Opinion
I.D. Nos. 9702013762 9907017204
Submitted: August 21, 2000
Decided October 2, 2000
UPON DEFENDANT'S PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 2nd day of October, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief it appears to this Court that:
1. William J. Webb Jr. (Defendant) has filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Defendant alleges that his conviction is the result of 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) "odium"; and 3) "defrauding of plea agreement-sentence". For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. Defendant was arrested on July 26, 1999 for Assault First Degree, Burglary First Degree, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. On March 16, 2000 Defendant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(B). Defendant plead guilty to Assault First Degree (Cr.A. # IN 99-08-2482), Burglary First Degree (Cr.A.#IN 99-08-0767), and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Cr.A.# IN 99-08-0768). The State agreed to recommend no more than twenty years of prison at Level V.
On June 23, 2000 Defendant was sentenced by this Court to 12 years of Level 5 imprisonment for Burglary First Degree, suspended after serving 5 years for 7 years at Level 4, suspended after serving 1 year at Level 4, followed by Level 3 or Level 2 probation. On the Assault First Degree charge Defendant was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment at Level 5, suspended after serving 24 months at Level 5 followed by 6 months at Level 3 or Level 2. On the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child Defendant was sentenced to 12 months at Level 5 suspended for 12 months at Level 2 probation. Additionally, Defendant was found guilty of Violation of Probation for which he was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment at Level 5.
On August 21, 2000 Defendant filed the instant Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging three (3) grounds.
3. Before addressing the merits of any claim raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified." Claims for postconviction relief, which are entirely conclusory, may be summarily dismissed on that basis.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4). See e.g., Jordan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1994, Walsh, J. (Aug. 25, 1994) (ORDER); State v. Brittingham, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (Dec. 29, 1994) (ORDER) at 3 ( citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556) (holding that conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to warrant postconviction relief).
4. Ground one of Defendant's motion is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must show both (a) that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (b) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different." Since Defendant must prove both prongs in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, failure to prove either prong will render the claim unsuccessful. Defendant must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that when setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at page 3.
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1998) ( quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972).
State v. Mason, Del. Supr., Cr. A. No. IN93-02-0279-RI, Barron, J. (April 11, 1996) (Mem. Op.) at 7.
Defendant has not made the requisite showing as to the first prong. Defendant's allegation that "my attorney, Edward Pankowski, refused to assist-work [sic] for any type of justice on my behalf by lying to me about my questions of law and various part's [sic] of my indictment and that he was working with the prosecutor and going to add names to my plea agreement after I signed" is conclusory.
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at page 3.
5. Defendant's second ground asserts "Odium". To explain "odium," Defendant further alleges that, "[t]he hatred from the victim, the State, Edward Pankowski, and the court's refusal to acknowledge the injustice against me in many ways is suggesting that I am not entitled to any type of fair hearing at all." Defendant offers no other facts to support this claim. This brief allegation is conclusory.
"The state or fact of being hated. A state of disgrace. usually resulting from detestable conduct. Hatred or strong aversion accompanied by loathing or contempt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107-1108 (7th ed. 1999).
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction relief at page 3.
6. Defendant's third ground asserts "Defrauding of plea agreement-sentence." Defendant merely alleges that the State "defrauded the Superior Court in saying that it was going to recommend no more than 20 years at Level 5, but [at sentencing] the State recommended 28 years at Level 5." This allegation is also conclusory.
Id.
7. Defendant's above allegations of "ineffective assistance of counsel," "odium," and "defrauding the Superior Court of plea-agreement-sentence" are all completely conclusory. Defendant proffers no factual support for the allegations. The Court finds these contentions vague and entirely conclusory. warranting summary dismissal.
8. For the reasons stated, Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.