Opinion
40703-5-II
01-24-2012
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. MATTHEW RICHARD WHITE, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Armstrong, P.J.
Matthew Richard White appeals his conviction of unlawful imprisonment, arguing that the State provided insufficient evidence to prove his guilt as either a principal or an accomplice. Finding sufficient evidence to support either theory of liability, we affirm.
Facts
In July 2009, 13-year-old S.R. was living with her grandmother, L.B., in Tacoma. A few weeks earlier, S.R. had met 17-year-old P.D. after running away from L.B.'s house. Beginning in early July, S.R. allowed P.D. to live in a shed on her grandmother's property without L.B.'s permission. P.D. then invited White, who was 20 years old, to live in the shed with him. The two would come into L.B.'s house when she left for work and leave before she came home. On the night of July 14, 15-year-old J.D. joined White and P.D. in L.B's shed.
Because juveniles are involved in this matter, we find that some anonymity is appropriate. Accordingly, we use initials to identify the juveniles and any relation to the juveniles.
On July 15, S.R. and her 14-year-old friend C.W. met with White, P.D., and J.D. The group planned to steal L.B.'s purse and car and leave the state. They agreed that they would have to physically subdue L.B. to carry out their plan and discussed tying her up.
Later that day, S.R. and C.W. went shopping with L.B. and S.R.'s mother. Once home, S.R. signaled the group in the shed. As P.D. and J.D. snuck into the house, White walked across the porch. When he stepped inside the sliding door, L.B. asked what he was doing in her house, and White replied that he was there to retrieve a shirt from her granddaughter. S.R. verified his story and went into her bedroom and closed the door. L.B. then saw movement in the hallway and asked who else was there. J.D. and P.D. appeared and struck L.B. on the head and shoulders with kitchen pans.
L.B. tried to move away, but J.D. and P.D. followed her into her bedroom while continuing their attack. White ran toward the bedroom carrying a white cord from the garage and tossed it inside. He also ripped L.B.'s phone out of the wall. J.D. then tied L.B. up with the cord and some tape.
After subduing L.B., the five loaded bags of stolen property into her car, and White drove them away. L.B. was able to free herself and seek help from a neighbor. When a Forks police officer noticed L.B.'s car early the next morning, he ran the license plate, discovered the car was stolen, and arrested its occupants.
The State charged White by amended information with first degree robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, first degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon, unlawful imprisonment, and second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission. The State also added an enhancement for gang activity to the robbery and assault charges.
S.R., J.D., and P.D. testified for the State, as did L.B., her daughter, and several law enforcement officers. The jury found White guilty on all counts except first degree assault, convicting him instead of the lesser included offense of second degree assault. The jury also found that White or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery and the assault, but it rejected the gang enhancement.
At sentencing, the State conceded to the dismissal of White's assault conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court imposed a mid-range sentence of 63 months for the robbery conviction and concurrent sentences of 19.5 months for the unlawful imprisonment and 38 months for the motor vehicle conviction, plus 24 months for the deadly weapon enhancement. White now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his unlawful imprisonment conviction.
Analysis
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Walton, 64 Wn.App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992).
The trial court instructed the jury that to convict White of unlawful imprisonment, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about July 15, 2009, he or an accomplice restrained L.B.'s movements in a manner that substantially interfered with her liberty; that such restraint was accomplished by physical force, intimidation, or deception; that such restraint was without legal authority; that White or an accomplice acted knowingly; and that these acts occurred in Washington. The court also instructed the jury that a person acts with knowledge respecting a fact, circumstance, or result when he is aware of that fact, circumstance, or result, adding that "[i]f a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, " the jury may find that he acted with knowledge of that fact. Clerk's Papers at 102.
White does not dispute that L.B. was unlawfully restrained, but he does argue that the evidence is insufficient to show that he participated in that restraint as either a principal or an accomplice. As support for this argument, he cites testimony showing that he objected to the planned assault, stayed in the yard, and did not participate in L.B.'s assault or imprisonment.
There is additional evidence, however, that White was part of the plan to restrain and rob L.B., that he distracted her to help J.D. and P.D. get inside, that he furnished the cord used to tie up L.B., and that he ripped her phone out of the wall. As stated, we defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony and witness credibility. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is evidence sufficient to prove that White knowingly acted to physically restrain L.B. by furnishing the cord used to tie her up, and that he knowingly impeded her liberty further by removing her ability to call for help.
Even if this evidence does not establish White's culpability as a principal, it is more than sufficient to prove that he acted as an accomplice. A person is an accomplice if he knowingly "solicits, commands, encourages, or requests" the commission of a crime, or if he aids in planning or committing a crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3); In re Welfare of Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979). A defendant is not guilty as an accomplice unless he has associated with and participated in the crime as something he wished to happen and which he sought by his acts to make succeed. State v. Luna, 71 Wn.App. 755, 759, 862 P.2d 620 (1993). Mere presence at the scene of a crime, even if coupled with assent to it, is not sufficient to prove complicity. Luna, 71 Wn.App. at 759. An accomplice need not have the same state of mind as a principal, but he must know that his actions will encourage or promote the principal's commission of the crime. State v. LaRue, 74 Wn.App. 757, 762, 875 P.2d 701 (1994). A person is not an accomplice if he terminates his complicity before the crime's commission and either warns the authorities or makes a good faith effort to prevent the crime. RCW 9A.08.020(5)(b).
Here, there was evidence that White participated in planning the robbery and knew that it would include restraining L.B. There is additional evidence that he assisted J.D. and P.D. in entering the house, that he furnished the cord J.D. used to tie up L.B., and that he ripped L.B.'s phone from the wall to prevent her from calling for help. Instead of withdrawing from the crime by warning the authorities or by trying to prevent it, White acted to make it succeed. The evidence is more than sufficient to show that White acted as an accomplice to L.B.'s unlawful imprisonment.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur: Hunt, J., Johanson, J.