Opinion
No. 3-089 / 02-1140.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, ROBERT F. SHIMANEK, Magistrate.
The State seeks discretionary review of a magistrate's ruling setting aside guilty pleas to simple misdemeanors. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, David Thompson, County Attorney, and Anthony Janney, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark Mossman of Mossman Mossman, L.L.P., Vinton, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
The State seeks discretionary review of a magistrate's ruling setting aside guilty pleas to simple misdemeanors. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The State charged adult high school students Benjamin Dahl and John Westergard with possession of an alcoholic beverage under the age of 21 and interference with official acts, both simple misdemeanors. See Iowa Code §§ 123.47, 719.1(1) (2001). The boys appeared without counsel, pled guilty, and were ordered to pay a fine of $100 on each charge.
Four days after judgment and sentencing, the boys, through counsel, filed motions to set aside the guilty pleas. Dahl's motion only challenged the plea to the interference charge. He alleged 1) he did not have the opportunity to consult with his parents or with counsel before entering his plea and now believed he had a "good faith defense to the charge," 2) the plea should be set aside in the "interest of justice," and 3) the complaint alleged the wrong date, requiring dismissal of the charge. Westergard challenged both of his pleas. He also cited the absence of an opportunity to consult with his parents or counsel and asserted he had a good faith defense to the charges and "may, in fact, not be guilty of any criminal offense." Like Dahl, he sought to set aside the guilty pleas "in the interest of justice."
Following an unreported hearing, a magistrate granted the motions and the State sought discretionary review. The Iowa Supreme Court granted the application and stayed further district court proceedings pending disposition of the discretionary review action.
II. Authority to Set Aside Guilty Pleas
The State argues the magistrate lacked authority to set aside the simple misdemeanor guilty pleas following entry of judgment and sentence on those pleas. We agree.
The magistrate noted that "[t]here is nothing in Iowa law which gives a solid procedure for the withdrawal of a guilty plea to a simple misdemeanor." Cf. State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1994) (essentially agreeing with this proposition but, in a case involving an indictable offense, declining to adopt federal guidelines for considering plea withdrawal requests). In setting aside the pleas, the magistrate therefore relied on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.74, authorizing new trials. Our highest court, however, has held that the rule on new trial motions is not a vehicle for challenging a guilty plea because it presupposes a prior trial. State v. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Iowa 1990). There was no prior trial here, so this method of attacking the guilty plea was foreclosed, and the magistrate lacked authority to set aside the pleas.
The rule states:
The magistrate, on motion of a defendant, may grant a new trial pursuant to the grounds set forth in rule 2.24, except that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be made within six months after the final judgment. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within seven days after a finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the seven-day period.
Although Alexander did not involve a misdemeanor, we believe the court's reasoning applies with equal force to a misdemeanor.
The defendants' proper remedy was a postconviction relief proceeding. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d at 423; Wenck v. State, 320 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa 1982).
We find it unnecessary to address the parties' remaining arguments. We reverse the magistrate's decision and remand for reinstatement of the simple misdemeanor convictions.