" Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d at 199-200 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 55 In State v. Weeks, 681 A.2d 86 (N.H. 1996), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered the defendant's challenge to a prior misdemeanor stalking conviction on the ground that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Weeks, 681 A.2d at 89.

As in Massachusetts, see Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Ct., 442 Mass. 228, 241 & n.15, 812 N.E.2d 895 (2004), New Hampshire recognizes no right to appointed counsel in a criminal proceeding in which there is no possibility of incarceration. State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 250, 681 A.2d 86 (1996). Accord State v. Westover, 140 N.H. 375, 377–379, 666 A.2d 1344 (1995).

In a footnote, the Johnson court noted that at least eleven jurisdictions had adopted the Custis framework. See id. at 1275 n. 7 (citing Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–70 (2006); People v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601, 606 (Colo.1995) (en banc); State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai'i 219, 74 P.3d 575, 580, 582 (2003); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314, 318–20 (2004); State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1995); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky.1994); People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (1994); State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (1996); State v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760, 761 (N.D.1999); State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358, 360, 362–64 (2002); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 532, 535 (2000)). Some state cases go somewhat beyond the Custis approach in their application of state law.

A strong majority of the states that have analyzed uncounseled misdemeanor convictions under their state constitutional rights to counsel and due process have declined to forge new and different ground. See, e.g., State v. Thrasher, 783 So.2d 103, 105-06 (Ala. 2000) (due process clause); State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 899 P.2d 1042, 1045-47 (1995) (state constitution generally); State v. Cook, 706 A.2d 603, 604-05 (Me. 1998) (due process); People v. Reichenbach, 459 Mich. 109, 587 N.W.2d 1, 4-7 (1998) (right to counsel); State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 681 A.2d 86, 88-89 (1996) (right to counsel and due process); State v. Woodruff, 124 N.M. 388, 951 P.2d 605, 616 (1997) (due process); State v. Porter, 164 Vt. 515, 671 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1996) (right to counsel and due process); State ex rel. Webb v. McCarty, 208 W.Va. 549, 542 S.E.2d 63, 67 (2000) (right to counsel). Those states that have parted ways with the majority appear to have done so because the right-to-counsel guarantee in their state constitutions is worded more broadly than our article I, section 10.

A suspended sentence may be revoked “upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a violation of the condition upon which the sentence was suspended.” State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 251, 681 A.2d 86 (1996). When, as here, the condition was to be of good behavior, the State's burden of proof is satisfied “either by establishing the fact of a criminal conviction for the acts which constitute the violation or by proof of the commission of the underlying acts.”

At least eleven states have adopted, expressly or implicitly, the Custis framework. See Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–70 (2006); State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai‘i 219, 74 P.3d 575, 582 (2003); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314, 319–20 (2004); State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1995); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky.1994); People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (1994); State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (1996); State v. Mund, 1999 ND 90, ¶¶ 8–10, 593 N.W.2d 760; State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶ 28, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528; see also People v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601, 606 (Colo.1995) (applying the Custis restriction as a matter of federal constitutional law in the discretionary sentencing context, as opposed to in the context of mandatory sentencing enhancements); State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358, 360, 362–64 (2002) (discussing Custis and holding that, when not based on a violation of the right to counsel, collateral challenges to a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence may not be brought during sentencing proceedings, but may be brought in a post-conviction proceeding based on the enhanced sentence).

Other state courts have similarly held that the revocation of a suspended sentence is analogous to the revocation of probation. Johnson v. State, 753 So.2d 449 (Miss.Ct.App. 1999); State v. Weeks, 681 A.2d 86 (N.H. 1996); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 681 A.2d 219 (Pa.Super. 1996); Holden v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 492 (Va.Ct.App. 1998); State v. Nelson, 697 P.2d 579 (Wash. 1985).

Because the issues raised involve only New Hampshire law, we decide this case on state law only, considering cases from the federal courts only as an analytical aid. See State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 249 (1996). The New Hampshire constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to our decision are as follows:

Many states have recognized that constitutional considerations do not require courts to entertain collateral attacks on prior convictions used for enhancement purposes unless the defendant claims the predicate conviction was uncounseled. See State v. Johnson, 38 A.3d 1270, 1278 (Me.2012); Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–70 (2006); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314, 319–20 (2004); State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai‘i 219, 74 P.3d 575, 582–83 (2003); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 535 (2000); State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917, 926–27 (1999); State v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760, 761–62 (N.D.1999); State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (1996); State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1995); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky.1994), People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (1994). In contrast, a smaller number of states have examined Custis and explicitly declined to adopt the reasoning based on an interpretation that the state's constitution offers greater protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution.

Thus, no separate analysis is necessary under the United States Constitution, and we consider cases from the federal courts only as an analytical aid. State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 249, 681 A.2d 86, 88 (1996). In Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 176-77, 304 A.2d 647, 648-49 (1973), we held that the due process requirements set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), for the revocation of parole are applicable to revocations of probation and suspended sentences.