;
Both Doctors supply very little testimony as to this criteria. Dr. Donohue completely omits any discussion of this, and Dr. Tavani simply opines that Defendant cannot follow testimony without any further explanation.
The Court must infer from other answers and observed behavior as to whether Defendat could follow testimony. As the Court believes the Defendant is malingering, the Court will find in the affirmative as to this criteria.
K. Whether she has the ability to meet stresses without her rationality or judgment breaking down;
Both Doctors agree that Defendant often breaks down when faced with discussion of these charges. However, Dr. Donohue attributes that to manipulative behavior, stating that this behavior is often seen by him when a patient wishes to avoid a subject. Dr. Tavani attributes this behavior to her cognitive impairment and progressively worsening condition.
The Court observed no hysterical behavior as described by Dr. Tavani. For the most part, Defendant was calm throughout the hearing. Stress does not appear to be a factor in precluding the Defendant from participating in her trial.
L. Whether she has at least minimal contact with reality;
Dr. Tavani agrees with Dr. Donohue that Defendant does have minimal contact with reality. The Court agrees.
M. Whether she has the minimum intelligence necessary to grasp the events taking place;
Both doctors agree that Defendant had an average intelligence at one point, having an IQ of 109. At various points in her past, she possessed the ability to work and to perform various other routine tasks. Dr. Donohue determines that Defendant has this minimum intelligence when he considers the testimony of Sanders and when he reviews the video of the Defendant in the store. Dr. Tavani disagrees, stating that Defendant's progressive dementia limits her intelligence.
The law does not require that the Defendant even have average intelligence, but "minimum intelligence." The Court does not believe that the Defendant's condition has so deteriorated that she is unable to appreciate the events taking place. To protect the Defendant's rights, this criteria is set into place to ensure that the Defendant understands that she is charged with a crime, has the right to defend herself, and the ability to provide answers if she chooses to offer them. Based upon the assessment of many of the criteria above, the Court believes she has such an ability.
N. Whether she can confer coherently with some appreciation of proceedings;
Dr. Donohue states that Defendant's ability to confer with the salesclerk and to respond to Sanders shows an ability to interact with others. Dr. Tavani disagrees. The Court agrees that Defendant has shown recent actions which show a person in touch with reality and able to communicate with others. Again, this requirement is about an ability to do so, not a desire or choice to do so. O. Whether she can both give and receive advice from her attorneys;
Clearly, it is more important for her to have the ability to take advice from counsel, but she must also have the ability to confer with counsel. Dr. Donohue states that he believes her appreciation of the need for an attorney belies an ability to use that attorney's advice. Dr. Tavani states that Defendant "has a track record of not taking advice, " and cites her refusal to heed both Dr. Keys' and her family's advice that she not drive.
Id. at 178.
Once more, this criteria does not go to whether she will or will not take advice but whether she possesses the capacity to do so. The Court has encountered a number of stubborn parties, none of which lacked the capacity, only the will, to heed advice.
The Court finds nothing in the testimony or Defendant's history to preclude her ability to follow the advice of counsel.
P. Whether she can divulge facts without paranoid distress;
Dr. Donohue believes that nothing in his experiences with Defendant or even those experiences of Dr. Keys would suggest paranoia. Dr. Tavani reads Dr. Keys' previous evaluations as suggesting paranoia, however. She stated that Defendant "thinks she is being followed," and that these paranoid thoughts predated her legal issues.
Id. at 118, noting that Dr. Keys did suggest that Defendant believed that people sometimes laughed at her. This did not constitute paranoia to Dr. Donohue.
Id. at 178.
If Dr. Tavani's assertions are correct, then there might be some basis for an assertion that paranoid thoughts might prevent Defendant's ability to divulge facts. However, the Court has been unable to corroborate Dr. Tavani's assertions by reviewing documents within the file or by rereading the transcript. These assertions do not appear to be tied to specific paranoid events. This Court has previously found that a person who has paranoid delusions can still be considered competent to stand trial; therefore, even assuming Dr. Tavani's assertions are completely correct, the Defendant's inability to meet this criteria may not preclude her competency to stand trial.
See, e.g., St. v. Floyd, Order to Determine Competency, ID # 0212002535, (Vavala, C. June 20, 2005).
Q. Whether she can decide upon a plea;
Dr. Donohue testified that Defendant could decide upon a plea. In his analysis, he believed her request for an attorney shows an understanding that she can plead not guilty. Dr. Tavani believed that the concept of a plea was "too complex" for the Defendant. She believed that, if the Defendant agreed to a plea, she would not be doing so in an informed manner.
Comp. Hrg. Tr. at 118.
Id. at 179.
While the Court does not necessarily agree completely with Dr Tavani's evaluation, the Court finds that Dr. Donohue does not provide any substantive reasons for his assessment.
R. Whether she can testify, if necessary;
Dr. Donohue testified that Defendant can testify, citing numerous occasions in her past involving communication with other doctors, security personnel, and store clerks. Dr. Tavani stated that Defendant may try to "have an interchange on the stand, but . . . her propensity to deteriorate . . . would render that effort a useless exercise."
Id. at 118-119.
Id. at 180.
The Court is not satisfied that Defendant is unable to testify. As stated previously, the Court accepts Dr. Donohue's diagnosis of malingering and factitious disorder. With the Court's own eyes, it is apparent that Defendant is able to remain poised and communicate when she wants to.
S. Whether she can make simple decisions; and
Dr. Donohue assesses Defendant as able to make simple decisions, citing her ability to reason that if she continued behaving poorly in Sander's presence, she may be forced to be treated for her illness in a jail setting. He noted that faced with this threat, Defendant improved her behavior, showing some thought process.
Id. at 119.
Dr. Tavani stated clearly that Defendant was able to make simple decisions, although she qualified that because of Defendant's "poor" memory, she may not remember what was explained to her.
Id. at 180.
The Court believes that Defendant does possess this ability, based upon both doctors' assertions, and accepts Dr. Donohue's inferences from Defendant's behavior.
T. Whether she has a desire for justice rather than undeserved punishment.
There was no testimony from either doctor which doubted that the Defendant had a desire to avoid undeserved punishment.
"Determining a defendant's mental competency . . . is a very fact-intensive endeavor." In order for the Court to render a decision on the defendant's incompetency, the Court must look to the totality of the circumstances, evaluating the "aggregate of a defendant's indicia of incompetence. The Court must consider "a full range of circumstances, but is not necessarily bound by any one of them, because the determination of competency is `not susceptible to generalized concepts, or theories, but must be based upon the facts of the particular case.'" Moreover, the threshold for legal competency is low. The State bears the burden of proving the Defendant's competence only by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a sufficient burden of proof because the defendant's competency is at issue, not her guilt or innoncence.
Irving, 2003 WL at *2 (citing Shields, 593 A.2d at 1005).
Shields, 593 A.2d at 1005.
Id., quoting U.S. v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767 (3rd Cir. 1987) (further citations omitted).
Id. at 1012
Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863, (Del. 1986).
Id. at 864, citing U.S. v. Makris, 535 F. 2d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 1976).
Because the burden is only a preponderance of the evidence, the Court was able to look beyond some of the weak testimony of Dr. Donohue and evaluated the import of the video evidence, the Defendant's interaction with Sanders, and her obvious malingering with regards to Dr. Donohue's evaluation. The Court took into consideration all parts of the file, including two conflicting reports by Dr. Kathryn Sheneman, Psy.D., J.D., who first filed an evaluation, stating Defendant "lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct," then an addendum which adopted fully Dr. Donohue's diagnosis of malingering and factitious disorder. The Court believes that this reversal by Dr. Sheneman is important. It is obvious from her first evaluation that she thoroughly researched Defendant's treatment history and spoke with the various doctors who worked with Defendant. Indeed, it is clear that she relied heavily on those interviews. Yet, after consultation with Dr. Donohue, she became convinced that Defendant was malingering.
The first evaluation, conducted on December 20, 2005 and filed on January 4, 2006, found that Defendant met the Delaware standards for Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. However, Dr. Sheneman filed an addendum on June 13, 2006 in which she reversed her opinion and adopted Dr. Donohue's positions.
Similarly, the Court was confronted with a great deal of mental health history and head trauma on the part of the Defendant. But, Dr. Donohue's assertions of malingering, Sanders' testimony, and the video of Defendant making the alleged transactions, overcame any weakness in testimony and the Defendant's assertions that she was cognitively impaired. Also, damaging to the Defendant's case, was the assertion that her behavior on that video was somehow learned behavior and that she came to realize that erasing her name and providing false addresses could be financially beneficial.
The Court holds that the State has met it's burden and that the Defendant is competent to stand trial. It will be up to the judge or jury to determine whether her mental illness should prevent any conviction.
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 62, the parties shall have 10 days after the filing of this order to serve and file written objections to this order to the Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.