California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995). As noted in State ex rel. Carper v. W. Va. Parole Bd., 509 S.E.2d 864, 869 (W. Va. 1998), "a 'setoff' is a term used to describe the time until the next parole review is given by a parole board when it denies parole to a prisoner[.]" Before July 10, 1997, the West Virginia parole review statute, which was then codified in West Virginia Code § 62-12-13(a)(5), provided that "the [Parole] [B]oard shall at least once a year reconsider and review the case of every prisoner so eligible."

"This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart." State ex rel. Carper v. West Virginia, Parole Bd., 203 W. Va. 583, 590 n. 6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 n. 6 (1998). In other words, we may "interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees."

In that regard, it is well established in our precedents that this Court has the authority to "interpret [the West Virginia] Constitution to require higher standards of protection than afforded by comparable federal constitutional standards," Pauley v. Kelly , 162 W. Va. 672, 679, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1979) (internal citation omitted); see alsoState v. Mullens , 221 W. Va. 70, 89, 650 S.E.2d 169, 188 (2007) (" ‘This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart.’ State ex rel. Carper v. West Virginia Parole Bd., 203 W.Va. 583, 590 n. 6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 n. 6 (1998). In other words, we may ‘interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees.’

Syllabus Point 3, Donley v. Bracken, 192 W.Va. 383, 452 S.E.2d 699 (1994). State ex rel. Carper v. W. Va. Parole Bd. , 203 W. Va. 583, 586, 509 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1998).

the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal punishment of chronic alcoholics for public intoxication held unconstitutional); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Bonham, 173 W. Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 501 (1984); Queen v. W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 179 W. Va. 95, 106, 365 S.E.2d 375, 386 (1987) ("It is not yet clear just what the federal courts will determine to be adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, and we, of course, reserve our option to extend broader protections to workers than the federal courts may require."); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Neuman, 179 W. Va. 580, 581, 371 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1988) ("The West Virginia Constitution, art. III, § 10, provides a criminal defendant a level of due process protection at least equal to that provided through the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and may, in certain circumstances, require higher standards of protection."); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Osakalumi, 194 W Va. 758, 461 S.E.2d 504 (1995); State ex rel. Carper v. W. Va. Parole Board, 203 W. Va. 583, 590 & n.6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 & n.6 (1998) ("This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart."); State v. Mullens, 221 W. Va. 70, 89, 650 S.E.2d 169, 188 (2007) ("we may interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees") (internal citation omitted). In a scholarly article in the West Virginia Law Review, the late Justice Thomas B. Miller reviewed this Court's precedents and found two common analytical strands in the relevant cases.

eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal punishment of chronic alcoholics for public intoxication held unconstitutional); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Bonham , 173 W. Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 501 (1984) ; Queen v. W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 179 W. Va. 95, 106, 365 S.E.2d 375, 386 (1987) ("It is not yet clear just what the federal courts will determine to be adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, and we, of course, reserve our option to extend broader protections to workers than the federal courts may require."); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Neuman , 179 W. Va. 580, 581, 371 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1988) ("The West Virginia Constitution, art. III, § 10, provides a criminal defendant a level of due process protection at least equal to that provided through the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and may, in certain circumstances, require higher standards of protection."); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Osakalumi , 194 W Va. 758, 461 S.E.2d 504 (1995) ; State ex rel. Carper v. W. Va. Parole Board , 203 W. Va. 583, 590 & n.6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 & n.6 (1998) ("This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart."); State v. Mullens , 221 W. Va. 70, 89, 650 S.E.2d 169, 188 (2007) ("we may interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees") (internal citation omitted). In a scholarly article in the West Virginia Law Review, the late Justice Thomas B. Miller reviewed this Court's precedents and found two common analytical strands in the relevant cases.

"This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart." State ex rel. Carper v. West Virginia Parole Bd ., 203 W.Va. 583, 590 n. 6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 n. 6 (1998). In other words, we may "interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees."

"This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart." State ex rel. Carper v. West Virginia Parole Bd., 203 W.Va. 583, 590 n. 6, 509 S.E.2d 864, 871 n. 6 (1998). In other words, we may "interpret state constitutional guarantees in a manner different than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted comparable federal constitutional guarantees."

Therefore, unless this Court addresses the matter, the Carper violation could be repeated by the Parole Board thus again escaping appellate review. Mr. Stollings contends that this Court's decision in State ex rel. Carper v. West Virginia Parole Bd., 203 W. Va. 583, 509 S.E.2d 864 (1998), required the Parole Board to set out findings as to why two years would have to pass before he could have another parole hearing. We agree.

On September 1, 1998, the petitioner filed the instant petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, alleging that the West Virginia Parole Board was violating federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. On December 14, 1998, this Court issued its opinion in Carper v. West Virginia Parole Board, 203 W. Va. 583, 509 S.E.2d 864 (1998). Carper upheld the constitutionality of the 1997 amendment to W. Va. Code, 62-12-13(a)(5), provided the statute is applied with certain procedural and constitutional protections.