Without an agreement evidencing Swift's intent to pay the court costs and attorney fees, we find Swift is not responsible for the costs and attorney fees associated with the dismissed charges. See State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1991) (holding "that the provisions of Iowa Code section 815.13 and section 910.2 clearly require, where the plea agreement is silent regarding the payment of fees and costs, that only such fees and costs attributable to the charge on which a criminal defendant is convicted should be recoverable under a restitution plan"); see also State v. Goad, No. 13-1319, 2014 WL 2885036, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014) (reversing court costs taxed by the district court for dismissed charges); State v. Wheeler, No. 11-0827, 2012 WL 3026274, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 25, 2012) (reversing the district court's assessment of court costs to the defendant for dismissed charges). We reverse the district court's assessment of court courts and attorney fees for Swift's dismissed charges.

This is not Wheeler's first time posing this argument to us. See State v. Wheeler, No. 11–0827, 2012 WL 3026274, at *2 (Iowa Ct.App. July 25, 2012).Recently, sections of chapter 625 have been found to be applicable to criminal actions, and there is no distinguishing language between these sections and sections 625.9 and 625.14. See, e.g., Dudley, 766 N.W.2d at 624 (applying Iowa Code § 625.8(2) to a criminal case); State v. Basinger, 721 N.W.2d 783, 785–86 (Iowa 2006) (finding Iowa Code section 625.8 regarding jury and court reporter fees applicable to criminal defendants); State v. McFarland, 721 N.W.2d 793, 794–95 (same); but see City of Cedar Rapids v. Linn County, 267 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 1978) (concluding Iowa Code section 625.1, authorizing taxation of costs to the losing party “provides authority for taxing costs in civil cases only”).