Opinion
No. 0505007388.
Submitted: September 18, 2006.
Decided: October 23, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Aquitall DENIED.
This 23rd day of October, 2006, upon consideration of defendant Latoria N. Webb's motion for judgment of acquittal, it appears to the Court that:
1. Latoria N. Webb ("Webb") was charged with Trafficking in Heroin ("Count I"), Possession with Intent to Deliver Heroin ("Count II"), Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine ("Count III"), Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana ("Count IV"), Use of a Dwelling for Keeping of Controlled Substances ("Count V"), Conspiracy in the Second Degree ("Count VI"), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia ("Count VII"). On August 11, 2006, Webb was found guilty by a jury for Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII. The jury found her not guilty for Counts III and IV. Essentially, the jury found the defendant guilty for those counts that related to a quantity of packaged heroin found in a bedroom at 219 North Van Buren Street ("heroin bedroom"), and found her not guilty for those counts that related to quantities of cocaine and marijuana found in a different bedroom at that same location ("cocaine/marijuana bedroom").
See Docket 32; Docket 33.
2. On August 22, 2006, Webb filed the instant motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 29 ("Rule 29"). She argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction because the only evidence that distinguished the heroin bedroom from the cocaine/marijuana bedroom was that two pieces of paper bearing Webb's name along with an expired KB Toy Store identification card also bearing Webb's name, which was found inside a bag containing the packaged heroin, were located in the heroin bedroom. Webb notes that the State offered no evidence regarding how the KB Toy Store identification card came to be placed inside the bag, who had placed it there, and when it had been placed in the bag. Webb also explains that the State offered no evidence regarding when Webb was last present at 219 North Van Buren Street prior to the execution of the search warrant on March 10, 2005. Lastly, Webb contends the jury was merely speculating as to whether she did anything "knowingly" as that term was used in the jury instructions.
Rule 29 provides in pertinent part: "(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury."
See Docket 32.
3. The State responds by first arguing that Webb's motion fails procedurally because she did not file it within seven days from the jury's verdict as required under Rule 29. In the alternative, the State contends that Webb's motion should also be denied because the prosecution offered sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a conviction. In its brief, the State specifically points to a whole host of evidence that was offered at trial which would support a jury finding that the heroin bedroom belonged to Webb and that she possessed, or had control over, everything in her room; including the bag containing the heroin. The State further maintains that it was not required to prove how Webb's identification card came to be placed inside the heroin bag, who had placed it there, and when it had been placed in the bag; nor is the State required to put a time or date as to Webb's whereabouts on or before the search warrant was executed. In sum, the State argues that the jury consciously reviewed the evidence presented, drew all reasonable inferences, and determined Webb was guilty of the charges.
See Docket 33.
4. Although it appears that Webb's motion fails procedurally because she did not file it within seven days of the jury's verdict as required under Rule 29, the Court will nonetheless consider the substantive merits of her motion.
5. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a judgment of acquittal, the standard is settled and straightforward[.]" It is "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, `any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Johnson, 1999 WL 458627, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 29, 1999).
Seldomridge v. State, 1997 WL 168338, at *1 (Del. Mar. 31, 1997) (quoting Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1170 (Del. 1990)).
6. In applying that standard to this case, the Court finds that, based upon the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could have concluded that Webb was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII. In making this finding, the Court relies upon the following evidence that the State maintains was introduced at trial: evidence that Webb listed 219 North Van Buren Street (the location where the heroin was found) with several government agencies; evidence that Webb changed her address shortly after her arrest for these charges; testimony from Webb's sister that Webb resided at this address; evidence that a female and a small child occupied the heroin bedroom at this address; evidence that the heroin bedroom contained women's and children's clothing; evidence that Webb has a five-year-old child; evidence of receipts containing Webb's name and address which were found in the heroin bedroom; and the introduction of the heroin bag which contained the heroin and Webb's identification card. This evidence is clearly enough for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the heroin bedroom belonged to Webb and that she possessed, or had control over, the heroin bag.
See Docket 33.
7. Webb's contentions that the State should have proved how her identification card came to be placed inside the heroin bag, who had placed it there, and when it had been placed in the bag, as well as her contention that the jury was merely speculating when determining whether she acted "knowingly," are unconvincing. These contentions are merely conclusory as Webb offers no support nor, at the very least, any explanation for why the State was required to prove such specific information or how the jury's deliberation on the "knowingly" standard was in any way speculative. The Court finds no validity in these claims and therefore concludes that they are devoid of merit.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the Court is satisfied that a rational jury could have found Webb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes for which she was convicted. Accordingly, Webb's motion for judgment of acquittal is DENIED.