In a footnote, the Johnson court noted that at least eleven jurisdictions had adopted the Custis framework. See id. at 1275 n. 7 (citing Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–70 (2006); People v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601, 606 (Colo.1995) (en banc); State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai'i 219, 74 P.3d 575, 580, 582 (2003); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314, 318–20 (2004); State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1995); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky.1994); People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (1994); State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (1996); State v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760, 761 (N.D.1999); State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358, 360, 362–64 (2002); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 532, 535 (2000)). Some state cases go somewhat beyond the Custis approach in their application of state law.

" Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d at 199-200 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 55 In State v. Weeks, 681 A.2d 86 (N.H. 1996), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered the defendant's challenge to a prior misdemeanor stalking conviction on the ground that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Weeks, 681 A.2d at 89.